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-After the demise of the Cold War the Arctic has been 
emerging as a scene for increasing scientific, environmental 
and economic cooperation between governments. At the same 
time contacts have been growing among indigeneous peoples, 
indicating an increased recognition of common interests and 
appreciation of common efforts. 
In the military sphere, though, the Arctic remains in the 
shadow of the military confrontation and competition of the 
Cold war. Russia maintains massive nuclear and conventional 
forces in the region, and the United States and United 
Kingdom continue to operate their attack submarines beneath 
the Arctic ice. Polar navigation provides shorter air routes and 
motivates elaborate air warning and air defence activities on 
both sides, and Moscow has made the Arctic island of Novaya 
Zemlya its sole nuclear weapons testing site. 
This study is aimed at describing these strategic interests in 
the High North, focussing on their implications for the states 
which are located in the High North. It also tries to identify 
those Arms Control or Confidence Building Measures which 
might be beneficial to enhance stability in the area. 
The term High North has been deliberately chosen to deno-
minate the area under scrutiny since this includes all of what 
is officially designated as the Arctic; but also the adjacent seas 
and northern regions. of the countries which are affected. by the 
strategic interests in the area. Due to the origin of the study 
its has been natural to concentrate on the strategic implications 
for Norway and for the nordic region. However the study is 
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of general value to all readers interested in the overall military 
strategic importance of the Arctic. 
The study has been produced at the time of great and conti-
nuing changes in the fonner Soviet Union, and this has in turn 
had a profound effect on the development of the European 
security arrangements as well as their Atlantic connection. The 
aim of the study has, however, remained to give a presentation 
of the implications for the Arctic and the circumpolar states if 
there is continued strategic competition between the United 
States and the successors of the USSR. 
We wish to express our gratitude to 0yvind Gfl!ndahl for his 
help in doing the final editing of the manuscript. 
Oslo, April 1992 
Tfl)nne Huitfeldt 
Tomas Ries 
Gunvald 0yna 
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l. The Arctic Area 
The Arctic region is, for most of those who live outside it, 
largely ignored. On the commonly used maps of the world the 
Arctic constitutes a border to nothingness, fading off the 
northern periphery of the map and appearing to lead nowhere, 
while in our daily lives the relative lack of news about the 
Arctic also tends to let it drift into obscurity. 
On the whole this ignorance of the Arctic is understandable, 
since human activity in the area is relatively marginal com-
pared to other parts of the world. However the Arctic none-
theless merits more general attention than it has received 
hitherto. This is so for two reasons. In the first place because 
it does play a vital - if largely overlooked - part in the 
strategic nuclear relationship between the US and the former 
USSR. And secondly because the development of human 
technology, combined with the continuous endeavour to 
expand our exploitation of the natural resources of the globe, 
are making the Arctic into a major potential area of human 
economic activity. 
Definition and Geographical Area 
The Arctic covers the land- and sea-areas surrounding the 
North Pole. However there is no commonly accepted definition 
of its southern border-line. Historically, the Polar circle, at 
latitude 66" 33' N, has been used as a border-line. In more 
recent years the Arctic has been defined as the area north of 
the 1 O"C isotherm.' This area tangents the north coast of 
Norway, passes over Iceland and sweeps south close to 50" 
North at Labrador, including the northern coast of Canada, and 
swings once more south to 50" North covering the Aleutian 
Islands and the Bering Strait, and finally enclosing the 
northern coast of Siberia.2 
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The land areas in the Arctic belong to the states which either 
border on the Arctic directly or else possess areas within the 
Arctic. The USA and Russia both cover large Arctic land 
masses, the USA becoming a true Arctic nation in buying 
Alaska from Russia in 1867.' Canada has special economic 
and sovereignty interests in the Arctic due to her Arctic 
archipelago and long coast stretching into the Arctic waters. 
Denmarlc: is involved in the Arctic through her possession of 
Greenland. Both Norway and Iceland have strong historical 
links to the Arctic, while today's interests are mainly linked 
to fisheries in the cold waters. Norway also has sovereignty 
over the Spitzbergen group of islands, where the 40 partners 
to the 1925 Treaty have equal rights to potential economic 
resources. 
The Arctic coastal states are Canada, USA, Russia, Denmark 
(Greenland), Iceland and Norway. The two remaining circum-
polar nations, Sweden and Finland, have a part of their 
mainland located north of Latitude 66• 33' N, but like Norway 
prefer to consider their northern regions as integral parts of 
their mainland and not as belonging to the more desolate 
Arctic. 
Large areas of the Arctic are covered by water. The frozen 
Arctic Polar Basin and the rim seas form the Arctic Ocean. 
Listed from the Norwegian Sea westwards, these include the 
Greenland Sea, the Wandel Sea, the Lincoln Sea, the Beaufort 
Sea, the Chukchi Sea, the East -Siberian Sea, the Laptev Sea, 
the Kara Sea and finally the Barents Sea. The Polar Basin 
itself is divided into two main parts (the American-Asian and 
the Euro-Asian Basin) by a submerged ridge, the Lomonosov 
ridge, stretching north from Novosibirskije Ostrova towards 
Greenland. 
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Climatic Conditions 
The temperature over the central parts of the Arctic is 
relatively stable due to the large masses of water transferring 
a constant amount of heat During the winter, the temperature 
in the air can reach -35°C, while it in the summer can touch 
Q°C. The temperature further south in the Arctic can reach 
l0°C during mid-summer. Due to the large masses of water 
fog is dominant during summer, in particnlar in costal areas 
and over open waters. The Arctic does not receive much rain, 
especially not in the central parts of the area. This is mainly 
caused by the low temperatures preventing the air from 
holding moisture, causing small amounts of precipitation. The 
downwinds can be very hard close to the ground and in areas 
where the glaciers meet the mountains. 
The Arctic is known for its special light conditions, total 
darkness with occasional Aurora Borealis during winter and 24 
hours of daylight during summer, reinforced by reflections 
from the vast snow- and ice-covered landscape. The special 
light conditions influence all activities in the Arctic, both 
civilian and ·military. 
Furthermore, the climatic conditions in the Arctic are to a 
large degree dominated by the large amount of water flowing 
to the other oceans. The Gulf-stream carries warm water to the 
Norwegian coast where it splits into two main streams. One 
flows along the western coast of Spitsbergen and the other 
brings warm water into the Barents Sea. The Arctic Ocean 
also receives warm water through the Bering Strait. These 
currents of warm water also have another effect, of particular 
importance for military operations. As the temperature in the 
water gradually decreases the cold water sinks. These tempera-
ture differences combine with the varying levels of salinity to 
form distinct layers in the water. These layers reflect sound 
differently, affecting the use of sonar and other passive 
instruments. This is of major importance in submarine warfare. 
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The major part of the Arctic Ocean is covered by ice, but the 
ice-front varies with the season, causing the rim-seas to be 
free of ice for a period during the summer months. However, 
large areas of the Arctic Ocean and surrounding seas are 
covered by floating ice-rafts and icebergs making both surface 
and sub-surface traffic hazardous. Due to wind and subsurface 
streams, the rafts can be moved into vertical positions, making 
surface formations of 20 to 30 meters or more. These obstac-
les make surface movements difficult. The ice itself affects 
navigation in two ways. Firstly, the ice can have draughts or 
keels more than 100 meters deep under the surface of the sea 
itself, therefore, io shallow waters the ice-conditions are of 
great importance for both offensive and defensive submarine-
operations. The submariner will need accurate and constantly 
updated maps, including the ice-conditions. In a worst case he 
could be forced to use active sonar to avoid being trapped in 
a "death valley" caused by the floating icebergs. Moreover 
important straits, such as the Bering strait, can be blocked by 
ice during the winter, making transit impossible.• Hence io 
Arctic submarine-operations, the ice-conditions in itself is an 
important but variable factor. Secondly, the ice creates special 
accoustic environments, due to reflection and the above 
mentioned layers io the water. Furthermore icebergs breaking 
loose from the ice as well as floating icebergs create noise, 
hampering accoustic surveillance. Both of these factors are 
distinct for Arctic operations, and of special importance in 
Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW). Moreover the ice makes 
airbOrne ASW-operations difficult or impossible. 
As regards the transmission of sound, the ice changes the 
noise background and the behavior of sound in the sea under 
the ice. In general, the sound will be refracted from its source 
upwards, but as it reaches the ice-covered surface, it will be 
reflected downwards again, a process which can be repeated 
several times. This process can scatter the sound, reducing the 
detection range of for example a submarine. Furthermore, the 
condition of the undersurface of the ice (and in shallow waters 
the seabed) will influence the reflection, a smooth subsurface 
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reflecting the sound better than a surface made of rough, old 
ice. In addition, the detection range varies according to the 
frequency of the sound, and the depth of the waters. In 
conclusion, detection of noise is possible at .greater ranges in 
deep waters than in ice-covered shallow waters, and shortest 
io shallow, ice-free waters.' · 
Until now, the major part of the Arctic resources have been 
protected by the cold climate itself, furthermore, resources 
have been available in other parts of the world, exploitable at 
a lower cost and with less techoical koow-how. The Arctic 
resources can in general terms be split in the resources 
available in the sea itself, minerals, oil and gas-resources 
located both on land and under the Arctic seabed. As for the 
resources located in the sea, Arctic fisheries and hunting of 
Arctic species have been going on for centuries. However the 
efficiency of modem trawler fleets and the use of modern 
transport in the Arctic have raised a new dimension to these 
resources; the need for international agreements protecting the 
future existence of the Arctic species. The need for ioter-
national agreements and co-operation are important factors 
with regard to the Arctic resources. 
The need for co-operation with regard to the conservation of 
Arctic resources may be necessary in another area as well, 
namely io the techoological context. Russia needs to accelerate 
the extraction of oil and gas resources in the Barents Sea and 
the Russian shelf as the West Siberian oil fields are expected 
to dry up by the end of the century. However Russian 
techoology is not yet fully capable of deep sea drilling. 
Transport and Lines of Communication 
Transport and communication in the Arctic can broadly be 
divided in communication over land, that is over ice- and 
snow-covered areas, surface or subsurface traffic io the water 
15 
and movement in the air. In a strategic/military context the 
latter two are of greatest interest. 
It is important to note that the Arctic Ocean should be 
regarded as one ocean, even if large parts of it preclude 
surface traffic by ships due to the extreme ice conditions. 
However, as for the other oceans, the sea-routes in and out of 
the Arctic are of special interest, and vital for controlling the 
traffic in the individual national areas. In this context both 
military and civilian traffic are important. The main lines of 
communication into and out of this vast ocean are concen-
trated to the Bering strait, the Davis Strait and the Greenland-
Iceland- and United Kingdom-gap (the GIUK-gap).6 
The Bering Strait connects the Pacific and Arctic Oceans. At 
its most narrow point the strait is only 92 km wide, with the 
two Diomede islands located approximately in the middle. The 
strait is the only area where Russia and the US share a 
common border, with Ostrov Ratmanova (Big Diomede) on the 
Russian side and Little Diomede on the American side. The 
strait is also a very shallow doorstep (only 60 meters deep) 
between the two oceans. In the winter the surface is covered 
by -ice, including icebergs which can extend to the sea-
bottom. This makes both surface and subsurface transit 
extremely hazardous. Both great powers have direct access to 
the strait permitting continuous surveillance of both surface 
and subsurface traffic. In wartime both powers could block the 
straits by mines and torpedoes. (Figure 1.) 
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(Adelphi Papers, no. 241, 1989) 
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The Davis Strait marks the entrance to Baffin Bay between the 
west coast of Greenland and Baffin Island. Baffin Bay is a 
very deep basin with the bottom descending over 2,000 
meters. However the Arctic access is restricted by two narrow 
and shallow main axes. The shortest route from Baffm Bay to 
Murmansk and the Kola Peninsula' passes through the Smith 
Sound Jx:tween Ellesmere Island and Greenland, through the 
Kane-basm, further on through the narrow Kennedy and 
Robson Channels to the Lincoln Sea, and from here into the 
Arctic Ocean. The other main route goes from the North 
Atlantic to the Labrador Sea, through Baffm Bay and the 
Lancaster Sound, the Barrow Strait, the Viscount Melville 
Sound, the McC!ure Strait {alternatively further south through 
the Prince of Wales Strait and the Amundsen Gulf) out into 
the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas, and finally through the Bering 
Strait. This axis ha8 been named the North-West {NW) 
Passage.' From Baffin Bay and the NW Passage there are 
other, shallow outlets into the Arctic Ocean, all of which are 
b~ocked by ice, making access for ships and large submarines 
difficult. The extreme ice-conditions hamper surface-traffic 
~ven through the main axis, and modem, specially designed 
Icebreakers are necessary for navigation here. Except from the 
wi~e Davis Strait, the ~ Passage passes through waters 
claimed by Canada as national waters, while the shorter route 
crosses tetritorial waters claimed by Canada and Denmalk 
(Greenland). 
In conclusion, both axes are characterized by their shallow and 
narrow straits. A major problem is how to exercise national 
sovereignty under the ice-covered surface. This is a sensitive 
issue, particularly where the transit and operation of US 
submarines is concerned, since one of the main access routes 
to the Arctic passes through the Canadian Arctic archipelago. 
As for the water-way between Canada and Greenland a future 
conflict between the US, Canada and Denmark co~ld arise 
here. 
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_ .. _t_. 
The GIUK-gap is no strait in the usual meaning of the word, 
but rather a widely used designation of the very wide passages 
between the large islands and groups of islands dividing the 
Arctic Ocean, the Norwegian and the North Sea from the 
western part of the Atlantic. However, the GIUK-gap can be 
divided into the Denmark Strait and the seas between Iceland, 
Faeroe Islands, Shetland, Scotland and Norway. The.Denmark 
Strait between Iceland and Greenland is both deep and wide, 
and even if the area close to Greenland is dominated by ice, 
the strait is open for both surface and subsurface traffic all 
year. Due to the wide and deep waters, the strait is very 
difficult to block by mines, but the surface activity in the 
strait could effectively by controlled, while this would be more 
difficult with regards to subsurface-traffic. 
The seabottom between Iceland and the Faeroe Islands 
contains a submerged mountain-ridge, with valleys descending 
down to 500 meters. Southwest and northeast of this ridge the 
seabottom descends down to more than 2,000 meters. Between 
the Shetland and Freroe islands a narrow, deep waterway leads 
to the Atlantic, starting from a deep basin west of the 
Norwegian coast, but south of the relatively shallow Barents 
Sea. Thus, both the axis between Norway and Iceland and 
west of Iceland are broad, deep free of ice and difficult to 
control. These axis into the Arctic leads on to the Northern 
Sea Route, stretching along the northern coast of the USSR 
and ending in the Bering Strait. 
The Northern Sea Route (also known as the Northeastern 
Passage) was opened to foreign Shipping in 1967, subject to 
Soviet regulations and payment of fees.' Hitherto it has not 
received much consideration by the west, despite President 
Gorbachev' s reminder of its potential in his MurmanSk speech 
in 1989. The potential importance of the Northern Sea Route 
is derived from the fact that it provides the shortest maritime 
link between northern Europe to large parts of the Far East 
and the US west coast. The distance from London to all Asian 
coasts north of Hong Kong is shorter via the Northern Sea 
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Route than via the Suez Canal, and the distance from London 
to San Francisco is shoner via the Northern Sea Route than 
via the Panama Canal. This means that the greater pan of the 
west coast of north America and the Far Eastern coasts of the 
USSR as well as Japan, Korea, much of China and Taiwan are 
closer to the EC through the Arctic than via the Atlantic and 
southern oceans. To this must be added potential future 
difficulties involved in vulnerable passages such as the Suez 
and Panama Canals and the Straits of Malacca. In this respect 
the Arctic Ocean constitutes a major potential maritime 
highway.10 · 
Commercial development will have to be based on a route 
which is not likely to be closed in the short, three-month 
season and will be largely dependent on the price Russia will 
charge for passage and ice-breaker services. In addition use of 
the Northern Sea route would call for the deployment of 
specially constructed commercial ships, configured for Arctic 
navigation with reinforced hulls and extra-powerful engines." 
In the long term the development of oil and gas resources in 
the Arctic may increase interest in the Northern Sea Route, as 
export of scarce energy resources and aquacultural products to 
Japan and the Far East most likely will demand low-cost 
transportation. Both Japan and the USA are potential partners 
with Russia and Norway in developing the Northern Sea Route 
due to the need to develop the route as such, and as a result 
of their shared interests in low-cost transportation connecting 
the west to the increasingly important high-tech Japanese 
producers and market. However development of Arctic sea 
lanes is not necessarily entirely positive. From an environ-
mental perspective the Arctic is more vulnerable than most 
other ecosystems to pollution by shipping and other industrial 
activity, a factor which will be reinforced in the near future. 
The potential military use of the Northern Sea Route would 
primarily be for peace-time transit only, and most likely on a 
very limited scale. 
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In theory there exists another maritime e~urance to ':he Arctic 
Ocean, consisting of the channel connec?ng tbe White _Sea to 
the Baltic Sea." However this channel 1S blocked by 1ce for 
half of the year, is only 5 meters deep and. cannot be used by 
ships exceeding 3,000 tons ( correspondmg to a western 
frigate). In conclusion, even though the channel connects ~e 
Baltic fleet to the Northern fleet, its military and strategic 
value is limited. 
From a historical perspective Arctic airspace has been used for 
a very short time only, but it has play~d _an impo~ant pan in 
the Arctic expeditions since the beg1nnmg of this century, 
starting with the first expeditions using balloons" to the fir:>t 
Arctic flights in the early 1920s.14 The use of the Arc~c 
airspace has also been important in mapping the Arctic, 
including the recent maps covering Greenland. Develo~ments 
in civilian aircraft technology has led to the co~~~rc1al _use 
of the shorter trans-polar flight route. The first CIVIlian fl1ght 
using the polar route was established in 1954 between Alas~a 
and the UK. As the range of aircraft increased, the Arctic 
airspace acquired a new military strategic context. In the 
beginning, this involved bomber aircraft, but it e~panded _later 
to also include airborne surveillance systems and mterconunen-
tal missiles. 
In addition to the their use as a transit route the Arctic is also 
of strategic military value, since they are dominated by the US 
and Russia and both have possessed the technology and 
political will to develop their military presence in the Arctic. 
(This is dealt with in detail in the following sections.) 
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2. United States Strategic lntensts in the 
lligh North 
Developments 1945-1952 
The United States had gained a foothold on Greenland, Iceland 
and on the Norwegian island Jan Mayen during the Second 
World War, and Greenland and Iceland continued to be 
important base areas after the war. Otherwise the USA did not 
show any particular interest in the Northern European region.' 
In the transition to peace, the USA was none the less inter-
ested in military bases in Norway. This came up in connection 
with the American Joint Chiefs of Staff's analysis in 1943 of 
requirements for forward air bases after the war, and was 
primarily aimed at being prepared in case of German revanch-
ism. As pan of its "Peripheral Basing Program" to control 
Germany, the United States Air Force proposed in May 1945 
to use Sola airfield as a bomber base. This plan was, however, 
stopped the same autumn as the USA feared counter-demands 
from Kreml, and as a result of American demobilization and 
the vulnerability of the bases. The entire program was 
abandoned in May 1946.2 
The political-ideological wishes of USA to contain inter-
national communism lead from the autumn 1947 to a cautious-
ly increased interest in Scandinavia. From 1948 Washington 
became more critical of the Scandinavian effons to place 
themselves outside the East-West conflict, and it tried to bring 
Norway in on the western side in the Cold War. 
The most important reason why the United States tried to 
bring Norway into the Atlantic Pact was political-ideological, 
as it was for most of the other countries. The Atlantic Pact 
was negotiated by diplomats who did not dwell much upon the 
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specifics of military planning. For psychological reasons, and 
for the sake of western cohesion, the threat of piecemeal 
aggression was deemed unacceptable. Moreover, Norwegian 
membership could set an example: If Norway acceeded, it 
would be easier for Iceland to join; likewise Denmark would 
bring Greenland along with it. 1bis would make it easier for 
the United States to gain access to the vital bases on these 
islands in the North Atlantic. But the Americans also recog-
nised that Norway could play a role , if only limited, in US 
air strategy.' 
Scandinavia's place in the geopolitical picture was elaborated 
by USA's National Security Council (NSC) in september 1948: 
The National Security Council pointed out that the Scandi-
navian countries were strategically important for both the 
United States and the USSR, because they were situated in the 
ffight path between North America and the strategic heart of 
the USSR, and between London and Moscow, and were also 
in the position to control the exits from the Baltic and the 
Barents seas. The region was considered important with respect 
to both the intercontinental Polar strategy and US requirements 
for forward operational bases close to Soviet territory (Peri-
meter strategy). 
The idea of a Polar strategy for offensive operations was 
emphasised more strongly in the early postwar plans. In these 
tentative plans, bases in Canada, Alaska and on islands in the 
North Atlantic were to act as "stepping stones" between the 
continents. Until aircraft could make intercontinental ffights, 
these bases were needed as staging areas for operations against 
the USSR. Later on, once long-range bombers and inter-
continental missiles had become fully operational, the principal 
value of these islands was to be in the fields of communi-
cations and early warning. 
The early attempts on the part of the US Air Force to build 
up an offensive capability in the north in the postwar years 
were, however, shown to be unrealistic. At a very early stage 
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they came up against climatic problems. The Air Force had 
underestimated the problems of operating in the arctic wastes. 
At the same time tight budgets undermined realistic plans for 
a Polar strategy. Instead, existing bases along the eurasian 
border of the the Soviet Union were reactiviated. 
In 1947 there was consequently a return to the Peripheral air 
strategy, with bases encircling Soviet territory as the central 
element. Greenland and Iceland remained important, but the 
dominant access routes were now from Great Britain and the 
Middle East. Plans for the peripheral concept were initiated in 
1946 with a program for rotation of strategic. air units. to 
forward operational areas and supported by aenal refuellmg. 
The US Joint Chiefs of Staff in May 1947 estimated that 80% 
of Soviet industry were within the operational radius of action 
of B-29 bombers operating from the British isles and from 
the Cairo-Suez area. 
The Soviet long-range air force was in early 1950 estimated 
to have more than 300 Tu4s in operational units, and this 
figure was assumed to be rapidly increasing. At this stage,. the 
Tu4 was not equipped to carry nuclear weapons. In fact, nght 
up to the first Soviet nuclear detonation in the summer of 
1949 it was widely held in Washington that it would take five 
to ten years for the Soviets to achieve a breakthrough in this 
area. The success of the first Soviet test profoundly altered 
perceptions within the US policy community, and for the next 
ten years the fear of a Soviet leap into the future dominated 
American strategic thinking. 
The gradual loss of the security of insularity ~ed the Ameri-
cans to return to Hemisphere defense. The continental defense 
of the far north began to take shape in the late forties. The 
war alliance with Canada continued and was formalized in a 
new agreement in 1946. Alaska's significance increased both 
for offensive and defensive purposes. The US build-up was 
nourished by the European crisis of 1948. Early-warning 
measures were initiated and air defense was strengthened.• 
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The United States was not interested in bases on Spitsbergen, 
although the idea was indeed aired on several occasions.Air 
Force Secretary Stuart W. Symington brought up the question 
on one occasion, and in the National Security Council's policy 
document NSC 28/1, approved by President Truman in 
september 1948 it was suggested that materiel support be 
given to Norway as a lever to acquire military rights on 
Svalbard. This particular proposal was later withdrawn. In fact, 
these initiatives all lacked substance and they would most 
probably not have survived a more thorough analysis of 
requirements and· possibilities. The islands were of potential 
interest to the United States, but physical, strategic and 
political obstacles ruled out serious US initiatives to acquire 
base rights. From an operational point of view the islands 
were too close to the USSR and thus extremely vulnerable to 
Soviet counter-attacks. In practice, US interest boiled down to 
an interest in early-warning and meteorological installations.' 
Although the Air Force had given up their arctic base plans 
for the time being, the vision of a future Polar strategy 
survived. In 1948 SAC Chief Curtis Le May, who was 
reluctant to depend on other countries, announced that "the 
fundamental goal of the Air Force should be the creation of 
a strategic atomic striking force capable of attacking any target 
in Eurasia from bases in the United States and returning to the 
points of take-off". Great efforts were made to develop 
techniques for refuelling bombers in mid-air, thereby increasing 
their range. The first air refuelling squadrons were brought 
into service in the United States in June 1948. That same year 
the first heavy bomber, the propeller-driven B-36 with a range 
of 4.000 nm made its first appearance, although it did not 
become operational until I 951. 
The technological innovations and visions for the future were 
reflected in the defense plans. The long term war plan of 
December 1949, Dropshot, which for planning puqJOses 
envisaged an outbreak of war in 1957, stated that bomber 
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groups would be led to their targets from the United States via 
Greenland among other places, and over Finnmark.6 
Transit was, however, only one facet of American interest in 
Scandinavia. The Norwegian mainland also attracted a certain 
amount of attention in American Perimeter strategy because of 
the bombers limited range and the need for forward bases. 
From a strictly operational and technological point of view the 
greatest need for operational bases in Norway appears to be 
at the end of the forties. Although the idea of peacetime bases 
in Norway was taken up in a revised analysis of base rights 
in 1948, the military agreed not to pursue the question any 
further as it was believed that public disclosure would have 
damaging political repercussions. The idea was not completely 
abandoned, however, though it did not reach beyond the 
planning stage. It failed to do so for a number of reasons: 
political hesitation, vulnerability, limited resources, and 
institutional weakness on the part of SAC. 
Even though the the High North did not figure prominently in 
Navy plans for offensive nuclear operations in the forties, the 
region did artract some attention. Admiral Radford foresaw 
strategic carrier operations against Soviet land targets directly 
from the North Sea, the Norwegian sea and even from the 
Barents sea. It was ssumed that the new CV A carriers would 
dramatically improve the scope for operations in the Arctic. 
According to these plans, the atomic missions would require 
forward operations, some of them in the North. Dropshot, the 
long term war plan of December 1949, envisaged the deploy-
ment of six aircraft carriers of different types in the Nor-
wegian sea and Barents sea at the outbreak of war, for 
offensive operations against Soviet territory. The heaviest and 
most effective vessels, however, were reserved for other areas, 
a fact which reveals the general priorities of the US Navy in 
the late forties.7 
The North Atlantic Treaty was signed on April 4th 1949, and, 
together with the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, 
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was an important turning point in several respects. The new 
situation was primarily characterized by three factors: I. 
Increased fears of war and rearmament in the West; 2. 
Establishment of a perimeter concept in the Alliance, and 
3.1ncreased American interest in Northern Europe. 
American rearmament started with the approval of NSC-68. 
This strategy document was produced before the outbreak of 
the Korean conflict in June 1950, but was only approved later 
in the same year.' The ideas in NSC-68 were adopted by 
NATO in general, and this started the rearmament process 
which culminated with the very ambitious force goals which 
were approved by the NATO CounciL meeting in Lisbon in 
February 1952. Even if these goals were were never met in 
full, the rearmament produced significant results. 
In Europe the strategy in case of war comprised three phases: 
First: The official doctrine of forward defence implied defence 
along the outer frontiers of the member countries in case of 
an attack; Secondly, A sustained defence along the Kiel canal 
in the South and Lyngen in North Norway: In the last instance 
everything would be committed to secure a bridgehead in the 
Stavanger or Trondheim area. 
In reality it was only the US which could give substance and 
credibility to these plans. By the beginning of the 1950s, 
American suppon by air and naval forces could be counted 
on, but USA's assets at that time were limited and it could be 
feared that help would be too late, and . that Norway was 
overrun and had to be reconquered. From 1951 the situation 
changed, because of the military measures which were about 
to be implemented. USA was able to commit more in Nor-
them Europe. USA was also interested in stationing 75 tactical 
aircraft in the country, an offer which Norway declined. 
Tactical air units were nonetheless dedicated for deployment 
in Norway in case of war, and some equipment was preposi-
tioned for this contingency.' 
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The American proposal to station tactical aircraft in Norway 
in peacetime indicates a significant American interest in the 
region. From a psychological point of view it was important 
that the so-called "rim states" did not fall into the hands of 
the Russians. Even as important was that Norway had become 
more interesting in connection with strategic nuclear warfare. 
Early in the 1950s SAC expanded considerably, and was the 
sole bearer of the USA's and NATO's strategy of nuclear 
deterrence. This also created a requirement for better foothold 
in forward areas. In the autumn of 1952 a secret agreement 
was concluded between Norway and the USA , where Sola 
and Gardermoen airfields were put at the disposal of SAC in 
case of war. In addition to staging and refuelling of B-29s, the 
Americans thought that fighter planes could operate from the 
airfields and preparations were made for this contingency. This 
was, as mentioned, not a new idea but implied that the 
requirement and capability for a forward presence increased.10 
The US Navy also moved into the nuclear age at the beginn-
ing of the 1950s, but it was still envisioned that the aircraft 
carriers would be used for traditional naval tasks, and against 
Soviet naval forces. Primary tasks were therefore attack on 
naval bases and airfields. 
The Supreme Allied Commander in Europe at that time, 
General Dwight D. Eisenhower, placed great emphasis on 
Norway: since the Central region was weakly defended, 
particularly as regards air defence,. one alternative could be to 
attack from the flanks and use aircraft from carriers operating 
in the North Sea to hammer the advancing Soviet divisions. 
This lead to the requirement for a sustained defence, a "hedge-
hog defence" in Norway. But, particularly the British were 
against using carrier-based aircraft in suppon of ground forces, 
as they believed that this would be at the expense of protec-
tion of the sea lines of communication over the Atlantic. 
Eisenhowers "continental strategy" was therefore never 
implemented in its original form, but several elements of the 
strategy were followed up. 
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The Nmthern region also had a certain interest in connection 
with intelligence collection. USAF conducted in the 1940s 
operations along the periphery of the Soviet Union to take 
photographs inside Soviet territory in the Baltic and also in the 
North where it was of particular interest to monitor the 
activity at the naval bases on the Kola peninsula. After 
detonation of the first Soviet nuclear device in 1949, there was 
introduced a a systematic program involving flights along 
Soviet territory to uncover Soviet nuclear activities in the 
Arctic. 
In addition, USAF and US Navy conducted aerial electronic 
intelligence to chart Soviet radar and air defense capabilities 
and to develop electronic countenneasures. In 1950 there was 
a division of labor in this collection effort: The US Navy was 
to be responsible for Southern Europe, while the USAF was 
to take care of the Baltic and Munnansk. CIA and the US 
Army Special Forces were also active in the early 1950s, 
trying to establish a clandestine "stay-behind" network in 
Scandinavia, indicating an interest in preparation for under-
ground warfare in case the area was occupied by the Soviets. 11 
The period 1953-1975 
Not being able to fulfill the Lisbon force goals, the NATO 
members started on the "long haul". NATO defenses became 
more dependent upon nuclear weapons, which was endorsed 
by the Alliance in December 1954.12 This also lead to the 
European continent becoming the focus at the expense of the 
flanks. 
~rom a str~tegic .point of view, the USA became primarily 
mterested m vanous fonns of functions which could be 
perfonned from Norwegian territory, without the USA having 
to cling to and hold large areas. 
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The USAF had already in the 1940s been engaged in plans for 
a Polar strategy, without much success. In the next decade, the 
Northern area gained in importance with the development of 
long range Soviet aircraft and intercontinental ballistic missiles 
on both sides. The American JCS maintained in May 1956 
that the arctic region was important both in offensive and 
defensive respects in connection with the new technological 
era.tl 
The technological developments also lead to the forward US 
bases becoming more vulnerable. Following a study in 1954 
lead by Albert Wohlstetter, the number of overseas bases, 
primarily in North Africa, was reduced.14 The analysis of the 
vulnerability of the overseas bases had an indirect effect on 
the SAC agreement concerning Norway. Even if the USA was 
primarily concerned with reducing the vulnerability of the 
peacetime bases including those in Great Britain, the model 
which was chosen indicated that pennanent bases in Norway 
were not needed and that the SAC arrangement from 1952 
could be integrated in the concept for forward operational 
bases in war. With the introduction of the B-47 bomber from 
1953, SAC's strategic fighter escort wings were no longer as 
needed, and the escort functions which were associated with 
Sola and Gardennoen airfields seemed to disappear. The SAC-
agreement concerning Norway did, however, remain well into 
the 1960s main! y for tanker and reconnaisance functions. 
The main task of the US Navy in the North was containment 
of the Soviets at sea. This did not raise a requirement for 
pennanent presence in the area. 
USA was superior at sea. Still there remained some problems. 
It was found in 1952 that the Soviets had six times as many 
submarines as the Gennans had in 1939, and the US Chief of 
Naval Operations advocated more resolute anti-submarine 
warfare, with attacks on the base complexes." Another danger 
was connected with the tactical air threat. An analysis by the 
JCS in October 1952 maintained that Soviet aircraft would be 
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capable of operating in the North Sea and in Western Sea 
Areas adjacent to Great Britain. In tbe mid 1950's, the CIA 
concluded that the Soviets were building up a formidable 
submarine capability, which could challenge the sea lines of 
communication . From 1955, the US Navy gave higher priority 
to anti -submarine warfare. In this the Soviet bases on Kola 
were given considerable emphasis. The importance of Kola 
was documented in a study by the strategic plans division of 
the Navy in 1953; with the Bosporus and the exits from the 
Baltic closed, the Soviet submarines would have to operate 
from northern bases. The analysis drew attention to the danger 
of forward submarine bases in North Norway, and underlined 
that American countermeasures against the only important 
Soviet submarine threat in the Atlantic would have to come 
through the Barents Sea.1' 
From the middle of the 1950s there appeared an additional 
significant factor. As a result of Soviet threat perceptions of 
American aircraft carrier operations in the North, a larger 
proportion of Soviet attack submarines were deployed to Kola, 
at the expense of the Black Sea and the Baltic. The total 
increase and the swing towards Kola implied that the difficul-
ties with establishing Western control in the Norwegian Sea in 
the initial phase of a war, was assessed as considerable 
towards the 1960s. The American concepts for naval warfare 
were dimensioned around three phases: First, an effort to 
establish a forward defense at sea, which implied forward 
carrier operations to knock out submarine bases and other 
installations on Kola; secondly: A barrier defense in the straits 
between Greenland, Iceland and Great Britain; and thirdly: a 
certain defense of the sea lines of communication across the 
Atlantic. Among the new measures which were put into effect 
from the American side was the establishment of more 
advanced permanent and mobile submarine detection systems. 
SOSUS was developed early in the 1950s and became 
operational around 1957. 
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The interest of the US Navy in the Northern flank was 
accentuated as the Navy achieved a role in strategic nuclear 
warfare. Early in the 1950s the Navy had been build up again. 
The number of carriers which had been reduced to 18 in 1950, 
were brought up to 29 before the number was stabilized 
around 25. At the same time the Navy was allowed to build 
bigger carriers, and subsequently developed aircraft which were 
better suited for the carriers, first A-2 Savage in 1951 and A-
3 Skywarrior somewhat later. With more and bigger carriers, 
and with the new aircraft the conditions were provided for the 
Navy to enter the nuclear age. In February 1951 the Navy got 
a rudimentary operational nuclear capability, but is was only 
under Eisenhower in 1953 that the Navy was authorized to 
have nuclear warheads on board. In 1954 carrier-based 
bombers were incorporated in the US operational plans for 
strategic nuclear warfare.17 
While president Eisenhower insisted that the Navy's carriers 
and nuclear weapons were used for strategic warfare, the Navy 
wanted a balanced Fleet to meet a variety of traditional naval 
tasks, and put great emphasis on use of nuclear weapons for 
such tasks. The stubbornness of the Navy prevented that 
Eisenhowers emphasis on strategic nuclear warfare achieved a 
dramatic breakthrough in priorities. 
On this background the Navy planned for the use of nuclear 
weapons in offensive operations against the Soviet base 
complexes on Kola, in addition to the tasks included in 
strategic warfare. Since the aircraft had relatively short combat 
range it was necessary to operate forward in the Northern 
areas to carry out these tasks. The Navy envisioned deploy-
ment e.g. off the coast of Helgeland in North Norway and in 
the Barents Sea in the initial stages of the war. This meant 
transit over Norwegian territory, but the Navy did not need 
any bases in Norway in peacetime. 
The carrier-based bombers represented the backbone of the 
Navy's nuclear capability through the 1950s. In 1958 when the 
33 
Navy presented its views as regards the goals towards the 
1970s, it proposed that the carriers should be oriented for 
limited war, but this was not well received by the Administra-
tion." Only in 1963, with Defense Secretary Robert Mac-
Namara were the carriers relieved from the exclusive strategic 
role. Main effort was again put on traditional maritime tasks, 
which also included support of ground operations. 
The Polaris program got its real start in 1956, after a difficult 
birth. The first Polaris submarine went on patrol in the 
Atlantic in 1960, and Polaris was included in the SlOP from 
the same time. The retirement of the carriers from the nuclear 
strategic role, and the introduction of the Polaris submarines 
meant a significant increase in strategic stability, in that USA's 
nuclear retaliatory capability became less vulnerable to a 
disarming first strike. 
The first generation of Polaris SLBM's (A-1) did, however, 
have limited range, and this meant that the submarines had to 
operate in the Eastern Atlantic. When the third generation 
SLBM's (A-3) became operational in 1964, it was possible to 
reach central targets in the USSR without entering the gap 
between Greenland, Iceland and United Kingdom. Polaris also 
needed forward bases. In 1960 the Bitish agreed that a base 
for Polaris submarines was established in Holy Loch in 
Scotland. 
In the period leading up to the sixties, US interests in the 
region were not insignificant and they resulted from a combi-
nation of sources. From a military-strategic point of view, 
Norway was deemed by the Navy and the Air Force to be of 
significance in the ongoing nuclear arms race with the Soviet 
Union. The American perspective, therefore, went beyond the 
somewhat narrower European and Continental approach of 
SACEUR. This would tend to suggest that Norway was of 
greater military-strategic importance to the United States than 
to the Alliance as a whole. Certainly, this is how matters were 
seen in London and even more clearly so in Paris. Beyond 
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these purely military-strategic considerations, Washington 
maintained an interest in Norway for political and ideological 
reasons: given the perceived vulnerability of Norway as a 
flank. U.S.military backing, in the broadest sense of the word, 
was considered crucial. 
The American interests, as outlined above, were reflected in 
US military and economic assistance and enhanced technologi-
cal cooperation. Nonetheless, the need to strengthen the 
defence of the Northern Flank as part of the Continental 
Strategy was not thought to be sufficiently urgent as to 
warrant more substantial U.S. military commitments. After all, 
Norway was located in a quiet corner of the world; hence 
there was no need to place it on the political agenda. Despite 
the strategic potential of Norway, it was not necessarily 
assumed that Norway would be immidiately or directly 
involved in a future conflict; Norway's role in the Continental 
Strategy was highly peripheral. Moreover, the greater part of 
the decision-making machinery in Washington was probably 
never informed of what constituted the nature of the issues 
that were of particular importance in the bilateral relationship. 
Of major importance in this respect was the whole issue of 
intelligence and Norway's position in the air and naval legs of 
the U .S. strategic triad." 
Iceland became in the early 1950s an important supporting 
base for US strategic air warfare. In 1961 the responsibility for 
the Keflavik air base in Iceland was transferred from USAF 
to the US Navy. This reflected the time-change in the Atlantic, 
the central role of the strategic bombers was phasing out, from 
now on the Atlantic became more important as operational 
scene for the strategic submarines, and Iceland also became 
central for maritime surveillance and anti -submarine warfare. 
Requirements to improve maritime surveillance was the 
background for SACLANT's interest in And!llya and Bod!ll in 
North Norway early in the 1950s when new airfields were 
consstructed at these places. During the 1950s this requirement 
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became more important because of the Soviet build-up of 
attack submarines and also because an increasing number of 
other submarines were deployed to Kola. These developments 
were also the reason for the Norwegian decision at the end of 
the 1950s to establish an underwater accoustic detection 
system from Andl')ya. The system was under strict national 
control, and it is evident that it played an important role in 
detecting and providing early warning of submarine move-
ments in western waters. 
In 1959 it became important for USA to confirm whether the 
USSR had deployed any operational ICBMs. This was after 
the US authorities has found that there was no "bomber-gap", 
and before they had been able to locate the existence of any 
operational ICBM sites in the Soviet Union. The U-2 high-
altitude recormaisance aircraft had since 1956 conducted flights 
along the Soviet periphery, and sometimes across Soviet 
territory to collect information about critical developments and 
activities. In May 1960 a U-2 overflight was conducted from 
Tmkey, primarily to locate possible ICBM sites. The missile 
test center at Plesetsk on the Eastern side of the White Sea 
was one of the locations to be covered on this mission when 
the U-2 aircraft was shot down over Sverdlovsk on May 1st 
1960. Later it was confirmed that the first operational liquid-
fueled Soviet ICBMs had been located at Plesetsk in 1960.20 
At the beginning of the 1960s the USA had become consider-
ably overcommitted with 45 formal defense agreements and in 
addition a number of informal commitments around the world. 
The commitments were not proportionate to USA 's conven-
tional forces, and they could no longer be supported by 
nuclear deterrence after the Soviet Union had achieved a 
credible strategic nuclear capability. 
This resulted in a change under President John F. Kennedy 
with the introduction of the doctrine of "flexible response", in 
which it was sought to reduce the dependence on nuclear 
weapons by building up greater conventional capabilities. The 
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doctrine, and the force requirements were strikingly similar to 
the concept which was launched early in the 1950s based on 
NSC-68. With MC 1413 in 1967 "flexible response" became 
official NATO policy, after having been the source of internal 
discussions in the Alliance since the new strategic concept was 
first launched at the NATO council meeting in Athens in 
1962. 
The Kennedy administration tried to give substanse to the new 
doctrine by increasing the military capability to meet threats 
at different levels.21 In addition to a general build-up of forces 
the Americans tried to fulfill their various commitments by 
increased flexibility, by which they could "swing" force from 
one theater to another. Consequently the USA built up their 
strategic reserves at home, and their capacity for air and sea 
transport. To complement this concept, there was also an 
increase in prepositioning in forward locations. 
Even if the main interest was linked to the European con-
tinent, there was an effort to fill the holes which existed on 
the flanks in view of the risks of limited aggression. USA 
now supported the idea of a mobile force to meet threats on 
NATO's flanks. Defense Secretary Robert MacNamara told 
the other NATO ministers in May 1965 that the threat to 
Europe had changed in character: there was less concern about 
a massive Soviet attack, than for e.g. "pressure on the flanks". 
In this was an admission that there was a flank problem, even 
if it was the situation on the Southern flank which gave cause 
for most concern in NATO. 
At the beginning of the 1970s the flank problem ws given 
increased attention. At the meeting of the DPC in May 1970, 
SACLANT oriented about the situation in the North, and the 
ministers discussed ways to strengthen NATO' s situation in the 
Atlantic. At the ministerial meeting half a year later, it was 
agreed that it was necessary to strengthen the flanks. 
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At the end of the 1960's Western attention was caught by a 
new dimension of the Northern problem: the buildup of a 
considerable strategic submarine force, and surface naval 
capability conce!ltrated on Kola. The justification for the 
buildup was believed to be global, but it cast shadows over 
Norway and created concerns that the USSR could become 
able to dominate the seas around Norway, and with the Soviet 
amphibiuous capability it was also believed that they could 
gain footholds in Norway to support a more offensive Soviet 
naval strategy. This danger was clearly demonstrated by the 
Soviet naval exercises "Sever" in 1968 and "Okean" in 1970 
and 1975.22 In 1981 the long reach of the Northern Fleet 
Aviation into the Norwegian sea was demonstrated by the first 
flights of the new Tu-26 Backfire intennediate range naval 
strike aircraft 
Increased interest in Maritime surveillance and ASW capabili-
ties was clearly demonstrated by the increase in US exercise 
activities. 1965 was a torning point in that American units 
participating in anny exercises in North Norway were drawn 
from continental USA and not from US forcesin Gennany. At 
the beginning of the 1960s the NATO exercises were given a 
larger scope, and the· activity was gradually fonnalized. This 
applies particularly to SACLANT's exercises in the "Team-
work" series from 1964, and in addition there were introduced 
exercises in Northern waters in the "tween"-years. In 1964, the 
first of SACEUR's "Express" exercises was conducted in 
North Norway with the Allied Mobile Force, AMF which had 
been fonned in 1960.23 
In this period the USA was stock in the quagmire in Vietoam, 
and also from the middle of the 1970s constrained by the 
aftennaths of the Watergate-washup. Less attention was 
directed at Europe, and the Northern flank was even more 
peripheral. At the same time the US Navy was reduced by 
block obsolescence from about 1.000 ships in 1968 to 465 in 
1977. 
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The total number of ships allocated to the US 2d Fleet in the 
Atlantic was clearly marginal in relation to the tasks which 
were to be perfonned. In the extension of the lower priority 
of the Atlantic, there was a significant reduction in the 
presence of allied naval ships in the Norwegian Sea in 
peacetime, and the larger NATO exercises were shifted further 
South in the Atlantic. In the decade prior to 1985, American 
aircraft carriers were present in the Norwegian sea a total of 
33 days. SACLANT maintained that he needed 2-4 carrier 
battle groups to enter the Norwegian sea in a wartime 
situation, and that air support from the Norwegien mainland 
was highly desireable. With the reduced number of carriers, 
which sank to 13 at the beginning of the 1980s, it would be 
difficult to achieve a reasonable degree of sea control north of 
the GIUK-gap. 
Changes in naval doctrine also contribute to that the Nor-
wegian Sea was down-graded. In the mid-1970s Defense 
Secretary Sclesinger proposed a "high-low" fonnula, where a 
smaller number of ships of high quality could be used for 
special tasks in high-threat waters, whereas the greater part of 
the fleet was used in less exposed areas. With this, priority 
was in reality given to protect the sea lines of communication 
further South in the Atlantic. Under Defense Secretary Harold 
Brown later in the 1970s the Administration became more 
concerned with power projection. But since there were now 
fewer carriers Defense Secretary Brown launched a new 
operational concept: instead of spreading the remaining carriers 
to 3-4 operational theaters to meet a complex Soviet offensive 
in the initial pase of the war, he proposed to concentrate on 
one theater in the early phase, and then be prepared to 
"swing" forces in a later phase. 
These changes did not mean that the sea lines of communi-
cation across the Atlantic could be ignored, but instead of 
meeting the Soviets in the Norwegian sea, the vital naval link 
was shifted southwards in the Atlantic, and further away from 
the threat area. President Carters "Consolidated guidance" in 
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April 1978 placed emphasis on sea control south of the GIUK-
gap. CNO, Admiral Watkins expressed in 1983 that for the 
time being all naval forces woulds have to be concentrated 
South of the GIUK-gap, to maintain the sea lines of communi-
cation: it was no longer possible to send carriers into the 
Norwegian sea or use them for power projection or support of 
land operations in the North. 
This meant that the USA was on the verge of resigning in the 
Norwegian Sea, and that there was a danger that even the 
waters further South were put at risk. A spokesman for 
SACLANT expressed in 1982 that: "it is now our belief that 
by 1986 there will be circumstances in which our strategy of 
forward defense at the choke points may not be possible". On 
this background the military and geo-political importance of 
Norway was seen only in relation to the Baltic Straits, and as 
a flank to the central region, and for early warning and 
collection of intelligence. The priorities of the US Administra-
tion meant that North Norway in particular became exposed. 
Still, it was politically important for the Administration that 
Norway held stand. In the same way as for the European 
continent, the USA was ready to contribute with reinforce-
ments which could be flown in. 
Implementation of Flexible Response, which was the most 
interesting feature of U .S. policy in the north in the seventies, 
had cautiously started in the sixties. The genesis of this first 
phase can be traced back to the Kenned y Administration's 
Flexible Response. In the short term, the most visible express-
ion of these early efforts has been the fact that the United 
States continued to furnish Norway with weapons and equip-
ment, despite the termination of the MDAP program. The 
Vietnam War drew energy from these ventures, although 
NATO's adoption of the doctrine of Flexible Response in 
1967 and the withdrawal of France from NATO military 
cooperation generated some new measures in the early 
seventies. 
40 
However, these first steps were ouly a prelude to what was to 
come in the second phase, when Flexible response in the north 
was made more robust. This phase started cautiously in 1969 
as part of a renewed U .S. interest in Europe, which coincided 
with a growing U.S. concern about Northern Europe. The 
reappraisal started with a series of intellectual exercises and 
culminated in important military steps being taken in the late 
seventies. 24 
The most important American contribution to deterrence and 
defense of NATO's Northern flank was in the form of 
dedicated combat aircraft squadrons which could be transferred 
to designated airfields on the Northern flank if and when it 
was deemed necessary. The first agreement about so-called 
"eo-located bases" was· concluded with Norway in 1974,. and 
in 1975 the Agreement was extended to include airfields in 
North Norway. Alltogether there are now COB-agreements 
covering 8 Norwegian airfields. 
The other important American contribution to deterrence and 
defense in the North is the agreement in 1981 to preposition 
the equipment for a US Marine Amphibious Brigade in 
Tr~delag. The MAB had been dedicated as reinforcement to 
Norway in 1977, and in 1978 it was decided that rapid 
reinforcement of Norway should carried out by air. . 
The US reinforcements to Norway have been incorporated in 
NATO's Rapid Reinforcement Plan which was agreed by 
NATO in 1982. The RRP has meant better coordination of 
reinforcements, and has clarified the priorities. The plan 
indicates greater attention to the Northern flank, but main 
emphasis is still put on the continent. 
In the light of the sharpened international climate at the end 
of the 1970s more attention was directed at the Norwegian 
Sea. North Norway was again seen in connection with the 
continent and the broader perspective of European defense. 
While these two operational arenas in the 1960s were seen 
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separate and even competed for attention, in the 1980s the 
linkages and interdependences between the Northern and the 
Central region were more generally accepted. 
Even if American policy at the end of the 1970s was heavily 
concentrated on the Persian Gulf, and on air and ground 
defense of the Eureopean continent, the US Navy maintained 
a desire to retain sufficient capability to operate in the 
Norwegian sea, at least in the later phase of the war. In this 
connection the US Navy studied if Norwegian airfields could 
be used to control the Norwegian sea, but it was found to be 
more costly and less operationally satisfactory compared to the 
use of aircraft carriers. In addition, the Norwegian airfields 
were even as vulnerable as carrier battle groups." On the other 
hand the US Navy had for many years wanted to preposition 
equipment for aircraft carriers in Norway. USA maintained that 
Norway as a reciprocal service for receiving reinforcements 
for defense of the land territory should accept that the country 
to a greater degree was used for operations in the Norwegian 
Sea. At the end of the 1970s Norway gave its consent to this. 
Plans were drawn up which provided for aircraft from 
American carriers using Norwegian airfields when the carriers 
entered the Norwegian Sea. This lead to a change in the 
"Invictus" agreement in 1980, that gave the aircraft permission 
to operate from Norwegian airfields if the carriers in an 
emergency was put out of action. 
The Reagan administration's defence program represented the 
third American effort after the 2d World War to build up a 
powerful conventional capability to implement and make 
credible the strategy of flexible response. On the two earlier 
occasions, with NSC 68 in 1950 after the outbreak of the 
Korean war, and President John F.Kennedy's "flexible respon-
se" from 1962, it was not possible to sustain the programs 
over time. 
The US Navy in the early 1980s formulated a comprehensive 
maritime strategy. This reflected to a degree the US Navy's 
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concepts from "Sea Plan 2000". The new maritime strategy 
was based on the assumption of a conventional war of 
undetermined duration, and the Navy was a very important 
instrument to implement forward defense. Secretary of the 
Navy, John Lehman particularly underlined the importance of 
the Northern flank for defense of the sea lines of communi-
cation, and of the continent. With the plan to build up the US 
Navy to 600 ships and 15 carriers it was considered that the 
Navy would have increased capabilities for forward operations. 
The maritime strategy was not intended as a "game-plan", but 
underlined the importance and the interrelationship of the three 
phases: 1. Deterrence or transition to war. 2. Seizing the 
Initiative, and 3. Bringing the fight to the enemy. The 
maritime strategy also envisioned the use of maritime forces 
to create diversions on the Northern flank to relieve pressure 
against the Central region. 
There is some doubt whether the so-called US maritime 
strategy really represented U.S. National Strategy, approved 
by the JCS and the President. In any case, the US maritime 
strategy has not been agreed by NATO, which has its own 
Concept of Maritime Operations which was approved in 1981. 
CONMAROPS gives priority to operations in the Norwegian 
sea, and underlines the tasks of Containment, Defense in 
depth, and Keeping the initiative. 26 
The developments in the North have indicated a need for the 
Western Alliance to "Show the Flag" in the Norwegian Sea 
in peacetime, after having kept a low profile · since the 
beginning of the 1970s. Allied naval exercises since 1985 
have reflected this requirement. Occasional US naval presence 
in the Norwegian Sea is seen as desireable to counter any 
impressions of Soviet superiority and to invite mutual re-
straints. It has also been regarded important to increase the 
allied naval presence in the Norwegian sea to prevent that 
such presence in a tense situation is interpreted as a crisis 
warning. The aim has been to return to the level of presence 
in the 1960s. It has also been stressed that there is no 
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requirement, and not even desireable with a pennanent allied 
naval presence in the Norwegian sea in peacetime.27 
The New American Strategy 
Following the changes in the Soviet Union and in Eastern 
Europe since 1989, the US has been through a phase of 
reconsideration regarding the national strategy. The main points 
of a ~ew American strategy was first presented by President 
Bu~h m an add;ess at the Aspen Institute on 2 August 199128• 
This address did, however, not get the attention it deserved 
because of the American reaction to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, 
but the new strategy has since been elaborated on in a number 
of. articles and statements by US policymakers. James J. 
Tnt_ten _of the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, 
California has made a special study of the many inputs on 
the Ameri~.an. side, and compil~ the New American strategy 
as one entity m a report: "Amenca Promises to come back. A 
new National strategy"29 Tritten describes the new strategy as 
based upon four main elements: 
1. Deterrence. 
2. Forward Presence. 
3. Crisis Response. 
4. Reconstitution. 
The point of departure of the new strategy is both that the 
end of the cold war has created a new international situation 
and ~;hat _the American economy no longer allows such large 
contributions to defence as was the case in the 1980s. It is 
envisioned that in the 1990s the defence budgets will have to 
be about 25% lower than at the end of the 1980s. This has 
clear implications for American defence thinking. 
To maintain a defence structure which is a scaled hack or 
shrunken-down version of the present could result in having 
a defence which is less than what is needed to meet emerging 
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challenges. What was needed was not merely reductions - but 
restructuring. 
The new structure is therefore considerably reduced compared 
to the present. It is no concidence that it is designated a 
"base force". The Anny is to be cut down from 18 to 12 
active divisions, while the reserve forces will be reduced from 
10 to 6. The number of Air Wings are to be reduced from 
36 to 25, and the number of aircraft carriers are down to 11-
12 from 14 today. In total the Navy will be reduced to 451 
ships, while it now has 545. The goal of a 600-ship fleet is 
no longer within sight. The Marine Corps will have a strength 
of 150.000 personnel, a reduction from 196.000. 
The American forces will be organized into four basic military 
components: 
1. The Strategic Force. 
2. The Atlantic Force. 
3. The Pacific Force. 
4. The Contingency Force. 
The first component contains both strategic nuclear offensive 
and defensive forces. The Atlantic Force will be responsible 
for Europe, the_l'!fiddle East and Southwest Asia. The Pacific 
Force will be responsible for East- and South-East Asia, while 
the Contingency Force is to be responsible for those areas of 
the world that would not be covered by the Strategic, Atlantic 
or Pacific Forces, including Latin America and Africa. 
The Atlantic Force is clearly the largest. 4 out of the 12 active 
divisions and all the 6 reserve divisions will be included in 
this. The same goes for half of the tactical air force and 4 of 
the aircraft carriers. In addition two Marine Expeditionary 
Brigades will also belong to the Atlantic Force. 
Whereas the American defence structure up tu now has been 
based upon the threat of a massive Soviet attack in Europe, 
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the new structure will not in the same way be oriented 
towards one single scenario. The philosophy is now that the 
US must be prepared to defend its interests all over the world: 
the Soviet threat is no longer the dominating one. An impor-
tant planning pre-condition is therefore that Russia is no 
longer capable of defeating NATO's defence in Western 
Europe, if it ever has been able to do this. To have any 
chance of success in this task, Russia would need a reconstitu-
tion time of one to two years. The US would be able to 
observe such a reconstitution, and there would be time to 
implement necessary countermeasures in case the international 
situation should be changed in this direction. 
Conclusions 
It appears that the United States has no permanent strategic 
interest in the High North itself, apart from a general ideologi-
cal-political interest in keeping the Nordic Arctic with its 
adjacent sea and land territories within the Western sphere, 
and preventing any increase of Russian control. 
It ~s also evident that American interests in the High North 
which have been demonstrated so far are not vital or critical 
to United States security, but are associated with optimimum 
utilization of relevant American military forces for achieving 
strategic and operational aims vis a vis the former Soviet 
Union. For this reason it is also characteristic that the U.S. 
military interests have varied over time with technological 
developments and operational requirements of the relevant U.S. 
forces.It is furthermore evident that the U.S. military interests 
have not made it necessary with a permanent presence in the 
area, m;td that it has been sufficient with planning and 
preparatton of support and facilities and with exercices of 
shorter duration. 
There is consequently little foundation for any belief that the 
US would have sufficiently strong self-interests to make a 
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military commitment self-evident or even probable in a conflict 
in the area. It is probably wise to remember some of the 
lessons of the Second World War and of the first period of 
allied cooperation after the war for Norway: Various American 
and Allied war plans of the late 1940s considered that the 
Soviets would occupy Scandinavia fairly early on in any war, 
though pethaps not at the start.30 The experience of 1940 
demonstrated only too well to Norway that, even if the 
campaign on their territory was going well, the dem~ds. of 
the battle on the continent of Europe would have pnonty. 
During the Second World War, there were no major cam-
paigns after 1940 in Scandinavia - it only provided sid~sho~s 
- and there was little belief that the situation would dtffer m 
a Third World War fought between the Atlantic Alliance and 
the Soviet Union. 
The second lesson - or confirmation of existing wisdom -
drawn from the war experience in Norway by the Allies was 
that the Scandinavian region should not be used as a spring-
board from which to launch a counter-attack on Soviet 
occupied positions in Europe. The idea ~f launchi_ng an 
invasion of the continent from Norway was reJected dunng the 
Second World War. The same considerations were taken into 
account in the post-War period as had weighed on the minds 
of planners during wartime: action in Scandinavia would be a 
sidetracking of the main effort on the continent of Europe 
and would spread valuable resources dangerously thin. The 
wartime lessons for allied post-War strategy - especially as it 
affected Norway - were pethaps quite simple. They were that 
Norway should remain peripheral to Continental Europe in 
their war-planning scenarios: that Norway would not be a 
suitable place from which to launch the liberation of occupied 
Western Europe, and that preparation - by Norway and its 
allies - against hostile action might just deter an attack." 
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3. The US Navy and the High North 
Developments and Activities 1970-1980 
Naval power has long played a central role in the defence of 
American interests abroad. The oceans bordering North 
America have been both a barrier and a highway, separating 
the United States from potential enemies, connecting it to 
allies, and providing a venue for commerce and trade. 
Geography dictated a prominent role of naval forces in 
American foreign policy during the eigtheenth and nineteenth 
centuries, and with the emergence of the United States as a 
military and economic superpower, Americans have come tu 
depend even more heavily on naval forces as foreign policy 
instruments'. 
The Americans currently expect the navy to perform four 
missions that are vital to maintaining the kind of world order 
within which American values and institutions can survive and 
flourish. The missions are: 1) Deter nuclear war, 2) Keep open 
the sea lanes, 3) Project power ashore and 4) Maintain a 
military presence in troubled areas abroad2 • Supporting a navy 
that is able to perform these missions well is difficult even in 
periods of increasing budgets, and it is clear that the navy is 
now having a period of zero growth or even declining budgets 
which are likely to extend well into the 1990s. 
At the end of the 1970s, a decade of lean budgets had not 
only left the ship numbers at a post-World War 11 low, but 
most of the ships still in service had grown old. The Reagan 
administration, which made a larger navy the cornerstone of 
its plans to rebuild American military strength, sought to 
expand and modernize the fleet by providing new classes of 
ships capable of meeting the challenges posed both by Soviet 
naval power and by the diffusion of moderne military techno-
logy to such countries as Iraq, Iran and Libya. In order to 
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recruit and retain the kind of personnel needed to ope~te its 
new and complex vessels , the navy also attempted dunng the 
1980s to reduce ships time away from home ports. The 
attempt to simultaneously expand, modernize and redu~. the 
operating tempo led the navy to undertake its most ambittous 
shipbuilding program since the Second World War. 
The fewer number of ships made it more difficul~ fo~ ~e navy 
to support American foreign policy by mamtrumng the 
necessary military presence near trou~le spots overseas: In 
November 1979, after the US embassy m Teheran was seized 
by Iranian radicals, it took the carrier Midway and ?er escorts 
roughly ten days to steam from the Western Pacific to the 
Arabian Sea. The presence of two carrier ~attle groups near 
the Persian Gulf throughout 1980. was sustained for the most 
part by stripping both the Mediterranean and the Western 
Pacific of one of the two carrier groups normally deplo~ed 
there. Tbese redeployments occured at a time when the Soviets 
were expanding both their Mediterranean squadron and. the 
Pacific fleet, thereby contributing to unease among Amencan 
allies in those regions. 
This was manifest also in NATOs Northern region at the tim~. 
It had become evident that SACLANT planne~ t~ conduct his 
defence of the Atlantic sea lines of commumcatton South of 
the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom Gap. As a result of the 
increasing threat from the buildup of the Sovi~t Northern fleet 
which had begun in the early 1960s, the Umted States Navy 
had come to regard the Norwegian Sea as a "high:threat area" 
and it was openly stated by SACLANT at the time, that. he 
was not gooing to risk sending carriers int~ the N!lrwegian 
Sea unless he had available two or more· earners which co111:d 
cooperate tactically and mutually support each o~er. 'f?is 
attitude in turn, raised concerns among Norwegian semor comm~ders whether it was realistic to base the defence of 
North Norway on the assumption that the US Navy was able 
to protect the introduction of allied reinforcements, and to 
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provide air support for the defence of the strategically most 
unportant areas. 
In retrospect, it has been argued that during the 1970s the US 
?J!VY was caught in a vicious cycle that was at least partly of 
Its own making. As defence spending declined, the navy 
became increasingly anxious to maintain at least 12 large-
deck carriers in operation, and by the mid-1970s about 50% 
of the naval budget was devoted to building and operating the 
carrier force. The more money was spent on the carriers, the 
les~ there was to support, much less enlarge, the surface fleet. 
Thi~ helps to explain why ship numbers declined steadily 
dUfi~g the 1970s. E~ort~ for carrier battle groups are a high 
pnonty: and the decline m fleet size meant that an increasing 
proportion o~ the su?'ac~ fleet had to be dedicated to protect-
mg the earners. This, m turn, limited the navy's ability to 
patrol the sea lanes and maintain a presence near trouble spots. 
Proponents of continued reliance on large-deck carriers argued 
that these deficiencies could be offset in part by the carriers 
abili~ to pr~ject n~val air power directly against Soviet ports 
and au~elds . But m o!<'er to keep the carriers out of range 
of SoVIet land based rurcraft, the planes they carried had to 
become larger, which meant that the carriers had to become 
larger too. _The larger the carriers, the more expensive they 
were to build and operate, thereby making it more difficult 
to buy ~p!ru;ement vessels at a ~me when defence spending 
was declining. The fewer the earners available, the more vital 
it ~as thauhey were the best that could be built, thereby 
putting even more pressure on budgetary resources. 
By the start of the 1980s, the Reagan administration had 
inherited a fleet stretched almost to the breaking point as a 
result of expanded responsibilities and declining resources. 
~avy ship strength in 1980 was 479 battle force ships, an 
mcrease of only 13 over the post-Vietoam low in 1977. 
Acceptance of new responsibilities in the Indian ocean created 
numerous instances in which carrier battle groups were 
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required to remain on station longer than scheduled in order 
to support emergency deployment requirements. The increase 
in operating tempo came at considerable cost to the navy in 
terms of morale, recruitement, and retention of skilled person-
nel. 
In order to meet these increased forward deployment require-
ments, while reducing operating tempo to a more manageable 
level, the Reagan administration advanced three lines of policy 
itended to improve the navy's ability to respond to crisis 
situations. First, it developed a renewed carrier-building 
program itended to increase the number of readily available 
carriers from 13 to 15. Because of anticipated retirements and 
the initiation of the Service Life Extension Program in 1980, 
a net increase of two in the carrier force pursuaded Congress 
to authorize four new Nimitz class carriers (in addition to the 
two already under constroction in 1981), the first of which 
would not enter the fleet until 1990. 
Secondly, the Reagan administration requested the reactiviza-
tion of the four IOW A-class battleships, each of which was 
to become the centerpiece of a new surface action group 
complete with escort vessels. The Navy justified the reactiviza-
tion cost of 1. 74 billion on the grounds that the new surface 
action groups were integral-tl:l-its-Plans--to-expand to 600 ships 
and would enhance its ability to project pqwer ashore and 
maintain presence in troubled areas overseas. It was hoped that 
battleship action groups could substitute for carrier battle 
groups in forward deployment areas to reduce the amount of 
time spent at sea by the latter. 
Third, the Reagan administration proposed an increase in both 
number and quality of the escort and support vessels (cruisers, 
destroyers, frigates and underway replenishment ships) needed 
for the additional carriers and battleship task forces that it 
plauned to create. Some of these new escort vessels were also 
to be made available for independent operation, such as 
presence in the Caribbean and the Persian Gulf, and port calls 
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to friendly nations. These new ships were designed for 
effective operation in the high-threat environment posed by 
Soviet submarines and land-based aircraft. 
!Jle goal of these initiatives was a 600-ship navy that would 
mclude at least 19 task forces organized around a carrier or a 
battleship. A large increase in the size of the fleet was 
achieved during the 1980s: the number of deployable capital 
ships increased from 13 to 18, and the fleet as a whole incr~as~ from 479 ships in 1980 to 565 in august 1989. The 
rebuilding of the fleet, however, had taken longer 1han 
expe:ted and proven extremely costly, thereby calling into 
questton the navy's ability to achieve the numerical goals set 
during President Reagans first term. 
!Jle principle o~ a IS-carrier force was accepted by Congress 
m 1982, when It agreed to include funds in the fiscal 1983 
budget for two additional nuclear powered carriers, but it will 
take the better pan of two decades just to achieve a net 
increase of two in the number of deployable carriers. The 
delays encountered in reaching the IS-carrier level are 
indicative of the problems facing the navy now that it has 
entered the 1990s. Part of the reason for these delays is that 
it takes about seven years to construct a NIMITZ-class carrier 
and only one shipyard the US has facilities to build i~ 
Newport News Shipbuilding. 
A second and more troubling problem is the relentless aging 
of the carrier fleet. In 1980, the number of deployable carriers 
declined from 13 to 12 with the entry of the SARATOGA in 
the Service Life Extension Program. The addition of the 
VINSON in 1982 and the THEODORE ROOSEVELT in 1986 
brought that number back to 14, but the delivery of the 
LINCOLN, and the WASIDNGTON in 1990 and 1992 will 
simply compensate for the long-delayed retirements of the 
MIDWAY and the CORAL SEA. Completion of the STENN-
IS in 1996 will raise the number of deployable carriers to 15 
but only for a few years, since by 1998 the SARATOGA will 
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.· 
be ready for retirement, having completed. the . 15 years. of 
additional service made possible by the Service Life Extens1~n 
Program. Completion of the UNITED STATES (CVN-75) _will 
buy a few more years but probably no more than th~t, smce 
during the first decade of the Twenty-first centory six older 
arriers will follow the SARATOGA into retirement How ~ese ships will be replaced is a ~atte~ that has barely been 
discussed in public, much less decided. 
The navy has also incurred significant costs a;; a resnlt of !ts 
other programs for modernization and expansiOn. Th~ Aegis-
equipped TICONDEROGA-class cruiser (CG-47) was mtended 
to serve as the principal antiair-warfare escort vessel for both 
carrier and battlehip task forces. When the last vessel of the 
program's 27-ship production run is delivered, the average cost 
per ship will have exceeded $ 900 million. The first five of 
the ARLEIGH BURKE-class guided missile destroye_rs (DDG-
51), which are to be equipped with a less C?s~y versiOn o~ the 
Aegis-ystem, will cost well over $ 800 million each. Thirty-
eight of these ships are planned. 
The Reagan administration also committed the navy . to 
modernizing and expanding the nuclear attack submanne 
component of the fleet through the construction of a ?ew cl~ss 
of submarines, led by the SEA WOLF. Advances m S~v1et 
submarine and anti-submarine warfare te~hn.ology. have given 
this program such a high priority that It IS unlike~y. to be 
scuttled back much. At an estimated cost of $ 36 billiOn for 
29 submarines, the SEA WOLF program could con~e as 
much as 1/3 of the navy's shipbuilding budget over the _life of 
the program. In addition, the navy continues to modernize ~ 
sea-based leg of the strategic forces tri~d through constru~on 
of OHIO-class ballistic missile submarmes (S~BN). A smgle 
OIDO-class SSBN which in 1978 was estunated to_ ~st 
approximately $ 1.2 billion, now costs in excess of $ 2 billiOn. 
The importance attached to this most survivable . of the US 
strategic weapons systems is likely to make this program 
virtually untouchable. 
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Admiral James D. Watkins who became the Chief of Naval 
Operations when the "Maritime Strategy" was being fonnu-
!ated, set fo~ that the navy must be able to respond effect-
•vely to vanous fonns of conflict on a worldwide basis· 
"Preparation for global war is the critical element in ensuring 
dete~~ce, but our pe~~time operations and response in time 
of cns1s are also cnucal contributions to deterrence and 
s!Rbll!ty .... In fact, the volatility of todays international 
Situation suggests that we must expect to employ these 
elements of our Maritime Strategy in an expanding set of the 
'Yorlds trouble~pots"'. As these comments suggest, the Mari-
time Strategy IS based upon the premise that it is better to 
deter conventional conflicts than to fight them. It also recog-
nize~ that ll?is will. not .be easy to do, because the volatility of 
the mtemational Situation and the wide diffusion of modem 
military technology suggest an expanding rather than declining 
list of potential trouble spots. 
~e navy's a~~lity to contribute to the goals of crisis preven-
tion and cns1s management in non-nuclear scenarios is 
detennined principally by the number of independently 
deployable task forces available, and the speed with which 
they can n:ac~ the scene of trouble. The more task groups that 
can be_ mamtame~ on a forward deployed basis during nonnal 
~acetime operations, the more visible the fleets operations 
":Ill be_ and ~us the greater its ability to deter crisis by 
dissuadmg hostile states from challenging American interests. 
~e mari~me strategy was intended to clarify the navy's role 
m supportmg ?mad foreign policy interests, thereby easing the 
task of all?cating scarce resources among competing programs. 
For a vanety of reasons, however, the choices which were 
~acing th~ navy ~ere becoming more difficult. In spite of the 
m~rease m ~e. s1z~ of. the fleet, the navy's ability to respond 
qu1ckly to cns1s Situations was not improved much over that 
of the 1970s. This is due in part to the increasing demands on 
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the fleet, but it is also due to unanticipated shortcomings in 
the fleet configuration called for by the maritime strategy. 
The maritime strategy in effect reaffinned the navy's commit-
ment to an ambitious program for modernization and expan-
sion just as the resources available for the completion of that 
program were beginning to contract. Faced with chosing 
between a small number of high-cost vessels and a larger 
number of lower cost, but also less-capable, vessels, the navy 
opted for a fleet organized around 19 very expensive capital 
ships (15 carriers and four battleships) in the hope that 19 
task forces would be enough to cover the sea control, power 
projection, and presence missions while reducing operating 
tempo to a more comfortable level. The battleship task forces, 
however, have not demonstrated an ability to operate indepen-
dently, and even before the recent defense cutbacks the seven-
year construction time for NIMITZ-class carriers would have 
prevented the navy from reaching its goal of 15 deployable 
carriers until 1996, at the earliest. However, at a cost of $ 7 
billion for each of these vessels, including its embarked air 
wing the construction of additional NIMITZ-class carriers will 
very • likely be at the expense of the other shipbuilding 
programs. In view of the projected retirement of seven o~der 
carriers between 1998 and 2008 and the long lead time 
required to build and outfit new ships, crucial decisions on 
the composition of the fleet in the next century m~st be ~ade 
soon. And these decisions will have to be made m a climate 
of declining rather than expanding resources for defense. 
Contribution to deterrence and stability in the North 
There has never been a pennanent presence of US or other 
allied surface naval combatants in the Norwegian sea, like 
e.g. in the Mediter;anean, nor has this been ~en as ne~essary 
or desirable. But 1s has been regarded as highly des1reable, 
particularly by Norway, with a periodic presence and a "show 
of flags" by US and other allied ships in the Norwegian sea 
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:m~ in the waters adjacent to NATO's Northern region. This 
IS m order to enhance the credibility of the guarantee of the 
~ance to the Northern members and to counter any percep-
tions of Soviet naval superiority by the build-up of the 
Northern fleet. 
Up to 1976 maritime exercises in the Norwegian sea increased 
in scope in spite of the gradual build-down of the US and 
British navies. This is illustrated by the following table:• 
Exerdse Ships Countries 
Teamwork 64: 125 7 Silver Tower 68: 200 9 Strong Express 72: 300 7 Teamwork 76: 400 10 Teamwork 80: 160 10 Teamwork 84: 130 8 
As a result of the technological developments and reduction in 
number of ships, allied naval presence in the Norwegian sea 
was reduced up to the middle of the 1980s. Allied ships have 
since then increased their activities in the Norwegian sea 
somewhat. 
In naval exercises since 1985, one to two carrier battle groups 
have regularly participated in Norwegian adjacent waters. The 
total number of days the carrier battle groups have been 
present in Norwegian waters have increased from around 4 
days per year in 1985 to a level between six and eight days 
on the average.7 
The change in attitude of the US Navy to forward operations 
in the Norwegian sea no doubt was connected with fonnula-
tio~ ?f the "Marit~e Strategy" and the initiation of the ship-
building program m the early 1980s. The exercises in Nor-
wegian waters also resulted in new tactical concepts aimed at 
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increasing the protection of the carriers against attacks by 
aircraft and submarines by operating close to the Norwegian 
coastline and also when possible inside the fjords. 
In 1981 Norway and the United States signed an agreement to 
preposition equipment, amm~tion and fuel for ~ Marine 
Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) m ~e TI'Jilndel~g area m. Central 
Norway. This was a measure which was destgned to mcrease 
the credibility of allied reinforcements from USA to North 
Norway, in view of the buildup of the Soviet Northern fleet 
with its amphibious and air assets since the beginning of the 
1960s. The MEB arrangement came about at the recommen-
dation of a bilateral Norwegian-American study group, and 
was not related to the introduction of the US Maritime 
strategy. 
Another aspect of US carrier operations close to the North-
Norwegian coastline in the Ofoten- and Vestfjorden area is 
tbat the shorter distance over land to Northern fleet bases and 
headquarters on the Kola coastline could raise Soviet defensive 
concerns, and thereby become a destabilizing factor in .the 
situation in the High North. Allied carriers are clearly destra-
ble to achieve sea and air control for introduction of reinforc-
ements, and to provide air support for defence of strategically 
important areas in North Norway. But it is also evident that 
carriers should not operate in areas where it raises Soviet 
defensive concerns and possibly lead to countenneasures which 
may in the longer tenn lead to a more unsatisfactory situation. 
In 1990 the equipment, ammunition and fuel for the MEB had 
been prepositioned in rock-protected storage sites specially 
constructed for the purpose. The reinforcement -concept had 
been developed further to include air-lifting of the Marine 
Brigade to the TI'Jilndelag area in crisis or war, and the name 
was consequently changed to "Norway Air-Landed Marine 
Expeditionary Brigade", NAL MEB.' 
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Norway's Defence Command and the US Navy in 1971 
entered a bilateral agreement about logistical suppon for 
American naval units. The arrangement included use of 
logistical installations which had been financed by NATO's 
common funded infrastructure program, and suppon of 
American naval aircraft during operations from cenain 
Norwegian airfields. The agreement with the US Navy was 
updated in 1980 to cover logistical uppon for aircraft which 
were no longer able to operate from their carriers. The 
"Invictus"-agreement regulates suppon for the US Navy in the 
same way as the COB-agreements regulates suppon for 
reinforcements from United States Air Force in Norway. 
As a result of maritime developments in recent years there has 
been an increased requirement for logistic suppon from ashore 
to the Atlantic Fleet when it is operating in Nonhem waters 
with long and exposed supply lines back to its home bases. 
The Chief of Defence in Norway was therefore in 1988 
authorized, in cooperation with American military authorities, 
to establish how Norwegian and Allied requirements for a 
limited extension of logistical suppon for the Atlantic Fleet 
could be met and accommodated within the framework of 
existing bilateral agreements. The requirements included 
prepositioning of conventional ammunition and fuel for ships 
and aircraft in connection with existing and planned installa-
tions. It could funherrnore become needed to designate 
airfields which, in case, could receive supplies for onward 
transpon to allied ships in time of war. Lastly, there was a 
requirement to arrange for repairs of Norwegian and Allied 
ships in war'. 
The proposed agreement was limited, and did not in its 
substance represent anything new, and it could be effected by 
an addendum to the existing "Invictus"- agreement covering 
logistical suppon and ship repairs. The proposed agreement to 
provide logistical suppon and repairs for US Navy was 
presented to the Foreign Relations Committee of the Nor-
wegian Storting in August 1990. The committee did not want, 
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however, at that time to take a decision on tbe agreement, as 
it was feared that this would be seen to be "a wrong signal" 
after the events in Eastern Europe in 1989 and 1990. In the 
spring of 1991, the extension of the Invictus agreement was 
however approved by the Norwegian Government. 
Naval activities in the post-CFE era 
The Teamwork naval and amphibious exercise conducted in 
September 1990 was originally intended to include only one 
US carrier compared to two carriers in Teamwork 1988. The 
Gulf crisis, however, led to a massive reduction in the 
participating forces as units were deployed to the Gulf area, 
including the one US carrier and 5.000 Marines originally 
scheduled to take part in the exercise. Both the original 
reduction in US participation and the effect of the Gulf crisis 
on the exercise seem to indicate what to expect in terms of 
Western peacetime military activity in the Nonh Atlantic with 
the changing east-west relationship and an increased readiness 
for "Out-of-area" contingencies: 
Teamwork 88 Teamwork 90 Teamwork 9010 
Original plan: Modified plan: 
Duration, days 22 18 12 
US carriers 2 I 0 
Aircraft 500 365 140 
Ships 200 195 85 
Personel 45.000 39.000 14.000 
Teamwork 1988 also reached deeper into the Norwegian sea 
than Teamwork 90. Amphibious landings took place in the 
TJ'Illldelag area of Southern Norway, while Teamwork 88 
included landings in Nonhern Norway and carrier operations 
far into the Norwegian sea. Sources indicate that the emphasis 
in Teamwork 90 on Southern Norway and the lower region 
of the Norwegian Sea came about because of changes in the 
east-west relations and the reduction in Soviet out-of-area 
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operations. There was also a marked contrast between the way 
in which Teamworlc 88 and Teamworlc 90 were presented in 
news releases. 
Exercise Battle Griffin 12-26 March 1991 was to have been 
an exercise were the NAL MEB were to to take out its 
prepositioned equipment and take part in a field training 
exercise in North Norway. Because of the US commitment of 
forces to Persian Gulf, 4th MAB which had been specially 
trained for the northern contingency was not available and 
could not take part in the exercise. Instead a Marine Reserve 
Brigade was called up and sent to Norway to take part in 
Exercise Battle Griffin. 
The experiences during Teamworlc 90 and Battle Griffin 91 
illustrate several points: It had been clearly foreseeen that 
allied reinforcements could be diverted to other contingencies 
as long .as they had not been exclusively dedicated to the 
particular NATO contingency area. Dedication of reinforce-
ments to particular areas has however been hard to get, as the 
Major NATO Commanders considered that this would reduce 
their operational flexibility in a crisis. This has been regarded 
by the receiving members of the alliance as acceptable in view 
of that the probability of two separate contingencies arriving 
at the same time was relatively small. 
On the other hand it was appreciated that the United States 
was really making an effort to meeting its commitments in 
reinforcing NATO by calling in extra personnel at the same 
time it was engaged in a full scale war in the Persian Gulf. 
In the longer term it is evident that in the post-CFE and new 
east-west relations it is necessary to review the security 
arrangements also in the North. In this connection there are 
however some important questions which we do not yet have 
the answer to: 
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- Will the CFE agreement and the dismantling of the 
military confrontation in Central Europe be followed by 
a corresponding build-down of the strategic competition 
between the former USSR and the USA? 
- Will the removal of the threat of surprise attack and 
sustained large scale offensive operations in Central 
Europe be followed by a similar build-down of offensive 
capabilities in areas which are adjacent to the Nordic 
region? 
It is also evident that the CFE-agreement will have significant 
impact on NATO's force structure and on the the forces 
available for reinforcement of exposed areas. The challenge 
will be to apply the new strategic concepts and reduced force 
structures to the Northern region. 
The experience of the period particularly since the build-up of 
the former Soviet Northern Fleet in the early 1960s · seem to 
underline the the need to continue to maintain the deterrent 
effect of the alliance through credible reinforcement and 
support options, while at the same time increasing reassurance 
and confidence building through mutual measures. 
US Navy projected Circa 2000 
There were about 550 "total deployable battle force ships" in 
FY 1990 and current planning calls for 435 in 1997. The 
inventory will probably not level off at that point, with some 
claiming that the JCS envisages 420 ships by the end of the 
decade. The limited room for growth in federal revenues, 
aggravated by the decline in US economy, combined with an 
avalanche of increasing demands on the federal treasury - for 
example, the need to rebuild the transportation infrastructure, 
the difficulties in limiting the rising cost of entitlements, the 
failing of banking and lending institutions, and the need tu pay 
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off the interest on the public debt - all are placing great 
pressure on affordability." 
Whatever happens to ship-building accounts, it is already clear 
that early retirements will have a far greater impact on the 
fleet size in the 1990s than new acquisitions. As occured in 
the early 1970s, ships considered least capable are being paid 
off, even if though they retain some utility "in order to 
provide funds for the remainder of the fleet, including new 
and more capable ships that are being delivered". It was the 
early retirement of 16 older frigates in 1988 and 1989 which 
signalled the indefinite postponement of the 600-ship goal. 
What will the fleet's make-up be as it reduces? Table 1 lists 
the last published version of the 600-ship plan, plus the 
composition of the fleet if it were proportionately reduced by 
25% (to about 450 ships) and by 33.3% (to 400 ships). 
Proportional reductions are consistent with balanced fleet 
concerns, with internal Navy politics to satisfy the three 
primary "unions" and with the post-World War 11 pattern 
whereby the levels of aircraft cearriers , attack submarines and 
amphibious lift remained relatively consistent, even as absolute 
numbers in each category changed. These reductions would 
result in a fleet of 20 to 23 strategic submarines, 11 to 12 
aircraft carriers, three battleships, 80 to 90 cruisers and 
destroyers, 69 to 78 frigates, 50 to 56 amphibious ships, and 
67 to 75 tactical submarines, four to five patrol combatants 
and 85 to 96 logistics, support and auxiliary vessels. 
One can further refine these numbers. Both START and 
budgetary concerns have already resulted in the decision to 
produce no more than 18 OHIO-class TRIDENT submarines, 
the last of which is scheduled for commissioning in 1997, and 
no new SSBN is expected to appear until .the second decade 
of the next century. Hence the sea-based strategic deterrent, 
residing in 31 SSBN in 1990, will rest exclusively with the 
OHIOs after the last of the previous generation BENJAMIN 
FRANKLIN -class ships pays off in about 1997. The 18 
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submarines will each be armed with 24 TRIDENT C-4 or 
newer, more accurate D-5 missiles, and account for 3.456 or 
70% of the 4.900 ballistic missile wameads allowed by the 
START Treaty. 
Table 1. Proportional reductions of the 600-ship Navy a) 
Ship 6QO.ship 450-ship 400-ship 
Type Navy Navy Navy 
Ballistic missile 
submarines 2().40 23 20 
Aircraft carriers b) 16 12 11 
Battleships 4 3 3 
Cruisers and destroyers 120 90 80 
Frigates 104 78 69 
General-purpose 
submarines 100 75 67 
Mine countermeasures 
ships 14 1 1 9 
Amphibious ships 75 56 50 
Patrol combatants 6 5 4 
Combat logisitcs ships 65 49 43 
Support/auxiliaries 60-65 47 42 
Notes: 
a) 
b) 
For the '600-ship' goal, see 'FY 1990 Report of Secretary of Defense 
Frank C. Cariucci' (Washington DC: USGPO, 1989), p. 142. 
In all official references to 600 ships up to 1990, the number of carriers 
listed was 15, not the 16 in this table. The reason for the difference is 
that, as a matter of convention, the official references omitted from the 
count one carrier normally in at two - to three-year overhaul termed the 
Ship Ufe Extension Programme. Also excluded was a carrier permanent-
ly dedicated to the training of new aviators. The new practice, used in 
this Paper, is to include all carriers in the count, except for the 
dedicated training ship. 
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Because of adamant US government opposition, it would be 
sutprising if negotiated arms control had any impact on the 
size or make-up of the Navy's general-puipOse forces. The 
Bush administration has concluded with Moscow an agreement 
(which is politically rather than legally binding) not to place 
more than 880 nuclear-warhead land-attack cruise missiles on 
such forces, but that agreement is of little practical conse-
quence since there were no plans to deploy more than 758 in 
any case. On 27 Septemper 1991 President Bush also an-
nounced, as part of a package of initiatives affecting the entire 
spectrum of US nuclear weapons, that the US will remove all 
tactical nuclear weapons, including nuclear cruise missiles from 
its surface ships and attack submarines, and remove nuclear 
weapons associated with land-based naval aircraft.11 
In addition to the impact of budgetary factors on general-
pUipOse forces are threat assessments and the tendency of both 
naval and many national decision makers to favour large, 
sophisticated ships. With regional contingencies now shaping 
national and naval assessments, naval leaders have designated 
power projection (rather than ASW, the major concern in a 
global Soviet war) as the top priority in the retention and 
purchase of forces, and they view aircraft carriers as central to 
that mission. 
With great reluctance they have accepted a mandated reduc-
tion in carriers from 15 in 1990 to 12 by the mid-1990s; 
Congressional spokesmen, including the highly influential 
Senator Nunn, foresee the numbers eventually dropping to 
between ten and 12. Since President Bush and Defense 
Secretary Cheyney have themselves admitted a preference for 
carriers, it seems reasonable to assume that there will be at 
least ten, and possibly as many as 12, by the year 2000. There 
will also be two retired carriers maintained in inactive status. 
It is not clear how long it would take to bring them back on 
line: possibly 180 days or more. 
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It should be noted that, whatever the inventory, the overall 
effectiveness of the carrier force may decrease towards the end 
of the 1990s. These ships derive their versatility from em-
barked fighter, attack, electronic warfare, tactical surv~illance, 
refuelling and anti-submarine aircraft, as well as ~ehcop~rs, 
but in nearly all of these categories co~t, contractmg, ~estgn 
and oversight problems have resulted m the cancellation or 
postponement of programmes to build n~e? re~lacements. 
For example, a workhorse in power proJ~tion ~s the A-6 
bomber, whose basic airframe has been m servtce for . 30 
years. Nearly half the A-6s in the Atlantic Fleet have saggmg 
wings, barring them from vigerous combat maneuvres. It had 
been expected that, instead of being repaired, the A -6s could 
be retired as the follow-on A-12s entered the inv~nto~, ?ut 
the A-12 has been cancelled and is one of five earner avtation 
programmes that has been eliminated or put on hold. The 
Navy has spent nearly $5 bn in recent years on pro~mes 
which have yet to result in operational aircraft or, as m the 
case of the A-12, a test model. It would not be sutprising if 
the cost of fielding a new aircraft had a negative effect on the 
number of carriers funded in future budgets. 
Battleships also constitute power-projection _units. 'f?e _us 
Navy had three in 1990, but all are to be retired. Thetr size, 
the power of their 16-inch guns, their 32 TOMAH~ WK la~d­
attack missiles and their armour make them tmpresstve 
platfonns, and they proved highly useful in Operation Desert 
Storm, but they are viewed as too costly to operate, partly 
because they are so manpower intensive. 
As for amphibious platfonns, of which there were 6~ in 1990, 
naval leaders have indicated that they are movmg down 
towards a capability to support two-and-a-half Marine Expedi-
tionary Brigades (MEBs).This translates into a force of around 
50 ships, since it takes about. 20 to. li!l the assault ec.helons ?f 
one brigade. With 50 also bemg Within the range amved at m 
the proportional reductions, this figure is accepted here as the 
size of the amphibious inventory projected for the year 2000. 
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Cruisers and destroyers, numbering lOO in 1990, are some-
times collectively referred to as "battle force combatants " in 
that they worlc in consort with and provide anti-air and ~ti­
su?II!-arine protection to aircraft carriers, battlehips and am-
phibious ships. Hence their numbers are dependent upon how 
many vessels there are to protect. Their numbers will probably 
also be affected by the fact that all battle force combatants 
will eventually be armed with the TOMAHAWK land-attack 
missile, _givin~ them a power-projection capability. As a result, 
some Will be mdependently assigned to remain ready for or to 
engage in strike missions. 
Before Operation Desert Storm, the Navy was estimated to 
have about 350 TOMAHAWK land-attack missiles on surface 
sb!ps within striking range of Iraq. One ship alone, the AEGIS 
cmser SAN JACINTO, carried 122 missiles. These consisted 
of its normal complement of 12, plus another llO placed in 
~aunchers usually reserved for SAMs. Possibly also affecting 
mve~t~ry decisions is ~e potential utilization of ships with the 
sophisl!cated AEGIS au defence system in ballistic missile 
~efence. The Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO) 
1s reported to be "considering using shipboard sensors and 
weapons in the Global Protection Against Limited Strikes 
(GPALS), SDIO's restructured program for defending the US 
and its allies from ballistic missile attack". 
In the light of these factors, the numbers already on order, and 
of the institutional bias in favour of larger ships, it seems 
reasonable to project that the overall level of cruisers and 
destroyers will probably be somewhat more than the 80 to 90 
predicted strictly through proportional reduction; 90 to 100 is 
more reasonable. 
While the priority accorded to power projection has risen in 
the last two years, that accorded to wide-area sea control as 
an immidiate concern has decreased. The wide-area threat was 
linked to the prospect of a NATO-WARSAW PACT confron-
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talion, now accorded little credibility, and currently associated 
with warning times of approximately two years. It is therefore 
not surprising that the number of frigates, whose prime 
purpose is the protection of shipping, will drop below the 69-
78 units projected for a proportionally reduced force. Many 
Europeans value frigates highly, and they constitute the largest 
percentage of major surface combatants in their fleets, but, 
from an American perspective, they are the smallest, least 
capable and least favoured of major surface warships. 
The US is not building any frigates at present, nor does it 
plan to in the foreseeable future. There were 100 frigates in 
FY 1990, and there should be no more than 50 or so in the 
active and deployable reserves inventory by the year 2000. 
The frigates would be used to ensure local sea control (as they 
did in the Persian Gulf, for example, towards the end of the 
Iran-Iraq war), augment the protection of carriers, amphibious 
and underway replenishment ships, and engage in other 
aetivities such as drug interdiction. Another 40 units may be 
in the non-deployable reserves, where eight would serve as 
training ships and 32 would be mothballed. It would require 
180 days to bring them back into service. Crews on the eight 
training ships would be dispersed among the other 32 to serve 
as a eadre of experienced personnel around which entire crews 
would be assembled for each ship. 
Of all the Navy's sea-control platforms, the SSNs have long 
been considered the most effective for dealing with enemy 
submarines, especially in areas were it would be unsafe for 
surface ships or aircraft to venture. The size and and capabili-
ties of the former Soviet undersea fleet have almost exclusive-
ly constituted the threat which justified the purchase of US 
submarines, including the highly capable and extremely 
expensive SSN-2ls, which would enter service in the mid-
1990s. From a capabilities (as opposed to intentions) stand-
point, the former Soviet Union's own submarine-building 
programme, centred on the highly sophisticted AKULA and 
SIERRA boats, would seem to justify a robust US equivalent, 
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I, 
but ~timates of Sov_iet inteJ_Jtions. are generally having the 
opposite effect. Consistent w1th this development is the fact 
that J>?W~r projection has now replaced ASW as the Navy's 
top pnonty. 
Nevertheless, several factors suggest that there will be limits 
as to how much the submarine force will be cut back. One is 
that o_ther nations possess submarines which could pose a 
potenttal threat to American or allied interests. A second is 
that US submarines have an assigned role of supporting carrier 
battle grou~ operations. 'f!tey are also excellent platforms for 
warfa~ aga1nst surface sh1ps, covert mine-laying, intelligence-
collection, support to special operations, and land-attack with 
cruise _missiles, especially in circumstances where the US does 
?ot w1sh to em~loy or haza~ a surface ship. Another very 
unportant factor 1s that submanners constitute a very powerful 
"unioo" in the Navy. 
The long-term trend is for submarine numbers to reduce. In 
2000 there c_ould be ~ore tha:n 80 if those already approved 
fo~ constructton are butlt and 1f none of the existing units are 
rett~ before their thirtieth year. Since it has already been 
dec1ded, however, to retire _the oldest . submarines originally 
scheduled for nuclear refuellmg , and smce production of the 
new ultra-expensive SEA WOLF class (costing more than $2bn 
each) will be limited to one as the Navy moves to design a 
lower -cost option, there will probably be no more lhan 67-70 
submarines in the circa 2000 fleet. That range encompasses 
the lo:wer end of the 67-75 units projected in proportional 
redu~tto~s, and it is consistent with reports that the JCS are 
cons1denng a fleet of about 70 submarines in 2000. 
~ine countermeasures have never attracted a wide following 
~ the US Nav~. An on-going building programme will result 
m 14 ocean-gomg units by year 2000, and it is planned to 
supplement these wilh 18 coastal boats, of which about 13 
sho~d be o~rational by the end of the century. Incidents 
dunng Operatwn Desert Storm in which the AEGIS cruiser, 
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PRINCETON, and the amphibious ship, TRIPOLI, both 
suffered severe mine damage may result in additional ships 
being authorized, but they will not appear before the end of 
the 1990s. 
The number of combat logistics, auxiliary and support ships 
are largely a function of the size of the remainder of the fleet. 
Projections reflecting proportional reductions are a valid 
measure for force levels circa 2000; as the overall combatant 
fleet diminishes, this will reduce the number of logistic and 
support ships needed. In addition, the Military Sealift Com-
mand contains a Naval Fleet Auxiliary Force crewed by 
civilians, which supplements the Navy's own replenishment 
ships. These vessels carry food, ammunition, spare parts and 
fuel and can transfer these to naval ships under way. 
Table 2 summarizes the projections of the circa 2000 fleet as 
discussed above. It also lists the fleet as it exists today and 
specifies how it will change over the next decade, assuming 
the projections are valid. It projects 416 ships on average, 
made up of 18 ballistic missile submarines, ten to 12 aircraft 
carriers, 90 to 100 cruisers and destroyers, 50 frigates, 67 to 
70 general-purpose submarines, 27 anti-mine ships, 50 
amphibious ships, 40-50 combat logistics ships, 40-50 support 
and auxiliary ships, and possibly six small patrol combatants. 
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Table 2: 1990 and circa 2000 fleets 
Ship 1990 
lye 
Circa 2000 Difference 
Ballistic missile submarines 31 18 -13 
Aircraft carriers 15 10-12 a) 
-3 to -5 
Battleships 3 0 
-3 
Cruisers and destroyers 100 90-100 0 to -10 
Frigates 99 50 b) -49 
General purpose submarines 90 67-70 -20 to-23 
Mine countermeasures ships 24 c) 27 +3 
Amphibious ships 62 50 -12 
Patrol.combatants 6 6? 0? 
Combat logistics ships 60 40-50 -10 to-20 Supportlauxiliaries 74 40-50 -24 to-34 
Totals 564 d) 398·433 ·121 to 
·162 
Notes: 
a) 
b) 
There will be two carriers in inactive reserve status where it should take 
at least several months to bring them on line. 
Pres_ent plans call for an additional eight frigates to be retained for 
traJmng and another 32 to be mothballed. The latter group would require 
180 days to be brought on line. 
c) 
d) 
This total inclu~es both ocea~-goirig and coastaJ units, numbering eight 
an~ 17 respectively. The designated 600-ship force referenced ocean-
going umts only. 
This number is g~ter than the 550 mentioned at the beginning of this 
chapter because 1t Includes coastal minehunting vessels not included in 
the 'total deploy able battle forces'. 
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The seaborne units will be supplemented by land-based 
aircraft, the most important of which are the P-3 maritime 
patrol aircraft dedicated to surface surveillance and ASW. 
There are approximately 330 P-3s today, and they regularly 
operate in the Nonh Atlantic, the Nonh Pacific and the 
Mediterranean from bases in Nonh America, Asia and Europe. 
Their inventory should decline by about a third by 1994, and 
the force will approach the end of its service life before 2000. 
As a result of the cancellation of the planned follow-on, the 
p. 7, due to contractor performance problems, the Navy is now 
considering its alternatives, which could involve purchasing 
new P-3s or extending the life of the present aircraft. 
Finally, as noted earlier, there is a separate US strategic sealift 
fleet consisting of 296 ships in 1991, with 72 designated as 
active and 224 in reserve. The active units include eight US· 
owned fast sealift ships and 25 commercial ships on long-
term chatter, normally loaded with military equipment and 
supplies and positioned around the globe in order to provide 
quick support to Army, Air Force and Marine units deployed 
in a contingency. The Secretary of Defense's Annual Report 
published in January 1991 projects no increases in the size of 
the active force beyond FY 1991, but this may change as the 
lessons of Operation Desert Storm are analysed. 
There are 103 ships in the Ready Reserve Force, which are 
supposed to be available on five to 20 day notice, and 121 
ships in the National Defense Reserve Fleet (NOR) with a 
programmed availability of 60 to 90 days. The Ready Reserve 
Force is predicted to grow to 142 ships by 1994, while the 
NDR Fleet should be reduced since many of its ships are of 
doubtful serviceability and will almost certainly be retired. 
Operation Desert Shield revealed major flaws in the ability of 
the Ready Reserve to meet "surge" needs to transport unit 
equipment. The issue has attracted great attention in Congress 
and the Pentagon, and the DoD has commissioned a study of 
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defence mobility requirements. Numerous proposals have 
already been ~ade f? purchase fast sealift and ro-ro ships and 
to have them m a higher state of readiness than was the case 
in August 1990. To fill in the gaps, the US also intends - as !t did for the Gulf war - to rely on allies and on chartering; 
If ~cess'"?'. it also plans to requisition US flag ships or ships 
flymg foreign flags but owned by American companies. Prior 
to August 1990, the Military Sealift Command, which has day-
to-day operational responsibility for strategic lift assets 
(including shore equipment), already had about 60 privately-
owned cargo ships and tankers under long-term charter. These 
included 25 prepositioned ships mentioned above. 
Conclusions 
Donald C.F. Daniel projects a 25-33% reduction of the US 
~avy's total deployable battle force ships by year 2000. This 
IS based upon the assumption that the priority accorded to 
power projecti?n has risen in the last two years, while that 
accorded to w1de-area sea control as an immediate concern 
that was linked with a NATO-Warsaw Pact confrontation is 
now given little credibility, and currently associated with 
warning times of approximately two years. 
I~ _his conclus!ons Donald C.F. Daniel states that the possi-
bility of a maJor confrontation with the Soviet Union in the 
1990s is minimal, but should it occur it would raise a vast 
number of naval and other military issues. Focusing on major 
conc~rns raised in the Maritime Strategy debate of the 1980s 
provides a framework for considering naval employment and 
needs should there be a contingency in the 1990s. 
There ~ three principal conclusions according to Donald 
C.F.Dame~. One IS th~t a defensive strategy might suffice to 
contend with a submanne threat to shipping unless it becomes 
g~ographically widespread; an offensive tie-down strategy 
might then become more attractive. A second is that there is 
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little strategic leverage to be derived from conventional naval 
forces independently projecting power against the former 
Soviet homeland, but they could significantly contribute to 
bolstering the defences of allied states and helping regain lost 
territory. Third, there would be no compelling reasons for a 
dedicated anti-SSBN campaign. 
For a post-Soviet regional contingency in particular, the US 
would do well to provide more escorts for the protection of 
shipping and submarines in its circa 2000 fleet. But at this 
stage it would be impossible to predict whether plaoned and 
proposed additions to the Ready Reserve sealifi will be 
sufficient." 
75 
Notes 
1. The following is to a great extent based upon: Mark A. Randal 
and Wallace J. Thies article: The Opportunity Costs of Large-Deck 
Carriers: Naval Strategy for the 1990s and Beyond, Naval College 
Review, Volume XLill, Number 3, Newport N.!., Summer 1990. 
2. John Lehman, Aircraft Carriers: The Real Choices, The Washing-
ton Papers, Vl,No 52,(Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1978), 
p. 16. 
3. See, for example, Admiral James L.Holloway Ill ((Ret.), Naval 
Aviation Flies into the Future, Sea Power , July 1980, p.20. 
4. See: Cu"ent and Projected Aircraft C=iers, in: Randal & Thies, 
p. 11. 
5. The Maritime Strategy, Special Supplement, U.S.Institute Proceed-
ings, 1986, p.5. 
6. T!llnne Huitfeldt, NATO and the Northern Flank, Norwegian 
Institute for Defence Studies, FHFS Notat no 6, 1986, p. 25. 
7. Allied Reinforcements to Norway, MOD Norway Fact Sheet no 05, 
June 1989 
8. The Military Balance in Northern Europe, 1990-1991. Oslo, The 
Norwegian Atlantic Committee, 1st. ed., 1990: p. 21. 
9. Allied Reinforcements to Norway, MOD Norway Fact Sheet no 05, 
June 1989, 
10. Exercise "Teamwork 1990", Newsletter published by the Icelandic 
commission on Security and International Affairs, January 1991. 
11. Projection of US Navy to Circa 2000 is mainly based upon 
Donald F.Daniel, Beyond the 600-Ship Navy, Adelphi Papers no 261, 
Published by Brassey's for liSS, London, autumn 1991 
76 
12. President Bush's initiatives on nuclear anns, 27 September, 
Documentation, NATO Review No 5, October 1991, p.11. 
13. Donald C. F. Daniel, Beyond the 600-Ship Navy, Adelphi Papers 
No. 261, liSS London, automn 1991, p.44. 
77 
The Soviet Union collapsed in December 1991, and in its 
place are emerging a multitude of new states. In terms. of 
sheer volume the post -Soviet successor states are dominated by 
Russia, which is also inheriting the bulk of the post-Soviet 
military arsenal and, in the far north and the Arctic, remains 
confronted with the same basic geopolitical imperatives as the 
former Soviet Union. However all of the post -Soviet successor 
states, including Russia, are still in a process of profound 
transition. Their internal development, and their mutual 
relationships, have not yet been determined, and thus the entire 
post -Soviet area is in a state of deep flux. A situation which 
is made extremely unstable and dangerous by five factors: 
1. The severe poverty and desperation of the people. 
2. The continued decline of the economy and of living 
conditions. 
3. The lack of stable political institutions. 
4. The animosities between the nations of the fonner USSR. 
5. The mass of nuclear and conventional weapons left in the 
ruins of the Soviet Empire. 
Under these conditions this analysis of 'Soviet' military power 
in . the ~relic takes into account two factors. Firstly the 
restdual mterests and forces of the traditional Soviet military 
org_anisation affecting the Arctic, and secondly the way in 
whtch these forces are mutating in the new post-Soviet world. 
The first part of this section presents traditional Soviet 
strategic military interests and forces in the Arctic as they 
evolved up to 1991. At the date of writing - January 1992 -
the underlying Soviet military doctrine and the remaining post-
Soviet forces affecting the Arctic are of subordinate impor-
tance. Their impact and indeed very existence is overshadowed 
by the political changes taking place during the transition to 
a new post -Soviet system. In their wake the authority of the 
central Soviet leadership has ceased to exist and the Soviet 
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military organisation - though one ?f the !as~ holdouts of the 
old centralised command system - ts collapsmg. 
Nonetheless the classic Soviet Arctic strategic interests and 
forces remain important for two reasons. In the first J?i:U:e 
because they reflect the underlying Russian geopol~tical 
interests in the Arctic, and secon'!IY be_cause the assoc~att:d 
Arctic-oriented strategic forces still extst today. If_ Russta 
continues to exist in some form, and_ m~ages to retam some 
semblance of a large military orgamsatlon, then the_ bulk of 
the post-Soviet strategic forces will probably remam ~~er 
Russian command. Hence some knowledge of the compostt~on 
and rationale of the present Arctic forces is ~~~ful . as a gmde 
to future Russian military interests and capabtlittes m the area. 
However this presupposes that Russia itself does. not colla~e 
t tally and that some type of central Russtan authonty ~mai~ in place and that it manages to maintai~ an~ support 
a large strategic military force. Whether or not this ":tll be ~e 
case remains uncertain today. The second part of thts sectton 
makes a brief overview of the present disin~gration ~f the 
soviet armed forces and provides some alternative ~cen~~s of 
the likely future development of post-S?viet R;usstan milttary 
power and its implications for the nordtc Arctic areas. 
Soviet Strategic Forces in the Arctic 1955-1991. 
The following sections present the traditional Soviet strategic 
forces and interests in the Arctic as they evolved to 1991. 
This includes three types of forces (in descending order of 
intportance): 
SYS - Strategic Nuclear Forces. 
VPVO - Strategic Air Defence Forces. 
VMF - Naval General Purpose Forces. 
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However one should note that the forces and interests presen-
ted here belong to the past. The collapse of the USSR also 
involves her traditional military strategy and force structure. 
Thus the Soviet arctic forces presented here must be seen as 
being in the process of a rapid and potentially uncontrolled 
transition. However for the time being we must nonetheless 
continue to take them into account. Partly because their 
remnants still remain in force, and partly because they will 
form the backbone of the eventual Russian strategic interests 
and forces in the Arctic, which, at some point in the future, 
may re-emerge. These may not include a strategic nuclear 
element, but if they do it will be important to retain an 
understanding of its roots and legacy. 
SYS - Strategic Nuclear Forces 
The Strategic Nuclear Forces (SYS) of the Soviet Union 
consisted of three basic commands: 
1. Strategic Missile Forces. (R VSN) 
2. Strategic Submarine Forces. (VMF/PLARB) 
3. Long Range Bombers. (DA/MAA) 
The SYS was the most important command in the Soviet 
. Armed Forces. Two of the SYS forces - the Strategic Sub-
marine Armies and the Long Range Bomber Army - have a 
major Arctic operational orientation. This obviously does not 
mean that they are targeted against the Arctic, but it does 
mean that they need to use the Arctic area in one way or 
another in their ~artime operations against the CONUS. 
One of the main problems for the Soviet Union has been how 
to deliver her nuclear warheads to their strategic targets in the 
United States. With the exception of Cuba the Soviet Union 
does not dispose of forward bases near the US from which 
medium and intermediate range systems can be launched. As 
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a result the Soviet military has had two options when it came 
to reaching CONUS targets: 
1. To develop long range strategic nuclear delivery 
vehicles possessing a range permitting them to reach 
the CONUS on their own. 
2. To develop concealed strategic nuclear launch 
platforms which could reach launch stations within 
range of shorter-range delivery vehicles. 
Both of these types of system have been included in the 
Soviet arsenal since 1960, and both types have remained in 
use subsequently, as the two basic means for the Soviet Union 
to deliver her nuclear warlleads to the CONUS. The long 
range delivery vehicles have consisted of three basic types of 
strategic nuclear delivery vehicle (SNDV): 
1. Intercontinental range nuclear bombers (LRB). 
2. Intercontinental range ballistic missiles (ICBM). 
3. Intercontinental range submarine launched ballistic 
missiles (IC SLBM). 
Concealed launch platforms equipped with medium- and 
intermediate range delivery vehicles have consisted of one type 
of SNDV: 
4. Submarines armed with short-, medium- and inter-
mediate-range ballistic missiles (SR/MRIIR SLBM) 
and nuclear land-attack cruise missiles (SLCM).' 
Each of these delivery solutions confronts the Soviet Union 
with different basing and transit requirements, all of which 
have involved the Arctic in different ways. The long range 
forces have had to employ the shortest transit route between 
their launch points in the Soviet Union and their CONUS 
targets. This means in effect crossing directly over the Arctic. 
For the LRB this means flying through Arctic airspace, which 
has a major strategic impact on the area since it involves it 
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directly in Soviet offensive and US defensive strategic 
operations. In addition it has meant that the LRB main bases 
in the. early 1960's, and subsequently their Forward Operating 
Locations (FOL) have been placed in areas of the Soviet 
Union located as close to the US as possible in order to 
extend the range and operational freedom of the LRB over the 
US. Tilis has meant placing these airbases along the Soviet 
Arctic coastline and islands. 
Where the ICBM are concerned their extra-atmospheric 
ballistic trajectory causes them to pass over the Arctic. At the 
same time their considerable range (with the exception of the 
first missile system in use in the early 1960's) have meant that 
they could be based deep inside the Soviet Union. Thus 
neither their transit route nor their basing have had an effect 
on the Arctic. However they have had an indirect Arctic 
impact, by leading to the deployment of US Ballistic Missile 
Early Warning (BMEWS) radars in the north American Arctic. 
The driving force behind the development and deployment of 
the IC SLBM has been the need to find as secure maritime 
concealment areas for these as possible. Tilis has led the 
Soviet Navy to deploy them to sea areas close to the Soviet 
coastline and as far from western bases as possible, where she 
could concentrate her own general purpose forces to defend 
the SSBN's. As a result the IC SLBM have been deployed to 
the Arctic waters north of the Kola, protected by the Northern 
Aeet, and the sub-Arctic Sea of Okhotsk in the Far East, 
pro.tected by the Pacific Aeet. Tilis has placed the bases and 
mam patrol zones of the majority of the Soviet IC SLBM 
forces on the Kola and the adjacent Arctic waters, which has 
had a major impact on the Arctic. 
The conceale.d lau?ch platfonns had a different kind of impact 
on the Arctic. Smce the only system which could reach 
medi~-range launch stations within range of the US and 
re~run concealed was the submarine, it meant finding naval 
basmg areas providing maritime access routes to the Atlantic 
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Ocean, to reach the US eastern coast, and the Pacific, to the 
reach the US west coast. The only such basing areas in the 
USSR which are not blocked by narrow choke points under 
western control are the Kola Peninsula for the Atlantic and the 
Kamchatka Peninsula for the Pacific. This led to these two 
becaming the focus of a strong Soviet naval buildup as of the 
late 1950's, with a particular focus on the Kola Peninsula. 
Tilis meant that this Arctic area became a major Soviet 
strategic nuclear base and that the adjacent waters became vital 
transit routes for the Soviet strategic submarine forces. 
The Impact of the Soviet Strategic Nuclear Forces 
on the Arctic 
The Soviet strategic nuclear force has had eleven technologi-
cal breakthroughs when new or significantly improved delivery 
means were introduced to the strategic nuclear arsenal between 
1955 and 1990. Each has led to the deployment of a distinct 
new type of Soviet strategic nuclear delivery vehicle. These 
are listed in Table 1. 
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Tab/a 1. Technological Phasos In tha Sovlat SNDV Arsanal. 
, 
• 
'· ..
'· • 
'· • 
'· 
"· 
"· 
..... ""' 
1955 L.RB 
111110 SLBM 
11162 IC8M 
191111 IR SLBM 
1972 IC S1..B1.1 
1974 MIRV lcat.l 
I an MIRV SlBM 
••• u.-..a st.BM 
11184 IRALCM 
11185 MalO,_ ICBM 
1!107 IR Sl.CN 
DELIVEifY VEHIClE 
U,.-4, Tu-85 
... ,. 
... , 
........,~ ... 
........,.,. 
"'" SS.N·IB 
"""""·-AS-1:!/Tu-152. Tu-150 
"'" SS.N-21 
NB: Only h:k.o:IM ,,. lniUIII mcxlal at ...:11 !ypoo ol ,_ deiMuy l..:hnalogy. 
Table 2. Arctic Orientation Of tha Soviet SNDV Arsenal. 
YEAR TYPE AliCTIC ORIENTATION 
.... r ...... 1a hunchl..a.lnch Ara r,., •• 1o Targoc 
"" 
'"" 
'"' 
·-1972 
1974 
·~ 
••• 
·-·~ 
"" 
"' SrrvioK Araie 
..... 
·~ 
Clli8Sift""' 
""" 
"""" '* IC SlSM ... 
MIRV ICBM 
'""'""" """ 
"""""" ..... 
""" IR ALCM SovioK Araie 
Mol>,. ICBM -~""" 
IR Sl.CN ... 
~~~ up ID 11162. Aller 1!11;Z t11'r FOB.f'OL 
~s, Norw8gilln s.a 
Elatwlls.~ians.a a.,.,,. S. Batenlo, a-~~~nc~ 
... ,_ 
Arcllc: ac...·., 
Bartonll s-.. 
&ren!e, G...,land 
........ 
Atc:llc Oc:aan 
Carajilln An:llc 
--Can.lilln Araie 
--
11 BAign..., launch .... h 11111 can.!ian AJalc .,.,.piiiiiQD, 
NB; Only indudllt lhto lnnllll mod .. Ill 1111C11 1)11>" Dl ,_ d...._ry '"""""""'· 
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Each of these breakthroughs has also affected the strategic 
importance of the Arctic, by introducing a new weapons 
system which either depended upon the use of the Arctic for 
one or more stages of its operation, or else did not. This 
geographic orientation of the strategic nuclear weapons is 
determined by up to five factors: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
Basing area. 
Transit to launch area. (If different from base.) 
Launch area. (If different.) 
Transit to target. 
Target location. 
With the exception of US early warning, jet interceptor and 
forward operating locations for tankers the Arctic has not 
included major targets for the Soviet strategic nuclear forces. 
However the Arctic has represented a vital basing, transit and 
launch area for a number of the Soviet strategic systems types. 
This Arctic orientation is summarized in Table 2 . 
There are thus eight out of the eleven Soviet strategic delivery 
types which have bad a partial or major Arctic orientation at 
one or more stages of their planned operations against the 
CONUS. This does not mean that all of the forces making up 
these eight types necessarily included the Arctic in their 
planned operations. However an important pan did. Table 3. 
gives a rough outline of the percentages which involved the 
Arctic. 
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Table 3. Share of Arctic SNDV Operating In tha Arctic. 
YEAR TYPE BASING ARCl1C BASINOJOPERAllONS 
1955 LAB 
""""'"""" 
100" 
1960 SLBM 
ooastMna 
.... 100" , ... IR SLBM ··~ .... 1972 IC SlBM .... 70% 
•m MIRV SI..BM Kola 73% 1981 Under-lea SLBM .... 100" 1984 IR ALCM Sovilid Alclic 100" 
1987 IR SLCM """"""' Ko~ 70% 
Table 4. Relative Evolution of Soviet Nuclear Delivery Vehicles, 1961l-199D 
(In% cl total number of SNDV.) • 
ARCTIC , ... 1965 1970 1975 , ... , ... ORIENTATION 1990 
LRB Yn 56.8 32B 8.6 IRB V os 6.1 8.0 5.5 5.2 
lR ALCM V os 1.0 a9 4.5 5.3 
IR SLCM Yos 6.8 17.9 
ICBM (SS-6) Yos 22 0.8 6.4 IC SLBM V os 0.3 SRIMRIJR SUM" Yn 8.3 17.4 211.6 211.1 41D 2a0 16.9 23.8 
. 20.6 13.4 5.8 
ARCl1C TOTAL: 100D 55S 25.8 37.2 46.0 so.a 60.7 
I i ICBM No 0.0 44.4 742 &as 53.1 482 393 
TOTAL: 100D 100D 100.0 1110D 1110D 1110D 100.0 
• Including !ha ~ SR SLCM !or 1960. 
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This provides an idea of the rough proportion of strategic 
nuclear forces with a strong Arctic orientation. A more exact 
estimate, along with the evolution over time, is provided in the 
following subsection. However virtually the entire LRB force, 
first-generation SLBM force and latest generation of SSBN's 
specially configured for under-ice .operations have had a major 
focus on the Arctic, in the sense that the full force has 
depended upon the use of the Arctic for one or more of the 
four operations listed above. The remaining SLBM and SLCM 
forces have only had a partial Arctic orientation, since some 
30 % have had their SSBN and SSGN launch platforms based 
in the Pacific, south of the Arctic, along with their transit 
routes and launch zones. 
The next question is how important these systems were within 
the overall Soviet arsenal of strategic nuclear forces. This is 
shown in Table 4. which gives the relative size of the various 
types of forces in the Soviet strategic nuclear arsenal between 
1960 and 1990. 
The table shows the percentage of the various strategic nuclear 
weapons in the Soviet arsenal, measured in terms of the share 
of delivery vehicles which that weapons type represented. The 
resulting data can be complemented and modified by measur-
ing and taking into account additional factors, such as numbers 
of watheads, exposive power, penetrability, survivability, 
accuracy and so forth. However the above provides a basic 
outline of the strategic significance of each weapons type over 
time, and corresponds to the solid lines in Graph 1.1. 
The table also distinguishes between the proportion of Soviet 
strategic delivery vehicles with a potential Arctic operational 
profile and those without. This provides a rough indication of 
the evolution of the overall importance of the Arctic in Soviet 
offensive and US defensive strategic planning. From a high 
point in the early 1960's when the entire Soviet strategic 
nuclear force was based in the Soviet Arctic and depended 
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upon it for their operations the share dropped rapidly to about 
one-quarter in 197_0. This was due to the strong buildup of the 
ICBM forces, _wh1.ch reduce<! the strategic importance of the 
systt:ms operating m the Arctic. However since then the Soviet 
:"rct1c sys_tems have grown again. This is primarily due to the 
mc~ase m the relative importance of the SLBM force 
parttcularly as the intercontinental range SLBM began deploy: 
ment as of 1970, and the bomber/ALCM force as of the mid-
1980's. !bus today_ the proportion of Soviet strategic nuclear 
forces With an Arctic profile lies at a little under two-thirds of ~e full force: These proportions remain roughly the same even 
1f one takes mto account the MlR Ving of the ICBM force as 
of 1974, since it is compensated for by the MIRVing of the 
SLBM force after 1977. (See Graph 1.1., dorted lines.) 
I! we combine this. information with the data for the propor-
llol_l of the Strategic Nuclear Forces with an Arctic profile 
which actually had a high likelihood of operating in the Arctic 
we c~ get an overall view of the impact on the Arctic of the 
evol~tlon of the Soviet strategic nuclear force. This data is 
prov1ded in Table 5. 
Table 5. Arctic Impact of Soviet Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles. 
Percclntoge of tatal with Arctic apal'lltlonL 
LAND ... SEA 1960 1965 1970 1075 1HO 1185 1990 
Bombers+ALCM" FOB T- 56.8 "'A 8.6 7.1 8.0 16.8 28.4 IC Sl8M ..... 
""""' 
0.3 6.3 12.2 14.4 14.1 Other Sl..BM+SLCM•• .... Transit ... 22.0 11.8 16.7 1U 8.4 8.5 .... ..... 22 0.8 
TOTALS: 100. su 20.7 30.1 ... 40A ,,. 
LAB, JRB, lA ALCM. 
SM.lR/IR Sl..BM and IR SlCM. 
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The figures show the percentage of each type of delivery 
vehicle with an Arctic operational profile as a part of the total 
arsenal of Soviet strategic nuclear delivery vehicles in each 
year. (ie the data from Table 3. combined with Table 4.) The 
totals therefore show the percentage of the full strategic 
nuclear arsenal which is estimated as having involved the 
Arctic for some stage of its operations. The same data is 
presented on Graph 2. 
Graph 2. Evolution of Soviet Nuclear Delivery VehiCles with an Arctic profile. 
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This indicates the importance of the Arctic sea areas and the 
rec~nt growth in the importance of the Arctic airspace. The 
mam factor which has reduced the impact on the Arctic has 
been the ICBM force. In this respect the START Treaty is 
relevant for the futore of the Arctic. Since one of its main 
consequences will be to cut the number of ballistic missiles in 
both the US and Soviet arsenals the size of both the Soviet 
ICBM and SLBM forces will have to be reduced. This will 
have three consequences for the Arctic: 
I. The damping effect of the ICBM will be reduced 
further, as its relative size in the Soviet strategic 
arsenal diminishes. 
2. The bulk of the remaining Soviet SLBM force will 
probably be based on the Kola since the reductions 
will cut the number of older SSBN's sharply, and all 
of the modem SSBN types delivered since 1980 are 
based o~ the Ko~a. They are also specially designed 
for Arcttc operatwns, and the Kola remains the only 
basing area which gives them access to these. 
3. T?e ~!alive size of the air-breathing leg of the triad 
Will mcrease. Since this is entirely focussed on Arctic 
~it and the use of Arctic FOL this will probably 
mcrease the strategic importance of the Arctic 
airspace further. 
~s a result the strategic importance of the Arctic sea areas and 
auspace for a Soviet military planner has continued to grow. 
However at present these interests are rapidly being over-
shadowed by the collapse of the USSR and the chaotic 
~onditions emerging in the post-Soviet area. This is dealt with 
m the next chapter. 
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The Evolution of Soviet Strategic Forces and the 
Arctic, 1955-1990 
This section provides an historical outline of the devel?pme~t 
of Soviet strategic nuclear forces up to the early 1990 s. It ts 
divided into the main periods of the technological development 
of the Soviet strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, analysing the 
way in which the various weapons systems affected the Arctic. 
1955: Intercontinental Bombers (LAB) and improvis-
ed SLBM and SLCM submarines 
This first phase of the development of the Soviet strategic 
nuclear arsenal is characterised by the predominant position of 
the intercontinental bomber, coupled with an almost equal 
number of short-range SS-N-4 SLBM and SS-N-3C SLCM 
launchers, both of which had a nuclear land-attack capability. 
All of these systems had a strong Arctic orientation. The LRB 
depended upon the Soviet Arctic coastline for their basing, and 
upon the Arctic airspace for their transit to the US, while the 
bulk of the SS-N-4 and SS-N-3C submarines operated from 
the Kola Peninsula and had to transit the Barents Sea to reach 
their launch positions off the US east coast Finally this period 
also saw the deployment of the first Soviet fledgling ICBM, 
the SS-6 Sapwood. This system was primitive and never 
became an important part of the Soviet strategic nuclear 
arsenal, but it was interesting in that it's limited range made 
it the only ICBM to have been based in the Soviet Arctic. In 
the 1960 the composition of the Soviet strategic nuclear 
arsenal consisted of: 
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Type Number Percent 
LRB 104 56.8% 
SR SLBM 56• 30.9% 
SR SLCM 19• 10.4% 
ICBM 4• 2.2% 
Total 183 lOO% 
• Launchers. 
Virtuall~ the entire Sovi~t strategic nuclear force was based in 
the Arcttc, and the most important element, the intercontinental 
bombers, also depended upon it for their transit to their 
CONUS targets. This made the Arctic of vital importance to 
the Soviet offensive nuclear strategy. 
Long Range Bombers 
The deployment of the first Soviet strategic nuclear forces 
began in the ~id-1950's. The lack of forward bases within 
short and medmm-range of the United States initially limited 
the number and type of delivery vehicles available to the 
yssR. The Soviet Union sought to overcome this by develop-
mg . two ty~s of d~livery systems. On the one hand delivery 
v~hicles WI!h an mtercontinental range capable of striking 
dtrectly agamst the CONUS from bases in the Soviet Union. 
TJle firs~ such system to achieve operational status was the 
mterc?nttnental .range manned bomber. These began deploy-
ment m 1953 with the Tu-4 Bull, but it was not before 1955 
when .the first Tu-95 Bear A and Mya-4 Bison A reached 
operauonal status, that the LRB began large-scale development. 
~y 1960 104 Bear A. and Bison A were operational. Represen-
ttng 57 % of .the Sov1et strategic delivery vehicles this was the 
larges! force. m the a~enal at the time and occupied a primary 
plac~ m Sovi~t strategic planning. They also had a very strong 
Arctlc operattonal profile. To reach the CONUS they had to 
~mJ?loy the trans-Arctic flight routes, and their relatively 
limited operational radius and lack of airborne refuelling 
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capability made them heavily dependent upon the use of 
forward runways located as close to North America as 
possible. As a result a netwmk of strategic beavy bomber 
bases was built up in the extreme northern fringes of the 
Soviet Arctic in the late 1950's. By 1959 virtually the entire 
DA long-range bomber force was based on these airfields 
along the Arctic coastline.> 
These Arctic bases consisted of eleven main airfields with long 
runways, located along the entire Soviet Arctic coastline from 
the Kola Peninsula in the west to the Chukotskoye Peninsula 
in the Far East. They are still in use today - though no longer 
as main peacetime bases - and their military nature is indi-
cated by their isolated location, in most cases far from any 
human activity, and by their long runways exceeding four 
kilometers. These are necessary for the take-off of heavy 
bombers and interceptors when these are charged with a full 
weapons and fuel load but are not necessary for civilian 
flights. These DA strategic bomber runways are located at:' 
Runway 
Olenegorsk 
Belushya 
Nagurskoye SW 
Greem Bell 
Vorkuta East 
Sredniy 
Chekurovka 
Tiksi West 
Markovo 
Leninka 
Urelik 
Location 
Kola Peninsula 
Novaya Zemlya 
~lya Frat,l;tsa Iosif~ 
Mainland coast of the Kara Sea 
Severnaya Zemlya 
Mai~and ~st of the Lap~v Sea 
Ana~r Peni~sula 
Chukotskoye Penimula 
Tills does not include other military runway!, such as the long runways operated 
by the Naval Aviation, nor the shorter civil runways located next to the main 
civilian centres. 
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Four of the above bomber airbases were located near or in the 
nordic area: 
Olenogorsk 
Belushya 
Nagurskoye SW 
Greem Bell 
Due to the predominant role of the LRB force in the Soviet 
strategic nuclear arsenal these bases constituted vital strategic 
assets, and the trans-Arctic flight paths of the bombers were 
of major importance in Soviet planning. As of the mid-1960's 
the importance of the LRB force declined considerably, and 
thus the role of these bases probably also diminished. At the 
same time the bombers had their main bases withdrawn to the 
central and southern parts of the USSR. Howevere the bases 
were retained as Forward Operating Bases (FOB) for the 
strategic bombers, and have continued to play a vital role for 
the Soviet air-breathing nuclear forces tasked against the 
CONUS. The DA LRB force has continued to exercise from 
them right up to the present. 
SLBM 
The second main Soviet development effort in the 1950's lay 
in producing concealed launch platforms which could approach 
close enough to the CONUS to fire their short- and medium-
range missiles. This effort led to the initial deployment as of 
1956 of an improvised submarine force carrying the first short-
range SLBM's. As of 1957 this force was supported by the 
deployment of the first of a number of improvised cruise 
missile submarines, capable of firing short range nuclear cruise 
missiles with a land-attack capability. 
The first Soviet operational SLBM was the short-range SS-
N-4, with a range of 480 km. It was deployed aboard modi-
fied Zulu class diesel attack submarines, with the first con-
verted Zulu V beginning operations in 1956, canying two SS-
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N-4. By 1960 a total of seven Zulu V had been converted. 
During this time the first Golf I SSB and Hotel I SSBN were 
also deployed, both canying three SS-N-4. These latter two 
submarines were the first specially designed to carry SLBM's. 
The SS-N-4 SLBM force was rapidly built up, and by 1960 
it was the second largest element in the Soviet strategic 
nuclear arsenal. At that time a total of seven converted Zulu 
V class SSB and fourteen Golf I SSB and Hotel I SSBN were 
operational. They carried a total of 56 launch tubes, represent-
ing 31 % of the total SNDV force. However the initial 
strategic submarine force remained primitive, and though 
important was rapidly overshadowed after 1962 by the massive 
Soviet deployment of ICBM's. It was not before 1968 that the 
first effective SLBM/SSBN system began deployment, after 
which the Soviet SLBM force began a steady growth. (See 
below.) 
Nonetheless this initial SSBN force strongly contributed to the 
strategic importance of the Arctic, since it laid the foundati~ns 
for subsequent Arctic basing of the large SSBN forces which 
were to follow. The first SS-N-4 submarines were concentrated 
to the Northern Fleet bases on the Kola Peninsula,' which 
probably operated all of the first SS~N-4 submarines. Thus the 
Soviet sea-based strategic nuclear force had a strong Arctic 
basing orientation already in 1960, and has continued to do so 
to the present, making the Kola Peninsula one of the key 
basing areas for the Soviet nuclear arsenal. 
In these early years of Soviet SLBM technology, which lasted 
to the first balf of the 1970's, the basing of the SSBN force 
was determined by the limited range of their SLBM missile 
systems. This meant that their submarine launch platforms had 
to be based in areas providing access to their launch areas. 
The short-range SS-N-4 and medium-range SS-N-5 placed 
these launch areas in the coastal waters along the US Atlantic 
and Pacific shores. Thus the SSBN bases had to be placed in 
areas providing access to these waters. This need to reach the 
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Atlantic and Pacific persisted even after the deployment of the 
intermediate-range SS-N-6 SLBM in 1968, since it too could 
only cover the CONUS if launched from the western central 
Atlantic and eastern central Pacific. This range factor thus 
remained a primary determinant of Soviet SSBN basing up to 
1972, when the first intercontinental range SLBM became 
operational. (See below.) 
The Soviet Union possessed only two areas providing access 
to the above SLBM launch areas. One lay in the extreme 
northwest, along the 400 km long stretch of ice-free coastline 
on the Kola Peninsula, bordering on Norway. The other lay in 
the extreme northeast, on the desolate Kamchatka Peninsula off 
eastern Siberia. Of the two open coastal areas, the Kamchatka 
option is burdened by its remote location, far from Soviet 
demographic, industrial and administrative centres, and by its 
limited overland links with the rest of the country. There is no 
rail connection to the base.' and by road, which is in poor 
condition, it is roughly 3,700 km to the nearest railway 
junction at N agornyj on the BAM line. And this offshoot of 
the Trans-Siberian Railway line was only completed in 1984. 
In addition Nagomyj is roughly 1,600 km from Vladivostock, 
the nearest large naval resupply area. Thus virtually all logistic 
supplies have to be brought in by air or sea. Since the 
necessary quantities involved are large, as not only the base 
itself but also its entire surrounding infrastructure of defensive 
support bases need to be supplied, it makes this option 
uneconomical and impractical. 
This is not the case with the Kola basing option. This coast 
was only some 800 km north of Leningrad, to which it was 
linked by a double-tracked railway and an asphalted two-lane 
road.• In addition Murmansk itself was already a major port 
· and civilian centre with a population of 381,0007 and an 
industrial base. There are 19 large military airfields in the 
region, and extensive naval dockyards both by Murmansk and 
further east by Arkhangelsk, where the worlds largest sub-
marine production yard is located, at Severodvinsk.' 
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As a result the Kola emerged as the most viable basing option 
during the early days of the Soviet SLBM force, both its 
accessibility to the open seas, and its geologistic convenience, 
contributing towards making it the major basing area for the 
Soviet sea-based strategic nuclear forces. And with the growth 
of the importance of the Soviet strategic submarine fleet, the 
Kola Peninsula began acquiring a central role in the super-
power nuclear relationship. 
SLCM 
In these early days the Soviet Navy also deployed a number 
of short-range SLCM with a nuclear land-attack capability and 
which probably had this as their primary in the early 1960's. 
This was the short range SS-N-3C Shaddock SLCM, with a 
range of 460 km.' Subsequent SS-N-3 versions have had a 
primary tactical antiship role but this first 'C' version was 
specifically designed as a strategic land-attack missile. 
Deployment of the SS-N-3C began in the late 1950's aboard 
converted Whisky class diesel attack submarines. The first 
operational SS-N-3C were deployed in 1957 aboard one 
Whisky OC ('One Cylinder') SSG, carrying one missile. The 
following year the first Whisky TC ('Twin Cylinder') SSG 
with two missiles was deployed, and by 1960 the first of the 
Whisky LB ('Long Bin') SSG with four missiles became 
operational. That year a total of 19 SS-N-3C launchers were 
available, aboard two Whisky LB, five Whisky TC and one 
Whisky OC. At that point they represented the third largest 
force in the Soviet SNDV arsenal, with 10 % of the total 
force.'" 
All of these converted Whisky class SSG were based with the 
Northern Fleet in 1960." This could be for the same reasons 
as noted above for the SLBM, but it could also be because 
they had a dual role, tasked with attacking USN carrier battle 
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groups operating in the nuclear strike role against the western 
USSR fromn the Norwegian and possibly Barents Seas. This 
anti-carrier task would have been a priority mission for the 
Soviet Navy in the late 1950's, when the USN carriers 
represented an important nuclear threat to the USSR. Whatever 
the reason, the Kola basing of the Soviet nuclear SLCM force 
increased the strategic importance of this part of the Arctic, 
and since then a major portion of Soviet SSG/SSGN forces 
have remained based here. 
ICBM 
Full scale research and development of the ICBM also took 
place during the late 1950's, with the first operational model 
fielded in 1960. However this ICBM - the SS-6 Sapwood -
was primitive and during its operational lifetime between 1960 
and 1968 only four missiles were deployed. In 1960 this 
represented only 2 % of the total SNDV force, which rapidly 
shrank to only 0.5 % of the force by 1965, three years before 
the SS-6 was withdrawn. Thus it was never an important 
element in the Soviet strategic force. 
However from an Arctic perspective it was interesting since it 
was based in the Arctic/2 and has been the only Soviet ICBM 
to have been based here. The limited intercontinental range of 
this system meant that it had to be launched as close to the 
CONUS as possible. This led to the deployment of four 
surface launch facilities for the SS-6 along the Soviet Arctic 
coastline, on the two island groups of Novaya Zemlya and 
Zemlya Frantsa Iosifa" northeast of the Kola. 
1961: Introduction and growth of the ICBM force 
This second phase in the development of the Soviet strategic 
nuclear arsenal is characterised by the introduction of the first 
effective Soviet ICBM's and the very rapid growth of this 
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force. By 1964 it had become the larges.t ele~~nt of the 
Soviet strategic arsenal and it has kept this positiOn to the 
present, both in terms of numbers of missiles and num~rs of 
MJRV. The number of intercontinental bombers grew sh~tly 
in the early 1960's, peaking in 1964 with 173 operational 
aircraft, but in relative terms this force was noY" overshadowed 
by the JCBM's. During this ~riod the Sov1e~ SLBM force 
was reinforced by the introductton of the med1um-range .ss-
N-5 SLBM as of 1963, but the overall SLBM force remamed 
relatively primitive and was probably still cons.idered an 
uncertain and vulnerable component of the strategiC arsenal. 
Finally the short-range SLCM force continued to g_row with 
the addition of the SS-N-3A as of 1962. However th1s nuclear 
missile was primarily intended for tactical anti-ship operations, 
and it is uncertain to what extent the SR SLCM force was 
included in Soviet strategic nuclear planning for strikes against 
the CONUS. It probably still remained. part. of conti_ngenc~ 
planning, but it is no longer included m th1s an~ys1s as 1t 
would probably have had a very secondary rol~. Fmally one 
should also note the introduction of the first Sov1et IRBM, the 
4,100 km range SS-5 Skean as of 1961. With the exception of 
Alaska this missile did not have the range to reach the 
CONUS from Soviet launch sites and thus is not included 
here. However one should note that one of its ten basing areas 
did lie in the Arctic, on the Kola Peninsula south of Mur-
mansk The other nine were placed along the western and 
southe~ Soviet frontiers. The relative proportion of Soviet 
strategic nuclear delivery vehicles in the 1965 was: 
Type Number Pen:ent 
LRB 163 32.8% 
MRJSR SLBM 110 22.0% 
ICBM (SS-6) 4 0.8% 
ARCTIC TOTAL 277 55.6% 
ICBM 221 44.4% 
TOTAL 498 lOtl.O % 
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Of these a little over half had an Arctic orientation. Thus the 
introduction of the effective Soviet ICBM force was reducing 
the strategic imponance of the Arctic. This effect has con-
tinued to the present, though the overall number of delivery 
vehicles and MIRV has grown dramatically. 
ICBM 
The Soviet ICBM force began a rapid growth and qualitative 
development as of 1961 when the first SS-7 Saddler were 
deployed. In the following six years a funher four ICBM 
types were deployed: the SS-8 Sasin in 1964, the SS-9 Scarp 
Mic 1 in 1965 and the SS-11 Sego Mk. 1 in 1966. During 
this time the number of missiles also grew by a factor of 90, 
from 10 ICBM in 1961 to 909 missiles in 1968. 
With . the exception of the 4 SS-6 Sapwood none of these 
ICBM had an Arctic orientation. They were based in the 
southern and central pans of the USSR and their extra-
atmospheric ballistic trajectory placed their transit routes far 
above the Arctic airspace. While they did increase the US 
early warning requirements in the Arctic, leading to the 
d~loyment of the BMEWS radar central on Greenland, they 
dtd. not affect the Arctic significantly in any other way. Thus 
thetr development actually helped reduce the strategic impor-
tance of the Arctic to both the USSR and the US, but 
diminishing the relative imponance of those strategic nuclear 
delivery vehicles which retained an Arctic orientation. This has 
remained the case up to the present. 
LRB 
The predominance of the LRB force in the Soviet arsenal 
rapidly declined following the massive deployment of ICBM's 
after 1961, and by 1965 the LRB only represented 33 % of 
the total number of delivery vehicles. However the absolute 
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number of intercontinental bombers continued to grow into the 
mid-1960's, peaking in 1964 when 173 bombers were opera-
tional (30 Tu-95B, 85 Tu-95A and 58 Mya-4A). At the same 
time the quality of the LRB force improved, with the deploy-
ment of the improved Bear B (1962) and C (1963) bombers 
with an extended operational radius of 5,600 km, giving them 
a truly intercontinental capability. The absolute size of the 
LRB force remained constant at roughly this level for the next 
twenty years, but it's relative size in the arsenal shrank 
strongly. By 1970 they represented 8 % of the total SNDV 
force, at which level they remained for the next founeen 
years, until the deployment of the first Soviet ALCM forces. 
It was also to take some 20 years before the LRB force 
received its first new bomber, consisting of the modified Tu-
95G in 1984. As a result the strategic imponance of the LRB 
force rapidly declined after its peak in 1960, and was not to 
grow again until the deployment of the Soviet ALCM force 
in 1984. 
The Arctic basing of the LRB force was also withdrawn in the 
early 1960's, when most of the heavy bombers were rebased 
in the western and southwestern USSR. with only a small 
force remaining on the Kola and along the Arctic coast.14 By 
1962 these had also been relocated to the central USSR," and 
since then the bulk of the long range bomber force has been 
based in western Russia, the Ukraine and the Far East, with 
four main operating bases in the west and one in the far east.16 
However though the heavy bombers were rebased to central 
Russia they retained their dependence upon the trans-Arctic 
flight paths to reach their CONUS targets as well as the need 
for final take off from points located as close to the CONUS 
as possible. Thus the Arctic airfields remained vital for their 
missions and were kept at an operational status, but now as 
Forward Operating Bases (FOB), providing dispersal sites for 
the bombers during alen and forward suppon for their Arctic 
transit. Thus the Arctic bases have remained an essential pan 
of the operational capability of the LRB force, and they have 
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maintained a steady exercise pattern involving these bases up 
to the present However the relative importance of this leg of 
the strategic arsenal declined significantly up to the mid-
1980's. 
SR!MR SLBM 
In absolute terms the size of the Soviet SLBM force doubled 
between 1960 and 1965, growing from 56 launch tubes in 
1960 to 110 launch tubes in 1965. At the same time the new 
medium range SS-N-5 Sark SLBM was introduced in 1964 
which with its 1,400 km range improved the capabilities of th~ 
SLBM weapons system. However the relatively vulnerable 
launch platform, the Hotel II class SSBN, and limited target 
coverage of the missile, continued to make this weapons 
system unsatisfactory, particularly in comparison to the 
capabilities of the new ICBM force. As a result SLBM 
development remained slow and did not match the far more 
rapid growth of the ICBM force. Thus the relative size of the 
SLBM force fell to 22 % of the strategic delivery vehicles in 
1965. 
Approximately 80% of this force - or an estimated 89 SR/MR 
SLBM launchers - were deployed with the Northern Fleet 17 
1965 marl<:ed the beginning of the deployment of SLBM 
submarines to the Pacific Fleet, which now included an 
estimated 20% of the SSBN/SSB force. This led to a split of 
the Soviet SSBN force, with approximately two thirds operat-
ing from the Kola and one third from the Kamchatka Penin-
sula. This division prevailed up to the early 1990's, though as 
we shall see the Kola SSBN's became far more important as 
of the early 1980's. 
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1968: Introduction and growth of the first powerful 
SLBM force 
The third phase in the development of the Soviet strategic 
delivery force came in 1968 with the deployment of the SS-
N-6 Serb/Yankee class SLBM/SSBN system. This was the first 
truly effective Soviet SLBM/SSBN system and marl<:ed the 
beginning of a steady quantitative and qualitative buildup of 
the Soviet SSBN forces. This continued to the early 1990's, 
leading to a major increase of the strategic importance of the 
Arctic waters. At the same time the qualitative and quantitative 
growth of the ICBM continued, with the force multiplying .by 
a factor of six between 1965 and 1970. In 1970 the relanve 
proportion of Soviet strategic nuclear delivery vehicles w~s: 
Type Number Percent 
SR/MRIIR SLBM 311 16.9% 
LRB 157 8.6% 
IC SLBM 6 0.3% 
ARCTIC TOTAL 474 25.8% 
RVSNICBM 1,361 74.2% 
TOTAL 1,835 100.0 % 
The share with an Arctic orientation had now dropped to 
roughly one quarter, indicating a corresponding drop in the 
importance of the Arctic in Soviet offensive nuclear strategy. 
ICBM 
The Soviet ICBM force remained the predominant force in the 
strategic arsenal and continued a strong quantitative and 
qualitative growth. The number of missiles multiplied six times 
between 1965 and 1970, and one new type, the SS-13 Savage 
Mic. 1, was deployed in 1969. With roughly three-quarters of 
all delivery vehicles in 1970 it was now the largest component 
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of the Soviet strategic arsenal. As before this force did not 
have an Arctic orientation, reducing the strategic significance 
of the Arctic further. 
SLBM 
The Soviet SLBM force began a rapid growth in numbers and 
status following the deployment in 1968 of the intermediate 
range SS-N-6 Serb SLBM and its specially configured Yankee 
class SSBN. The SS-N-6/Yankee system provided a major 
boost over the limited capability and considerable vulnerability 
of the first and second generation SS-N-4 and SS-N-4 
SLBM/SSBN force. The Yankee I class SSBN had an ad-
vanced capability for accurate navigation and missile launch, 
while its survivability was increased with enhanced silencing 
techniques and electronic systems. Secondly the SS-N-6 missile 
itself had a far greater range than its predecessors, with the 
first version (SS-N-6 Mk. I) capable of reaching targets 2,400 
km away, and the Mk. 2 and 3 versions deployed in 1973 and 
1974 respectively, with ranges of 3,000 km. The patrol zones 
of the Yankee class still lay in the Atlantic and Pacific off the 
US east and west coasts," but now the Soviet SSBN force 
could cover the entire CONUS for the first time. It also meant 
that their launch areas were now both further removed from 
the US coasts and could encompass a far greater expanse of 
ocean, thereby increasing the chances of the Yankee escaping 
detection and localisation. 
The first 48 SS-N-6 were deployed aboard three Yankee 
SSBN's in 1968. Within four years, by 1972, 26 Yankee class 
SSBN's with 416 SS-N-6 launchers were operational, and the 
full force of 34 Yankee SSBN's with 544 launchers was 
deployed by 1976. During this time the SS-N-5 force grew at 
a slower pace, as the SS-N-4 was phased out and its SSB/-
SSBN reconfigured to carry the SS-N-5. In 1970 the seaborne 
force thus consisted of 311 launch tubes for short, medium 
and intermediate SLBM: 
104 
Type Number 
SS-N-6 Serb Ml 224 
SS-N-5 Sark 45 
SS-N-4 42 
Range (km) 
2.400 
1.400 
480 
229 SLBM launchers are estimated as deployed with the 
Northern Fleet, or 74 % of the full force." Thus ro?ghly three 
quarters of the SSBN force operated from the Arctic bases on 
the Kola and would have had to transit the Barents Sea 
enroute to their launch stations off the east coast of the US. 
The SS-N-6/Yankee system represented a major advance in 
soviet SLBM/SSBN technology and noticeably _boosted ~e 
status and role of the SLBM forces in Sov1et strategic 
planning. This is both indicated by Soviet stateme~ts and ?Y 
command changes. As of the late 1960's the s~mor Sov1et 
leadership began referring to the SSBN force m the same 
context as the RSVN ICBM forces, and as. an int~gral part ?f 
the long range striking power of the Sov1et Umon. And m 
1969 or 1970 - once the SS-N-6/Yankee programme was well 
underway - the Commander of the Northern Fleet S.M. Lo~v 
was promoted to Admiral of the Fleet_ This ~as ~e first ume 
a Soviet officer reached this rank while servmg m an opera-
tional command, and provides a strong indication ?f both ~e 
high ranking of the SLBM force in Soviet strategic plannmg 
as of this date, and of the primary role played by the North~rn 
Fleet One should also note that in 1972 or 1973 Admiral 
Lobo~ was promoted further when he was appointed tp the 
General Staff as the highest ranking naval officer ever to be 
assigued to that body, with the same rank as ~e Chief of the 
General Staff, General of the Army Kulikov. 
In 1970 the Soviet Navy also began trials of its first inter-
continental range SLBM. This was the 7,800 km range ~S­
N-8 Mk. 1 mounted aboard a modified Hotel Ill class tnals 
SSBN with six launchers." The Hotel Ill was deployed ~ith 
the Northern Fleet"- operating from the Kola and Severodvmsk 
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facilities. These missiles were probably not yet operational but 
formed pan of the evaluation and trials programme for the SS-
N-8. They heralded the beginning of a surge in the number 
and importance of the Soviet SLBM forces which was to take 
place in the following years and continue steadily to the 
1990's. 
LRB 
The size of the heavy bomber force fell slightly, as no new 
systems were constructed and the existing aircraft were lost to 
attrition and the missiles were tested. As a result the inter-
continental bomber force was now the smallest, and its relative 
strength was to continue to decline until the early 1980's. In 
1970 the force consisted of 157 aircraft: 
Type Number Radius (km) 
Tu-95 Bear B/C 75 5,600 
Tu-95 Bear A 30 
Mya4 Bison A 52 
During this period the DA heavy bomber basing, transit routes 
and Arctic forward support requirements remained basically 
unchanged, but the relative importance of this force declined 
strongly. 
1972: Introduction of the intercontinental-range SLBM 
The fourth technological breakthrough in the development of 
the Soviet strategic nuclear force was the operational deploy-
ment of the intercontinental range SLBM as of 1972. This was 
the SS-N-8 Sawfly Mk. 1, mounted in twelve launchers aboard 
the new Delta I class SSBN. It led to a very rapid additional 
buildup of the SLBM force, boosting the growth of the SLBM 
force already underway as pan of the SS-N-6/Y ankee pro-
gramme. As a result the size of the SLBM force doubled from 
106 
311 launch tubes in 1970 to 771 launch tubes in 1975, of 
which 162 were intercontinental range SS-N-8 deployed aboard 
twelve Delta I and 11 SSBN's.23 All of the modern SS-N-8 
force was operating with the Northern Fleet from the Kola 
basing complex:24 
Northern F1eet Northern Fleet 
Total Class Year SSBN Lnchr Launchers 
3 Delta n 1975 3 48 100% 
9 Delta I 1972 9 108 100% 
I Hotel m 1969 I 6 100% 
12 12 162 100 % 
At the same time the intermediate-range SS-N -6 force had 
continued to grow, increasing the size of the transit-oriented 
SR/MRIIR SLBM force to 609 launch tubes aboard 60 
SSBN/SSB. 66 % of this force, or 406 launchers, were 
deployed with the Northern Fleet:"' 
Northern Fleet Pacific Fleet No1hlm Flo;t 
Total Class Year SSBN Lnchr SSBN Lnchr Launchers 
33 Yaokee I 1967 22 352 11 176 66% 
7 Hotel n 1963 5 15 2 6 71% 
13 Golfll 1964 8 24 5 15 61% 
7 Golf I 1960 5 15 2 6 71% 
60 40 406 20 203 66% 
As a result a total of 568 SLBM launchers were based on the 
Kola, representing three quarters of the full force (74 %). 
However one should note that since the Soviet Navy had now 
built up a sizeable and modern intercontinental and inter-
mediate range SLBM force it is likely that the older Hotel 
and Golf class SSBN's armed with medium and short range 
SLBM were reallocated a theatre role for Europe and the Far 
East. 
The development of the intercontinental SLBM system was of 
major importance for the Arctic for two reasons. In the first 
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place it boosted the viability of the SSBN force in Soviet 
strategic planning since it increased the security of the 
SLBM's by eliminating the need to transit to launch stations 
off the US east and west coasts. Instead SSBN patrol and 
launch stations could now be placed in the Soviet inner waters 
near their main bases, increasing both security and readiness. 
Since a major part of the Soviet SLBM force was already 
operating from the Arctic bases on the Kola this meant that 
the increase in the strategic significance of the SLBM force in 
general also boosted the importance of the Arctic. 
Secondly, the new Soviet intercontinental range SLBM force 
became specially focussed on the Arctic, since one of its 
principal new patrol and launch zones came to lie in the 
Arctic waters, in the ice-free areas of the Barents and Green-
land seas." This led to an initial concentration of all Soviet 
Delta class IC SLBM carriers to the Kola bases, which 
provided the only access to the Arctic patrol zones. Subse-
quently a part of the Delta force was also assigned to the 
Pacific Fleet, with roughly one-third operating in the Sea of 
Okhotsk from the Kamchatka bases. 
According to the US Navy no Delta class SSBN were detected 
passing south of the GIFUK gap since 1975.27 This need to 
protect the Soviet SSBN force was reinforced during the 
1970's by the growing USN and RN ASW capabilities. In this 
extremely high technology field the US has made considerable 
advances since the war, making those parts of the oceans 
where the US and allied forces can maintain sea control 
increasingly dangerous to Soviet submarincs.28 With the 
development of the SOSUS system in the late 1950's" and the 
regular improvements on the system since then, access into the 
Atlantic and Pacific became increasingly hazardous for Soviet 
submarines. SOSUS arrays were reportedly concentrated in two 
areas off the Soviet strategic submarine bases; along the 
Aleutian Islands covering the Talinskaia Bay base, and in the 
GIFUK gap.'" covering access from the Kola basing complex 
to the Atlantic. The hydrophone belts, which are linked to 
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sophisticated computer systems at local shore stations which 
in tom are integrated into computer systems on the continental 
us. are capable both of identifying individual submarines by 
their accoustic signatore and of narrowing down their location 
to an area within a radius of some 50 nautical miles." 
According to Rear Admiral John Grove, RN, who was chief 
Polaris executive in the British Ministry of Defence, the 
NATO detection capabilities in the north Atlantic are highly 
effective: "As far as is known Britain detects every Soviet 
submarine in the area and the Soviets detect no British 
submarines."32 Another report states that the US SOSUS array 
between Greenland and Scotland is able to detect every Soviet 
submarine that enters the Atlantic from Murmansk. 33 
The development of the IC SLBM had four major conse-
quences for the Arctic area. Firstly it increased the overall 
importance of the SSBN force. Secondly it made the SSBN 
bases on the Kola more important. Thirdly it added a new 
element to the Arctic strategic environment by making the 
nordic Arctic waters a primary Soviet SSBN patrol zone, and 
fourthly, as result of this, it boosted the development of the 
Northern Fleet general purpose forces, since the Soviet Navy 
now could argue that they were needed to protect the vital 
SSBN patrols in the Arctic waters. This was probably one of 
the main arguments which permitted Admiral Gorshkov to 
continue his strong buildup of the Soviet Navy and the 
Northern Fleet in particular. 
1974: Introduction and growth of the MIRVed ICBM 
The next major technological breakthrough in the Soviet 
strategic arsenal was the deployment of the SS-19 Stiletto Mk 
1. as of 1974. This was the first Soviet MIRVed ICBM, 
leading to a virtual exponential growth in the number of 
independently targetable ICBM warheads between 1974 and 
1980. During this period three MIRVed ICBM systems were 
deployed: 
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1974 SS-19 Stiletto Mk. I 
1975 SS-17 Spank" Mic. I 
1977 SS-18 Salilll Mk. 2 
6MIRV 
4 MIRV 
8MIRV 
'f!le numbe~ of independently targetable ICBM warlieads 
tripled, surgmg from 1,587 in 1974 to 5,002 in 1980. From 
then ~n the quantitative growth steadied down, growing to 
6,545 m the next ten-year period up to 1990. (See Graph 1.1.) 
However the strong qualitative development continued with an 
additional four MIRVed ICBM systems deployed 'between 
1980 and 1987: 
1982 SS-17 Spanker Mk. 3 
1982 SS-18 Salilll Mk. 4 
1982 SS-19 Stiletto Mic. 3 
1987 SS-24 Scalpel Mk. I 
4 MIRV 
10 MIRV 
6MIRV 
10 MIRV 
~s development would have led to a reduction in the relative 
~Ize of the other elements of the strategic nuclear forces had 
It not been accompanied after 1977 by the MIR Ving of the 
SLBM force. A comparable development took place for the 
LRB force fter 1984, when the intercontinental bombers were 
boosted with their own 'MIRV', the AS-15 ALCM which 
pe~it17d each ALCM bomber (Bear H and Blackjack) to 
stn:ke eight separate targets. (See below.) As it was it tempo-
ranly boosted the predominant position of the ICBM force 
Thus ~e relative size of the components of the Soviet 
~trategic nu~lear force in the following years was (measured 
m terms of mdependently targetable warheads):34 
1974 1977 1980 1984 1987 1990 
ICBM 65.6 % 61.7 % 70.8 % 69.6 % 64.0 % 59.5 % 
SLBM 27.9% 34.2% 27.0% 28.7% 31.0% 33.1 % 
LRB 6.5 % 4.1 % 2.2 % 1.7 % 5.0 %• 7.4%• 
• Including ALCM load of 8 ALCM per Bear H and Blackjack. 
llO 
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Intermediate-range bombers 
A second new development in the Soviet nuclear forces in 
1974 was the deployment of the Tu-26 Backfire B with the 
Long Range Aviation Armies. 1bis was an intermediate-range 
bomber with a primary theatre role, but which it is argued 
could have operated against strategic targets in the northern 
CONUS." The Backfire B has an unrefuelled operational 
radius of 4,430 km, which permits it to reach New Foundland 
on two way missions from forward airbases in the Soviet 
northwestern Arctic, and brings it all the way to Washington 
State from bases on the Anadyr Peninsula in eastern Siberia. 
The Backfire B deployed with the DA were also fitted with an 
aerial refuelling probe which made air-to-air tanking possible, 
further extending their reach. According to one US expert the 
Tu-26 has a two-way range to cover almost all of the CON-
US, if staged via Arctic bases, uses inflight refuelling and 
maintains a subsonic limited low-level flight profile.'• This 
theme is repeated in the Soviet Military Power series, which 
indicates that the unrefuelled operational combat radius of the 
Backfire froin Soviet Arctic staging bases covered New-
foundland in Canada over the eastern US and the northern 
Midwest and most of the Northwest of the CONUS itself. 
With inflight refuelling the Backfire radius extended to cover 
all of the US except Florida." 1bis US concern over the 
possible strategic role of the Backfire is also indicated by the 
US desire to include it in the SALT II strategic arms limita-
tions talks. While this could have been a negotiating tactic 
there is no doubt that there also was a degree of genuine 
concern involved. 
As a result this intermediate range bomber can also be 
included as a potential strategic nuclear weapon against the 
northern parts of the CONUS, though its primary role was no 
doubt as a theatre bomber. The Backfire B force deployed in 
1975 was still relatively small, consisting of some 25 bombers 
- less than one regiment - and its basing is not clear. The 
regiment was probably still in an initial shakedown stage, 
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outlining in the western USSR, but under all circumstances 
would have had to transit the Arctic to reach the CONUS. To 
do so it could have dispersed to one or more of the eleven 
Arctic DA FOB, though it is unclear whether these had been 
equipped at this stage to support the Backfire. 
Intercontinental-range bombers 
~ring this ti~e the LRB force remained basically unchanged 
ID terms of size and with few qualitative improvements. One 
development involved the gradual introduction of a strategic 
airborne tanker force in the early 1970's, when some 50 older 
Tu-95 Bear A and Mya-4 Bison A were converted into 
airborne tankers" for the DA heavy bombers. During this time 
the LRB force probably retained a strategic nuclear role, but 
there are indications that the faith placed in this system as a 
strategic weapon was declining, and that they may have been 
increasingly oriented towards theatre missions." 
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1977: Introduction and growth of the MIRVed SLBM 
The next major breakthrough came in 1 CJ77 with the intro-
duction of the first MlRVed SLBM. This was the SS-N-18 
Stingray Mk. 1, with a 6,500 km range and 3 MlRV, deploy-
ed aboard the new Delta Ill class SSBN. Following the usual 
pattern the new systems were first deployed to the Kola, after 
which a smaller number were based in the Pacific. By 1980 
ten Delta Ill armed with 16 SS-N-18 each had been d~ployed, 
of which 80 % were based on the Kola. At the same time the 
deployment of the older non-MIRVed intercontinental range 
SS-N-8 continued, actually tripling the number of SLBM 
launchers since 1974. In all there were 453 IC SLBM launch 
tubes aboard 35 SSBN in 1980. Of these, 307 launchers were 
deployed with the Northern Fleet, representing 68 % of the 
full SLBM force:" 
Northern Fleet Pacific Fleet Nm1111mFW 
Total Class Year SSBN Lnchr SSBN Lncbr Launchers 
I Golf V 1980 I I lOO% 
10 Delta m 1975 8 128 2 32 80% 
4 Delta n 1975 4 64 lOO% 
18 Dehal 1972 9 108 9 108 so% 
I Hotel m 19 I 6 lOO% 
I Golf m 19 6 0% 
35 23 307 12 146 68% 
On the basis of their strong numerical and qualitiative growth 
the IC SLBM probably had a major priority in Soviet strategic 
planning, on par with that accorded to the ICBM force. As 
noted above the deployment of the MIRVed SLBM also 
marked the beginning of a surge in the number of ~LBM 
watheads, which kept this force the second largest ID the 
Soviet SNDV arsenal, and maintained its strategic importance. 
With 80% of the Delta Ill force operating with the Northern 
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Fleet, and 68 % of the all Delta classes in the same fleet the 
No£!bern Fl~t constituted one of the key elements in' the 
S_ov_Iet S!J"ateg~c arsenal and made the associated Arctic area of 
Similar unportance in the US-Soviet nuclear relationship. 
Du~g this ti_me the development and deployment of medium-
and mtermediate. range SLBM' s ceased. The last y ankee class 
SSBN armed with 16 SS-N-6 Mk 3 was delivered in 1976 
and after this the size of this force steadily diminished. On~ 
new 1R SLB~ was fielded in 1977, but it was never series 
produced. This was the SS-N-17 Snipe, of which twelve were 
deployed aboard a modified Yankee II class SSBN. However 
the overall MR/IR SLBM force now began a steady decline as 
they were replaced by the IC SLBM. The sbort range SS-N-
4 were phased out by 1979, and the SS-N-5 and SS-N-6 
~L~M's be;!!an a slow decline as their platforms reached the 
limit of their operational life and were not replaced. By 1980 
there were 533 launch tubes on 49 SSBN/SSB. 350 launchers 
were deployed with the Northern Fleet, representing 66 % of 
the full force.41 
DAIRB 
Fin_ally the force DA Backfire intermediate range bombers 
which first emerged in the mid-1970's continued to grow. In 
198~ 75 Backfire were operating with the long range Aviation 
A~es, pro~ably ?rganised in two full regiments and one 
which ~as still fitting out, located at three main airbases. On 
the basis of open sources two of these were located in the 
western central USSR and one in the Far East. In addition the 
Backfire regiments also employed five Arctic FOB, of which 
t~~ ~ Olenegorsk and Vorkuta East - were located in the 
VICIDity of the nordic area:42 
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Main Bases 
Sol Tsy 
Kozelskh 
Belaya* 
Area 
200 km soulb of Leningrad 
west of Moscow 
by Lake Baikal 
• Estimate, based m Map. 
A further three Baclif~re main bases were also in use but these were 
operated by the Naval Aviation and hence are not included here. 
Forward Bases 
Olenogorsk 
Vorkuta East 
Tiksi West 
Mys Schmidta 
Leninka 
Area 
Kola Peninsula Westem AJdic 
Arctic coast, by Kara Sea Westfm AJdic 
Arctic coast, by Laptev Sea Cenbal Araic 
Arctic coast, by Chukchi Sea Eastern Arctic 
Anadyr Peninsula, by Bering Sea Eastern Arctic 
If we assume a roughly even dispersal of Backfire to the five 
Arctic FOB then roughly 40% of the force would have staged 
via bases in the vicinity of the nordic area. It is interesting to 
note that all the DA Backfire FOB listed in Soviet Military 
Power 1985 were located along the Arctic, facing the US. 
By 1980 the first MA naval strike Backfire had also been 
deployed, but they are not included here. Though these aircraft 
can carry out nuclear land-attack missions they have not been 
fitted with aerial refuelling probes and hence could only reach 
the CONUS on one-way missions. While this option cannot be 
excluded it nonetheless seems unlikely given the large number 
of alternative Soviet nuclear delivery vehicles which have a far 
better capacity for striking at CONUS targets, and hence this 
system is not included here. 
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1981: Introduction of under-ice MIRVed SLBM 
The next major breakthrough came with the deployment of the 
first ~LBM/~BN system specially designed for under-ice 
operations. Thts was the SS-N-20 Sturgeon, armed with up to . 
10 MIRV, deployed aboard the radically new Typhoon SSBN 
class. It was foll_owed in 1985 with the similarly ice-strength-
ened Delta IV wtth th~ SS-N-23 Skiff SLBM. These were very 
large. and very expenstve weapons systems, and indicative of 
a maJOr development (and investment) effort. 
This led to a continued rapid growth of the size of the IC 
~LBM force, and an even greater increase in the number of 
mdependently targetable warheads carried on the SSBN's By 
1985 ~ total of 592 IC s_LBM launchers were deployed i~ all, 
of which 382 operated wtth the Northern Fleet, representing 64 
% of the full SLBM force:" 
Northern Fteet Pacific Fleet NoniB'nFl&t 
Total Class Year SSBN Lnchr SSBN Lnchr Launchers 
I Delta N t985 I 16 100% 
3 Typhoon 1983 3 60 tOO% 
t4 Delta m 1975 8 t28 6 96 51% 
4 Delta I! t975 4 64 tOO% 
t8 Delta I 1972 9 108 9 t08 50% 
I Hotel ill t969 I 6 100% 
I Golf ill t977 6 0% 
42 26 382 t6 210 64 % 
The_ deployment of the Typhoon aitd Delta IV SSBN's had 
parttcularly strong consequences for the Arctic region. These 
two SSB_N ~ypes are ~ciall y constructed for operations under 
!he Arctic t~ and ~a~tcularly for operations in the marginal 
tee z~ne. This capability has been developed partly in order to 
explOit the vast space in the Arctic Ocean for dispersal, and 
P~Y t~ help concealment from accoustic and other sensors by 
hidt~g m the Arctic marginal ice zone. (See Section 2. for 
details.) 
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The Arctic Ocean provides important additional security to the 
soviet SSBN force, which probably is the reason for the 
emphasis upon Arctic under-ice SSBN operati_ons. This ~az 
have begun with Delta III class SSBN already m the 1970 s, 
but has been strongly boosted with the deployment of the 
special under-ice Typhoon and Delta I~ S~BN's in the ea~y 
1980's. The Typhoon is the first submanne m the world whtch 
appears to have been constructed specifically for under-~ce 
operations," notably with a specially construc~~d an~ ret_n-
forced conning tower and superstructure. In addttion, smce tts 
deployment it has not left the arctic region north of the Kola, 
and there are reports from the US Navy that it has developed 
a special 'ice-pick' tactic, drifting beneath the ice-pack for 
prolonged tours of under-ice duty .46 
This new Arctic concealment mode was considered necessary 
because of perceived advances in US and British forward 
ASW, particularly from SSN's, which it was thought posed a 
significant threat to the older Delta I-III classes operati_ng in 
the open water SSBN 'Bastions' in the Sea of Okhotsk m the 
Far East and the Greenland and Barents Seas north of the 
nordic region. The hunter-killer SSN is generally evaluated as 
constituting the ideal ASW platform.47 Both British and US 
SSN's regularly operate in the immediate proximity of Soviet 
naval bases, including in the Barents Sea, the White Sea and 
the Sea of Okhotsk with one of their primary missions being 
the tracking of Soviet SSBN's.48 While the Soviet Navy has 
tried to neutralise this danger through the deployment of 
considerable conventional naval forces for strategic defensive 
ASW in the Barents and northern Norwegian Seas and for sea 
denial missions further south, they have apparently been 
unable to establish a sufficiently secure filter against SSN's. 
Since ASW is a high-technology field par excellence, and 
particularly dependent upon sophisticated computers, the 
Soviets are at a disadvantage in this area and have trouble 
preventing USN and RN strategic ASW operations even in 
their inner home waters." 
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The second danger to the Soviet IC SSBN's operating in the 
Sea of Okhotsk and in the Barents and Kara Seas stems from 
western ASW mine systems, notably the CAPTOR deepsea 
mine. The Barents Sea and Sea of Okhotsk are both located 
over the continental shelf, and are thus shallow, with an 
average depth of between 200-300 metres and 200 metres 
respectively. This makes them suitable for mining with the 
a~vanced CAPTOR ASW mine, which can be deployed from 
aucraft (notably the B-520 has been modified for this task).'" 
This mine sinks to the sea bottom after deployment where it 
lies in inen mode and is extremely difficult to detect. Its 
advanced hydroaccoustic sensors permit it to be programmed 
to attack specific types of submarines, and thus for instance 
only_ SSB~'s, or even only one panicular category of SSBN, 
possibly nght down to just one particular ship." 
The shift in the patrol profile of the Soviet SSBN force from 
t?e ~ntral Atlantic and Pacific to the Arctic was of major 
Significance for the nordic area since the Soviet naval bases on 
the Kola were the only facilities providing access to the new 
patrol zones in the Arctic Ocean. Access to the Arctic Ocean 
for the Pacific Fleet - from the SSBN bases on the Kamchatka 
Peninsula or in Vladivostock is extremely difficult and 
dangerous because of the need to transit the Bering straits. 
Submerged SSBN passage - or even surfaced passage - is 
hazardous due to the shallow waters (the route would involve 
ea 1,500 km during which bottom depth is between 70-80 
me~s)" and shifting surface ice ridges, and partly because 
transit would run paralel to the US SOSUS stations on the 
Aleutians, and subsequently along the US controlled Alaskan 
coast. Finally, the distance between Alaska and Siberia at the 
narrowest stretch of the straits is only 90 km," making it an 
easily mined choke point. 
This has hitheno led to the deployment of every one of the 
new Typhoon and Delta IV SSBN's to the Kola bases 
considerably boosting their strategic imponance. It has als~ 
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boOsted the strategic imponance of the nordic Arctic wat~rs, 
which has increased the focus of USN and RN offensn:e 
hunter-killer SSN's on the area. Thus a new USN emphasis 
upon major under-ice training for the SSN force was an-
nounced in 1982 by the then Chief of Naval Operations, 
Admiral James Watkins." This has in turn reinvigorated the 
development and deployment of VMF genet;aJ purpose forces 
to the same areas in a defensive mode, seeking to suppon the 
security of the new SSBN 'Bastions'. 
As a result the Soviet use of waters adjacent to the nordic 
area as SSBN patrol wnes has gradually increased since the 
early 1970's, and today all the most modem S~BN are 
exclusively focussed on this area. This development IS shown 
in the table below: 
Deployment Gen. SLBM SSBN Patrol Area 
·Arctic force 
1958-1967 1st SS-N-4/5 GoH I/11 US coastal waters 
80% 
Hotel I/11 US coastal waters 80% 
' 66% 
1968-1975 2nd SS-N-6117 Yankee I/11 US offshore 
1972-1982 3rd SS-N-8 Deltai/11 
Barents,Greenland Seas 66 '1o 
Sea of Okhotsk 
1973-1983 41h SS-N-18 Delta m 
Barents. Greenland Seas 80 '1o 
Sea of Okbotsk 
1983-... 51h SS-N-20/23 ~ Arctic Ocean 100% Delta N Arctic Ocean 100% 
For the moment this leaves only the Kola as a suitable basing 
area. However the emergence of the Arctic Ocean as . a 
deployment area could, in future years, . also red.uce Its 
imponance in this respect. The Kola as a pnmary basn~g m:ea 
for the strategic nuclear submari~e force was cho~en p~arilr 
on the basis of considerations which ~tedate the A~? !'_ge . 
Thus accessibility to the open seas, which the SSBN s m~ttally 
needed due to limited SLBM ranges, and subsequently (m the 
Barents) due to difficulties in operating and especially launch-
ing their missiles from under _the ice, no ~o~ger apply to. ~e 
latest generations of SSBN. WI!" a new p':'onty and capability 
emerging for under-ice operattons there IS no reason why a 
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new b~e could !lot be built in an area chosen for its optimal 
submanne transit routes to the ice-covered arctic and its 
maximal distance from US access routes to the Arctlc and to 
the suiVeillance stations beginning some 100 km from the 
present SSBN bases at Zai"da Guba, Olenya Guba and Gremik-
ha. Potential SSBN basing areas in the inner Soviet Arctic 
coastline east of the Kola are available, and the economic 
development of the area has improved logistic overland links 
In addition, from a geomilitary perspective, such a locatio~ 
W?uld be far more secure than the Kola or Kamchatka, and 
might even, were the submarine pens (and adjacent submarine 
construction yards) to be built underground, be kept undetected 
~m the we~t for s_o~e time. Such a base may even already 
exist. What IS certam IS that the arguments in favour of such 
a base ~re sufficient to make its future construction possible. 
Should It take place it would reduce the strategic importance 
of ti_Je Ko!a, and thereby reduce the strategic heat by the 
?or?Ic region. But for the time being open sources do not 
mdicate that such an alternative Arctic base has been establish-
ed. 
During this period the Soviet intermediate and medium range 
SLBM force continued its gradual decline. In 1985 there were 
387 launch tubes on 35 SSBN/SSB." 188 of these launchers 
were deployed with the Northern Aeet, representing 49 % of 
the full medium and intermediate-range SLBM force." 
They ~us c~ntinu:d to contribute to the strategic importance 
of theu Arctic basmg and transit areas, though their role was 
steadily diminishing. The diminishing Arctic share also reflects 
how older equipment was transferred to secondary deployment 
areas, while the most modern IC SLBM's were concentrated 
to the Kola. 
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1984: Intermediate-Range ALCM 
The next major breakthrough in the Soviet SNDV arsenal 
came with the deployment of the 3,000 km intermediate-range 
AS-15 ALCM as of 1984. This strongly boosted the capability 
and status of the strategic intercontinental bomber force, and 
marked its resurgence after over twenty years of stagnation. It 
also led to the increased strategic importance of the Arctic 
airspace. The AS-15 was the first new air to ground system 
deployed with the heavy bombers since 1961, when the short 
range AS-3 Kangaroo first saw seiVice. The AS-15 strongly 
boosted the capability of the heavy bombers by permitting the 
standoff delivery of the ALCM at some 2,500 - 3,000 range 
from the target. This both increased the bombers suiVivability 
and complicating the US defence against the air-breathing 
threat considerably. These developments marked the beginning 
of a new era for the Soviet heavy bomber forces, and though 
still small in 1985 they were to grow rapidly in size quality 
in the last half of the 1980's. This development was also to 
involve the nordic region, since the forward support and transit 
routes of the invigorated heavy bomber force partly involved 
this area. 
The first Soviet intermediate range ALCM began deployment 
in 1984 and by 1985 200 of the AS-15 Kent ALCM had been 
deployed with the DA heavy bombers. The AS-15 is a 
dedicated strategic weapons system, specially designed for 
standoff operations from the Tu-142 Bear H. They have an 
independent flight profile in their final approach to the target, 
and both this flight, and their transit aboard the Bear H would 
take place over the Arctic. 
The deployment of the AS-15 coincided with the fielding of 
two new variants of the Tu-95 Bear. Though still modest in 
size the heavy bomber force was boosted by the introduction 
of the Tu-95 Bear G as of 1983 and particularly the Tu-142 
Bear H in 1985. While not new aircraft types but modified 
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versions of the original Tu-95 Bear B/C bombers from the 
early 1960's they were strongly modernised. The Bear H was 
also specially designed to cany the new AS-15 Kent inter-
mediate range ALCM. By 1985 the number of bombers was 
only increased marginally to 160, since the old Bear A were 
retired, but it improved the capability of the DA LRB 
considerably: 
Type Number Radius (km) 
Tu-142 Bear H 25 8.200 
Tu-95 Bear G 20 8.240 
Tu-9S Bear B/C ss S.600 
Tu-95 Bear A 30 
Mya-4 Bison A 30 
The increase in the size of the DA LRB force was marginal 
but the improved capability, especially when the associated 
introduction of the AS-15 ALCM is taken into account, was 
noticeable. The new bombers also permitted the phaseout of 
the obsolescent Mya-4 Bison and Tu-95 Bear A (both 30 years 
in service). 
During this period the DA heavy bomber basing, transit routes 
and Arctic forward support requirements remained basically 
unchanged, and the former estimate of roughly 40% of the 
bombers operating near the nordic area in wartime is con-
sidered to remain unchanged. 
According to various open sources the Moscow Air Army, 
which controls all strategic intercontinental nuclear bombers, 
operated from five main bases in the inner USSR in the mid-
1980's. Four of these were located in the western part and one 
in Central Asia:" 
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Aircraft Airfield 
Tu-142 Bear H Dolon 
Tu-95 Bear Vladimirovka 
Tu-95 Bear Chemovoye 
Tu-95 Bear Palmira 
Tu-95 Bear Lukhovitsy 
Location 
Kazhakstan, northeast of Sary Shagan 
Russia, northwest of the Caspian Sea 
Ukraine. between Kiev and Moscow 
Ukraine. by Kiev 
Russia. by Moscow 
The above only provides specific aircraft types were these have be~ indicated in 
the sources. In 1985 all Bear H were probably based at Dolon, fitllng out as one 
regimenL 
According to one open source the Moscow Air Army also 
controlled five Arctic FOB," of which three were located close 
to the nordic area:" 
Aircraft Airfield 
Tu-95 Bear B/C Olenogorsk 
Tu-95 Bear Belushya 
Tu-95 Bear Vorkuta East 
Tu-9S Bear Mys Schmidta 
Tu-9S Bear Urelik 
Location 
Kola Peninsula 
Novaya Zemlya 
Coastline by Kara Sea 
Chukotskoye Peninsula, eastern Siberia 
" " 
The airfield at Olenogorsk is a major DA FOB,00 to which Tu-
95 Bear B/C bombers regularly deploy for training purposes.•' 
The same applies to the long runway at Belushya on Novaya 
Zemlya wich also is a FOB for DA heavy bombers." These 
FOB are kept at a high level of readiness, and the Moscow 
Air Army heavy bombers routinely deploy units fo~ regular 
training at the Arctic airfields, which are ke~t contmuously 
cleared of snow .63 This indicates that they continue to play an 
operational role, and in wartime they would .probably be used 
as forward operating locations for those a1rcraft tasked for 
crossing the Arctic against north American targets. One should 
note that Dolon is located just west of the exact centre of the 
USSR. From this location all Arctic staging airfields can be 
reached. The closest is Vorlruta East, followed by those on 
Novaya Zemlya and on the Kola. 
Finally the DA intermediate range Backfire force m~intain~d 
a steady growth, almost doubling in size from 75 rurcraft m 
1980 to 130 in 1985. The quality of the force was also 
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improved with the deployment of the improved Backfire c 
version as of 1983. These bombers remained primarily theatre 
systems, but retained a capability to strike strategic targets in 
the CONUS. 
1985: Mobile ICBM 
An important development in the Soviet SNDV arsenal took 
place in 1985, when the first land-mobile ICBM was fielded. 
This was the road-mobile SS-25 Sickle, followed in 1987 by 
the rail-mobile SS-24 Scalpel, carrying 10 MIRV. This 
development was important since it reinforced the credibility 
of the Soviet ICBM force. For some time the fixed silo-based 
ICBM's had become vulnerable to the growing accuracy of the 
US ICBM force, and hence the survivability of the land-based 
element of the Soviet nuclear triad had come into doubt. This 
was particularly disturbing since this was the largest element 
of the Soviet strategic nuclear arsenal, and could have been 
one of the factors behind the investment in the Arctic oriented 
SSBN force. 
However the deployment of the ICBM on mobile platforms 
made it harder to find and hence increased its sorvivability. 
During the 1980's the fixed Soviet ICBM silos had become 
increasingly vulnerable to US ICBM and later SLBM strike 
despite their hardening, because of the improvements in the 
US missile accuracy. The development of the mobile ICBM's 
were designed to counter this, reinforcing the security of the 
ICBM leg of the triad. By boosting the viability of the ICBM 
force the relative growth in the importance of the nuclear 
forces with an Arctic orientation was partially arrested. 
1987: Intermediate-Range SLCM 
Another important development in the late 1980's was the 
deployment of the first intermediate range SLCM, the SS-N-
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21. This was probably primarily intended as a theatre weapo~, 
but with its 3,000 km range could have been used for stra~giC 
strikes against the CONUS. Most of these SLCM submann~s 
were deployed with the Northern Fleet on ~ Kola, an~ the1r 
tranSit routes could have involved the Arctic Ocean 1f they 
were assigned launch positions against the CONUS in the 
Canadian Arctic archipelago. (Tilis is dealt with below.) 
1990: Status of the Soviet SNDV force and its Arctic 
orientation 
By 1990 the Soviet Union operated seven nuclear weapo~s 
types with a strategic capability. Eight of these had a potent~al 
Arctic orientation, representing 66 % of the total Sov1et 
Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicle (SNDV) force. This is 
shown on Table 6. 
Table 6. 
Noldlc,., W•lllrs 
Numb• 
"""""' 
......... ofTotat ..... ... 
-Vt.AF IC SL8M 
,,. 17.4% 72% 12.5 'llo ..,m ""'""' OA IR AL.CM 640 15.5 '1(, 40% U% FOB T-
VMF IR SLCM 
"" 
5.5"' 
"" 
4.4"' ..... T"""" 
VMF lfl.ot.!A SLBM 
'" 
5.1% 
"" 
.... "'m T ..... 
DA IRB 190 4.6'11. 40% 1.8% 
FOB T-
DALRB 185 4.5% 40% 
,. .. FOB T"""" 
TOTAL 2,725 ... " 38.2 " 
RVSN ICBM 1.<08 3.4.1% 
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The evolution of the Soviet strategic nuclear arsenal which 
began in the 1970's continued through to the 1990's. The 
I<?J~ fo~ce remained the largest but with the steady cuts in 
m1ssiles 1t now only held a little over a third of the total 
SNDV inventory. However its role in Soviet planoing remain-
ed strong, as indicated by the deployment of a second land-
mobile ICBM as of 1987. 
The intercontinental SLBM force remained in second place 
having grown by some 20 %, from 592 SLBM in 1985 to 720 
in 1990. It was now followed by the intennediate range 
ALCM force, which with 640 delivery vehicles was the third 
largest in the arsenal. This number should be taken in 
conjunction with the heavy bomber forces, which still only 
held 5 % of the total SNDV's, but was boosted qualitatively 
by the continued deployment of the Bear H and the brand 
new supersonic Tu-160 Blackjack as of 1988. Taken together 
the DA LRB/IR ALCM force now had the second largest 
number of SNDV. As noted above the development of both 
the IC SLBM and the DA LRB/ALCM force strongly involved 
the Arctic. 
An important new deployment in the late 1980's was the 
intennediate range SLCM submarines. These first became 
operational as of 1987 with the SS-N-21 Sampson SLCM 
which was a dedicated nuclear land-attack SLCM. It wa~ 
deployed very rapidly and by 1990 there were an estimated 
218 launchers on at least four different SSGN/SSN classes. It 
was accompanied by the testing of the SS-NX-24 SLCM as of 
1988. This was a supersonic intennediate-range land attack 
SLCM, but it remained limited to its testbed SSGN and was 
not depoyed en masse. Nonetheless this IR SLCM force had 
~ estimated 6 % of the full SNDV arsenal. They had a major 
1mpact on the Arctic since the majority were based on the 
Kola. and pa~y because the Arctic Ocean may have become 
a maJor transit route to launch stations in the Canadian Arctic 
archipelago. 
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The three smallest weapons types consisted of the inter-
mediate/medium range SLBM force, which had been steadily 
shrinking since the deployment of the IC SLBM, and the DA 
IRB and RVSN IRBM forces. The latter two only had a 
secondary strategic nuclear role. The intennediate range 
Backfire force continued to grow, but the SS-20 IRBM was 
rapidly withdrawn as a result of the INF Treaty, which 
stipulated that all SS-20's were to be eliminated by June 1991. 
Intercontinental-range SLBM 
In 1990 the USSR deployed 720 launch tubes for intercon-
tinental SLBM aboard 48 SSBN.64 516 launchers were 
deployed with the Northern Fleet, representing 72 % of the 
full force:" 
Northern Fleet Paclne Fleet Nm1hlm Fllllt 
Total Class Year SSBN Lnchr SSBN Lnchr Launchers 
6 Della IV 1985 6 96 100% 
6 Typhoon 1983 6 120 100% 
14 Delta m 1975 8 128 6 96 57% 
4 Delta !I 1975 4 64 100% 
18 Delta I 1972 9 108 9 108 50% 
48 33 516 15 204 72% 
One should also note the qualitative priority assigned to the 
Northern Fleet SSBN force, which still operated all of the 
most modem Delta IV and Typhoon SSBN classes constructed 
since 1980, and which therefore had an even greater propor-
tion of SLBM warheads. Thus the importance of the Kola 
SSBN bases continued to grow, as did the Arctic waters in 
which they patrolled. 
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Intermediate-range ALCM 
The 640 intennediate range ALCM were the third largest force 
in the Soviet SNDV arsenal in 1990, with 16 % of all 
delivery vehicles. Their Arctic orientation remained unchanged, 
and thus the growth of this force increased the strategic 
importance of the Arctic airspace. 
Intermediate-range SLCM 
The introduction of the intennediate range SLCM has strongly 
involved the Arctic through the basing, transit and launch 
zones of the majority of the associated submarine launch 
platfonns. In 1990 the VMF deployed 220 launch tubes for 
intennediate range SLCM with a primary nuclear land-attack 
capability, aboard 35 submarines. 06 178 launchers were 
deployed with the Northern Fleet, representing 81 % of the 
full force:"' 
Northern Fleet Other Fleets NonhimFled 
Total Class Year SSGN Lnchr SSGN Lnchr Launchers 
I Yankee Trials 1983 I 12 lOO% 
2 Yankee Notch 1988 2 40 100% 
5 Akula 1985 2 12 3 18 40% 
3 Sierra 1984 3 18 100% 
24 Victor m mod. 16 96 4 24 
35 28 178 7 42 81 % 
The SS-NX-24 has been deployed aboard one modified 
Yankee class SSGN, from which it has been undergoing trials 
since 1988.68 However its operational status is uncertain as it 
has not been deployed further and there are reports that it has 
involved considerable technical difficulties, not least involving 
the fact that its considerable size requires the construction of 
a special SSGN for it if it is to be deployed. 
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Intermediate- and medium-range SLBM 
By 1990 the the number of medium and intennediate SLBM 
launchers had fallen to 210, aboard 15 SSBN/SSB." 108 
launchers were deployed with the Northern Fleet, representing 
51 % of the full force. 70 
The six Northern Fleet Yankee I were withdrawn from their 
strategic role and assigned a European theatre role in 1990. 
This has also been indicated by their patrol pattern, since they 
have not transitted the GIFUK gap since and hence appear to 
have dropped their fanner patrol zones off the US east coast. 
This may mean that they also patrol in the Arctic sea areas 
north of the .Kola. 
Intermediate-range Bombers 
The growth of the DA intennediate range Backfire bombers 
continued. With 190 in service in 1990 it was a relatively 
small but modem force, representing 5 % of the strategic 
arsenal. The basing and FOB netwmk for the DA Backfire 
force had not changed since 1985, and thus its potential Arctic 
role remained unchanged. 
Intercontinental range-bombers 
The size of the DA intercontinental bomber force had only 
grown slightly by 1990, to 185 bombers, but its quality was 
improved through the introduction of new bombers and 
particnlarly with the deployment of the AS-15 Kent IR ALCM. 
With 5 % of the total SNDV force it was one of the smallest 
elements in the Soviet strategic arsenal, but this is misleading. 
If numbers of bombers are added to numbers of ALCM it was 
the second largest. It operated six different types of heavy 
bombers, as the three oldest systems were being phased out 
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:!~~aced by the two modem Bear H and Blackjack 
Type Number Radius {km) 
Tu-160 Blackjack 20 7,300 Tu-142 Bear H 80 8,200 Tu-95 Bear C!G 60 8,240 
Tu-95 Bear AtB 25 5,600 
The basic basi~g ~nfrastructure of the Moscow Air Anny had 
n~t ch~ed S1~1ficantly since 1985 and its strong Arctic 
O;"'entatton conttnued. The Bear H had begun routine excer-
Cises fro~ the ~ola FOB alongside the older heavy bomber 
types which tramed here. However no DA heavy bombers 
were penn~ently based on the Kola by 1990. The Bear H be?~ sta~ng through Kola FOB for refuelling during Arctic 
tra~ng flights as of 1987. The Kola runways are also 
routtnely _used by the _DA strategic tankers, operating modified 
Mya-4 B1son ~ers m 1987 and modern ll-78 Midas tank fro~Il: the ~?la m 1990 for inflight refuelling of the Bear H ~~ 
Arctic tratmng missions against the CONUS." 
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1. Nuclear land-attack cruise missiles are normally classified as 
theatre nuclear forces, however if they were used against the 
CONUS they would have a marked strategic role. Since they clearly 
could he used for this purpose they are included as potential strategic 
nuclear rorces in this study. In should also note that certain land-
attaCk SLCM probably were specifically designed for use against the 
CONUS. This is for instance the case with the SS-N-3C in the early 
1960's, possibly remaining tasked for this role up to the 1980's. 
(POLMAR, 1976: pp. 51-52, 91, and COCHRAN, ARKlN, NORRIS 
& SANDS: pp. 171-172.) While the relative strategic importance of 
follow-on SLCM with a primary or secondary nuclear land-attack 
capability probably declined, they remain a powerful potential 
strategic nuclear threat against the CONUS. 
2. The Military Balance 1959: p. 4. 
3. Global Navigation and Planning Chart: GNC-1. Edition 6. 
Defence Mapping Agency, June 1972. 
4. Data for Soviet SSBN/SSB deployment for 1960 is difficult to 
find thus this table is based on estimates by the author. The 
deployment of the Zulu V is extrapolated from: BREEMER: 
Estimating the Soviet ... , 1987: pp. 40-43. which mentions that the 
Zulu V firing trials were held at Severodvinsk (by Arkhangelsk) and 
Severomorsk (just north of Murmansk) and that the USN observed 
Zulu V SSB's returning from patrol in the northeastern Atlantic as 
of 1959. Deployment of the Golf I class is also extrapolated from 
Breemer, p. 42, who cites a former member of the Northern Fleet 
missile testing and evaluation centre, Mikhail Turetsky who served 
in the centre from the mid-1950's to 1962, and who refers to missile 
test with both the Zulu V and the Golf I. The assumption that all 
Golf I and Hotel I operated with the Northern Fleet is made onthe 
basis of: 'Utvikling av de sovjetiske styrker i vflrt interesseomrAde 
de siste 20 Ar.' Aktuelle Forsvarssp(Jrsmdl, Nr. 0185, Januar 1985: 
Vedlegg 5. This publication gives data for the Northern Fleet 
SSBN/SSB force in 1966. The very large percentage of Golf and 
Hotel submarines in the Northern Fleet that year, coupled with the 
fact that the Northern Fleet has continuously received the latest 
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strategic submarines first, indicates that all submarines in these two 
classes were probably deployed with the Northern Fleet in 1960. 
5. Asian Security 1979. Tokyo, Research institute for Peace and 
Security, September 1979: p. 55. 
6. Brodin, Kalarina: Siikerhetspolitisk Utveckling i Norden. Stock-
holm, SSLP, 1st ed., 1982: p.9. 
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8. Sovie~ Military Power: 1984. Washington, Dept. of Defense, 3rd. 
ed., Apnl 1984: p. 92. · . 
9. COCHRAN, ARKIN, NORRIS & SANDS: pp. 171-172. 
10. COCHRAN, ARKIN, NORRIS & SANDS: pp. 171-172. 
11. Data for the deployment of Soviet SS-N-3C SSG in 1960 is 
~iffi~ul~ to fmd. The figures in this table are extrapolated from: 
~tvi~lin~ av .. .', 1985: Vedlegg 6, which provides data for the 
slluation m 1966, and from which one can work backwards. In I 966 
all Whisky Long Bin are given as being deployed with the Northern 
Fleet, and hence it is likely that the frrst two of this conversion type 
went to the Northern Fleet in 1960. Deployument data for the 
"!'hisky Twin Cylinder and One Cylinder are not available, but it is 
likely that they were deployed to a Fleet providing potential transit 
access to strategic targets in the CONUS since they were converted 
to carry a strategic land-attack SLCM, and by 1960 were carrying 
the SS-N-3C. ~RE!'~R (pp. 52-5~) _also cites references by 
TURETSKY whtch mdicate that the mtsstle was under testing with 
the Northern Fleet. 
12. One of the major Soviet ICBM testing centres is located at 
Pl~~tsk, some 200 _km. due south of Arkhangelsk. However since 
thiS ts not an opemuoual ICBM launch field it is not included here. 
13. POLMAR: p. 44. 
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14. The Military Balance 1960: p. 3. The Military Balance 1962-
1963: p. 55. 
IS. The Military Balance 1962-1963: p. 4. 
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Military Power: 1984. Washington, Dept. of Defense, 3rd ed., April 
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extrapolated from Mi/itll!rbalansen 1977-1978: p. 79. and Utvikling 
av ... 1985: Vedlegg 6. and on estimates based on their deployment 
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20. POLMAR: p. 90. 
21. COCHRAN, ARKIN, NORRIS & SANDS: pp. 106-107, 136-
151. McGWIRE: "The Rationale .. .": pp. McGWIRE: "The Evolu-
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26. Soviet Military Power 1987. Map on pp. 128-129. 
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5. Sm1iet Strategic Air Defence Forces in the 
Areti.c 
The Troops of the National Air Defence (V oyska Protivovoz-
dushnoy Oborony Strany - VPVO) are the second most 
important service in the Soviet Armed Forces, charged with 
defending the state against destruction by attack from the air 
and space.' In 1990 the VPVO was divided into five main 
components:' 
IAPVO 
ZRV 
RTV 
PRO 
PKO 
Fighter Aviation of Air Defence 1948 
Zenith Rookel Troops 1954 
Radio Technical Troops 1955 
Antirocket Defence 1958 
Antispace Defence 1967 
The service has been organised along these basic lines since 
the mid-1950's. The first three branches have generally been 
the most important and those which have had an impact on 
the Arctic through their bases and operations, though some of 
the PRO EW and battle-management radars have also been 
deployed to the Soviet Arctic coastline. Today the VPVO is 
both a major element in Soviet strategic planning and has a 
major Arctic and nordic focus. 
In the period between 1979 and 1981 a major reorganisation 
of all the Soviet Air Forces took place, as part of the shift to 
the new TVD command structure. This also affected the 
VPVO. The VPVO national command structure was partially 
decentralised and the regional VPVO Headquarters directing 
the IAPVO, ZRV and RTV forces partly integrated with the 
newly established regional TVD commands. As a result the 
former ten IAPVO Armies under centralised VPVO control 
were reduced to five, each corresponding to one of the new 
TVD commands:' 
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1. PVO Anny 
2. PVO Anny 
3. PVO Anny 
4. PVO Anny 
10. PVO Anny 
Western TVD 
Northwestern TVD 
Southwestern TVD 
Central Strategic TVD 
Far Eastern TVD 
E~ch. PVO Anny w~s further broken down into Air Defence 
Districts, corresponding geographically to the Military Districts 
of the Front forces. The Air Defence Districts are provided 
~th a~nistrative and lo~stic support by the Military District 
m which they are located, but are under the direct operati-
onal command of their respective PVO Air Anny' which in 
wartime is linked to the local TVD HQ.' At the s~e time the 
I~VO and ZR V were reinforced by the transfer of fighter 
aucraft and SAM systems from the Front Air Forces and the 
Ground Forces to the VPVO. 
~~ new organisation was intended to integrate all Soviet 
m1~tary forces beneath the strategic nuclear level into the new 
reg10nal :VD co~mand system, thus providing the capability 
for mass1ve coordmated combined anns operations in the new 
Theatres of Strategic Military Operation. However the new 
organisation proved incapable of meeting the needs of the 
VPVO strategic air defence mission, and with the increase in 
the US nuclear bomber/ALCM threat the VPVO was partially 
released from the TVD command system. The integration 
between the regional VPVO headquarters and the TVD 
commands were relaxed and the by the mid-1980's the 
~entralised VPVO national command system was re-established 
m a ~li?htly modified fonn.7 However the regional organisation 
cons1stiiig of five PVO Annies was retained.' 
The table on the next page shows the evolution of VPVO 
weapons technology and numbers between 1960 and 1990. 1o 
the early 1960's the US air-breathing threat shifted from the 
dep~oyme~t of medium-range bombers deployed around the 
Sov1et penmeter to the deployment of mainly intercontinental 
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B-52 strategic bombers, which had their main readiness 
stations on the CONUS and which had the Arctic as one of 
their main transit areas. This also shifted a major part of the 
Soviet air intercept effort to forward defence over the Arctic, 
which led to a major deployment of VPVO interceptors to the 
Soviet far north. 
During the 1980's the VPVO held a high priority in Soviet 
defence planning, as indicated by the renewed investment in 
the development and deployment of advanced interceptors, 
AEW/AWACS aircraft and SAM systems for the VPVO. (See 
table on next page.) However in the late 1980's the VPVO 
came under increasing political pressure from the new Soviet 
regime under Gorbachev, notably when the light plane piloted 
by Mathias Rust managed to penetrate Soviet air defences and 
land on the Red Square in Moscow in May 1987. 
This development was largely linked to the apparent increase 
in the US emphasis upon air-breathing strategic nuclear 
delivery systems, including both bombers but also and 
particularly the ALCM, which was fully deployed by the mid-
1980's. However the immediacy of the US strategic nuclear 
threat was reduced in September 1991, when President Bush 
announced the unilateral reductio in the state of readiness of 
US strategic nuclear forces. This included the removal of all 
US strategic nuclear bombers from day-to-day alert status and 
the removal of their weapons to storage areas. 
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Table 1. Organisation of the 2. PVO Anny in the northwestern USSR, 1990 
Evolution of the VPVO. 1960 - 1990 i 
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The 2. PVO Army 1990-1991 
The 2. PVO Army is responsible for the strategic air defence 
of the Soviet Union in the Northwestern TVD. It consists of 
two Air Defence Districts, the Arkbangelsk ADD with 
headquarters in Arkhangelsk and the Baltic ADD headquartered 
in Riga. The Arkbangelsk ADD covers the same area as the 
Leningrad MD and the Baltic ADD covers the Baltic MD. 
Table 1. on the next page shows the organisation and ORBAT 
of the 2. PVO Army in the northwestern USSR.' 
The Arkbangelsk ADD faces the most important Arctic transit 
routes for the US strategic nuclear bomber forces, and thus has 
a major responsibility for the VPVO Arctic air defence 
operations. It is thus of major importance to the Soviet 
strategic air defence effort as well as a major military factor 
in the Arctic. 
The Arkhangelsk Air Defence District 
In 1990 the Arkbangelsk ADD operated nine IAPVO regi-
ments with 270 interceptors:" 
2 regt60 Su-27 Flanker B 
3 regt90 MiG-31 Foxhound A 
2 regt60 MiG-25 Foxbat E 
2 regt60 Su-15 Flagon ElF 
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These aircraft operated from twelve active airbases in the 
Arkhangelsk ADD:11 
LOCATION BASE INTERCEPTORS 
Yamal Peninsula Kamennyy n.a. 
Novaja Zemlya Belushya n.a. 
By Plesetsk Kotlas South 1 regt MiG~25 Foxbat12 
Kola Koshk:ajaur 1 regt SuM27 Flanker B 
Kola Maljaur I regt MiG-31 Foxhound A 
Kola Monchegorsk I regt Su-15 Flagon F 
By Arldumgelsk Andozero n.a. 
By Arldumgelsk Yagodnik 1 regt MiG-31 Foxhound A u 
Karelian ASSR Engozero n.a. 
Karelian ASSR Girvas n.a. 
Lake Ladoga Nunnalitsy n.a. 
N of Leningrad Gromovo n.a. 
In addition two very long Soviet runways are also located on 
the Arctic island archipelago of Zemlya Frantsa Iosifa, east of 
Svalbard. They are not listed as IAPVO bases but are optimal-
ly located for far forward Arctic air intercept missions:" 
Zemlya Frantsa Iosifa Greem Bell 
Zemlya Frantsa Iosifa Nagurskoye Southwest 
Three of the Arkhangelsk ADD IAPVO airbases are located 
just north of Leningrad, probably intended for the medium 
range air defence of this strategic target. Two airbases are 
located by Arkbangelsk. One of these bases one regiment of 
long range MiG-31 Foxhound A interceptors, almost certainly 
for long-range Arctic air intercept missions. During alert or in 
wartime it probably deploys north to one of the Kola bases 
and/or to one of the three Arctic island bases of Belushya, 
Greem Bell or N agurskoye Southwest. The second airbase by 
Arkhangelsk could operate medium-range interceptors for the 
area defence of the vital strategic targets at and around 
Severodvinsk. A further two airbases are located in the 
northeastern end of the Air Defence District, at Belushya and 
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Kamennyy. probably intended for long range air defence 
covering the central Arctic. 
One should also note that there is a panicularly heavy 
concentration of additional airbases on the Kola Peninsula. All 
in all there are 17 large military airfields and 1 civilian 
airfield on the Kola, of which only 50% are in use in 
peacetime." Three of them are the active IAPVO bases, 
(Koshkajaur, Maljaur and Monchegorsk); three are Naval 
Aviation airbases (Severomorsk, Olenegorsk and Luostari); and 
two are Frontal Aviation airbases. The Moscow Air Army also 
stages Tu-142 Bear H training exercises through Olenegorsk 
on a routine bases. 
lbis means that there are another nine military airfields on the 
Kola which are not in use · in peacetime. They are however 
kept at a continuous state of very high operational readiness, 
with permanent maintenance personnel keeping them swept 
from snow, etc. lbis means that in ao alert or in wartime the 
Soviet Union could very rapidly at the least double the 
number of combat aircraft based on the Kola. A part of this 
reinforcement could also involve IAPVO units flown up from 
further south. 
Materiel 
The Arkbangelsk ADD has consistently had a high priority for 
receiving the latest air defence equipment. lbis is reflected in 
its present ORBAT which includes the most modern intercep-
tors, SAM systems aod AWACS in the Soviet forces. Since 
1980 it operates two regiments with MiG-25 F oxbat E, 
designed for long-range, high-altitude, high-speed operations 
and with a partial look -down/shoot -down capability." Since 
1982 three interceptor regiments have converted to the MiG-
31 Foxhound A/' also a very long-range interceptor with a 
full look-down/shoot-down capability." The most modern 
IAPVO interceptor, the Su-27 Flanker B, began deployment to 
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the Arkhangelsk ADD in 1986 aod since then two regi?~ents 
have completed conversion." lbis interceptor is also specifical-
ly designed for the VPVO and optimised for i?':lg ,.range 
operations with a full look -do~shoot -down ca~ab1~ty. The 
table below provides an overv1ew of the modernisation of the 
Arkbangelsk ADD since 1980:11 
Arlthangelsk ADD material 1980-1990. 
YEAR LOCATION SIZE SYSTEM COMMENT 
1988 Kola 11-76 Mainstay 
""""'"""" 1988 Kola 1oegl 
Su-27 Flanlwr B deployment underWay 
1986 Kola 1mgl SU-27 Flanlulr B deployment began 
1985 ""~ SA-10 Grumble deployment began 11-76 MaJnstll)' test l~ghts begin 1984 Ko~ New command and radar system 1984 Kola GC! 
11182 Kola 1 ... 1 MiG-31 Ftnhound A deployment began 
1982 ..._ ... 1<egl MiG-31 Falthound A deployment began 
1980 n.a. 1oegl MiG-25 Foxbat E deployment began 
The new Su-27 and MiG-31 interceptors are supported in their 
long range operations by airborne command and surveillance 
systems. During the late 1970's these initia~y consisted ~f the 
relatively ineffective Tu-126 Moss AEW rurcraft, of wh1ch a 
number operated from the Kola. In the 1980's they have been 
supplemented by the second-generation ll-76 Mainsti!Y 
AWACS, with a far superior aribome command and surveli-
laoce capability. Four Il-76 prototypes began trials in the early 
1980's." ll-76 trials on the Kola began in 1984.'' aod by 1987 
two to four Tu-126 Moss AEW or 11-76 AWACS periodically 
operated from the Kola." Production of operational 11-76 
models began in the late 1980's,"' coinciding with an increase 
in ll-76 Mainstay operations from the Kola. They were now 
providing forward command and surveillaoce support for long 
range air defence operations beyond the raoge of the ground 
based C31 centres.'" By 1990 the ll-76 Mainstay AWACS was 
fully operational with the 2. PVO Army, which operated ten 
Mainstay in the Artdlangelsk ADD,17 of which a number 
routinely operated on the Kola.18 They were supported by 5 11-
20 ELINT aircraft based in tbe Artdlaogelsk ADD.1' 
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The introduction of these systems enhanced the capability of 
the IAPVO to carry out strategic and tactical low-level 
intercept, and the forward aiiborne C31 capability of the 11-
76 for the first time pem1itted effective IAPVO long range 
tactical air superiority missions. The A W ACS/interceptor teams 
for strategic and tactical missions involve the MiG-31 and Su-
27 interceptors operating with the 11-76.30 It is again significant 
that all of these latest systems have been allocated to the Ark-
hangelsk Air Defence Sector almost immediately upon coming 
into service." 
During the 1980's a new ground-based air defence control and 
warning system was also installed on the Kola. Work on the 
new system began in 1984 and was completed in the late 
1980's." it is probably linked to the new emphasis on low-
level point defence, combined with the introduction of the SA-
10 SAM battalions as of 1985. 
ZRV (SAM Troops.) 
The Arkhangelsk ADD also operates an extensive SAM 
network, designed for point defence of key targets in the Air 
Defence District as well interception of low-level aircraft and 
ALCM. In 1990 the Arkhangelsk ADD ZRV controlled some 
75 SAM groups, operating:" 
SA-2 Guideline 
SA-3 Goa 
SA-5 Gammon 
SA-10 Grumble 
The SA-10 Grumble is an advanced Soviet SAM system, 
reportedly effective against cruise missiles.34 The SA-10 began 
deployment to the Kola in 1985," replacing the old SA-2 
Guideline missiles. By 1990 several SA-10 battalions were 
operational on the Kola, deployed for the defence of the main 
naval bases." Finally one should note there are reports that the 
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2. PVO Am1y is presently being reinforced by air defence 
systems being withdrawn from Central Europe, of which a part 
are being redeployed to the northwestern USSR. 37 
RTV (Radio-technical Forces.) 
Because of its location the Arkhangelsk ADD also contains a 
number of important Ballistic Missile Early Warning (BM-
EWS) facilities as well as elements of the ABM defence 
system of the PRO. These include one older first generation 
Hen House BMEWS radar against ICBM and SLBM attack, 
located at Olenegorsk, (the 2. PVO Am1y operates a second 
Hen House radar at Novgorod in the Baltic ADD)." The 
Arkhangelsk ADD also operates two of the nine So~iet 
second-generation modem phased-array BMEWS radars, whtch 
also are used as part of the ABM battle management system. 
They are located at:" 
Olenegorsk40 
Pechora41 
BMEWS/ABM 
BMEWS/ABM 
The Kola Hen House and both phased array BMEWS stations 
are directed towards the Arctic, to provide early warning of 
ballistic missile attack and to track incoming bombers. 
Forces on the Kola 
Approximately 100 IAPVO interceptors are based on the 
Kola,41 operating in three regiments from three airbases: 
I regt 
l·regt 
1 regt 
30 Su-27 Flanker B 1986 
30 MiG-31 Foxhound A1982 
30 Su-15 Flagon ElF early 1970's 
The oldest IAPVO interceptors on the Kola are the medium 
range Su-15 Flagon F. They are designed for medium-range 
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intercept miSSIOns in the inoer air defence zone, operating 
under very tight control from ground-based command centres. 
The Su-15 have been based on tbe Kola for some time, and 
in 1978 it was an Su-15 Flagon which intercepted and shot 
down the civilian airliner KAL 007 over the central Kola. 43 
The next most modern IAPVO interceptor based on the Kola 
is the MiO-31 Foxhound A. This is a fourth generation long-
range interceptor with a true look-down/shoot-down capability. 
It is designed for very long range intercept missions in the 
outer air defence zone over the Arctic, operating against B-
520/H ALCM earners prior to launch and against low-level 
ALCM. The Mi0-31 Foxhound A regiment deployed to the 
Kola between 1982 and 1983,44 replacing the older second 
generation Tu-28P Fiddler B long-range interceptors on the 
Kola. 
The Mi0-31 was followed by the Su-27 Flanker B, which 
began deployment to the Kola in 1986,45 and was operational 
by 1988.4' The Su-27 Flanker B is the most advanced 
interceptor in seiVice with the IAPVO. It has a true look-
down/shoot -down capability and is also designed for very long 
range intercept missions and against cruise missiles. In the 
Arkhangelsk ADD it would operate primarily in the outer air 
defence zone over the Arctic against B-520/H and ALCM. 
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ARKHANGELSK AIR DEFENCE DISTRICT FORCES 1980-1990 
1980" 1985" 
lnlerc:apiOI'II 340 275 /9 rag! 
Madam (SU-27/MIG-31) 60 I 2 ragt 
su-27 Flatrk.ar B .... 
MIG-.31 Foxhound A .... 60 /2 ragt 
MIG-25 Foxbat E .... 30 /1 ragt 
Mlg-23 Flogg9r BfG .... 30 /1 ragt 
Su--15 Flagon Elf .... 95/3 ragt 
Yak-28P F1rebar .... 30 /1 ragt 
Tu-2BP Fiddler 8 .... 30 I 1 ragt 
AWACS 
11-76 Mainstay AWACS 
"'"" Tu-126 Moss AEW 1·2 1·2 
SAM 1080 1085 
SAM groups .... @70 
SA-10 Grutrlb/8 ....... 
SA-5 Gammon Y" 
SA-3 Gco Y" Y"' 
SA-2Gu/d81/n8 Y"' Y" 
KOLA 1080 .... 
SU-27 Flsnker B 
MIG-31 Foxhound A 30 I 1 ragt 
MiG-25 Foxbal E 
Mlg-23 Flogg9t BIG 
Su-15 F1&gon Elf 
30 /1 regt 
30 /1 regt 30 /1 ragt 
Yak-2SP Ffnlbar 
Tu-2BP Flddlsr 8 3D /1 ragt 
Total: 100 I 3 rugl 100 /3 ragt 
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1990". 
270 /9 ragl 
150 /5 regt 
60 I 2 ragt 
90 /3 rag! 
60 /2 rogt 
60 /2 ragt 
........ 
1·2 
1000 
@75 
Y"' yoo 
Y"' phasing out 
1090 
30 ,, regt 
30 /1 regt 
30 I 1 regt 
100 I regtS 
Arkhangelsk Air Defence District Arctic Missions 
1991 
'":Ie VPVO status and development sank during the 1970's 
With the VPVO stagnating operationally and technologically' 
1bis changed drastically as of the early 1980's as a result of 
two factors: 
1. The strategic nuclear threat from US air breathing 
~ystems (heavy bombers and ALCM) began a sharp 
mcrease as of the early 1980's, making this a 
relatively more important service in the overall US 
strategic arsenal as well as increasing the importance 
of the Arctic airspace. 
2. Soviet technological advances in key areas vital for 
the development of the air defence systems needed 
by the IAPVL?. 1bis notably included the develop-
ment of effective defence systems against low-level 
systems, such as fighter-borne look-down/shoot-down 
radars, airborne command, control and surveillance 
~ystems and advanced SAM technology capable of 
mtercepting cruise missiles. 
!flese two factors led to a rapid resurgence of the general 
Importance of the VPVO in Soviet strategy, as well as a 
renewed focus on Arctic air defence and hence on the 
Arkhangelsk Air Defence District. As a result the missions and 
forces assigned to the 2. PVO Anny steadily increased during 
the 1980's. 
Strategic Air Defence (IAPVO+ZRV+RTV) 
Defen~e against SAC intercontinental range nuclear bombers 
a~acking ~~ss the Arctic and the Norwegian Sea is the 
pnmary miSSion of the Arkhangelsk ADD, with an absolute 
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priority over all other tasks. This classic VPVO mission dates 
from late 1950's when the USSR faced a massive nuclear 
bomber threat. The mission was downgraded in the late 1960's 
and during the 1970's when the relative nuclear threat from 
SAC bombers fell and the VPVO was unable to develop the 
necessary new low-level air defence technology. 
However as of the early 1980's the US nuclear threat from 
air-breathing systems increased considerably with the introduc-
tion of the SAC AGM-86B ALCM as of 1982,'7 and the 
deployment of 100 B-IB low-level supersonic penetrating 
intercontinental heavy bombers as of 1986.48 In addition the 
USAF Stealth programme, with flight trials of the new stealthy 
aircraft underway since at least the late 1970's49 and which the 
GRU must have been following very closely, would have 
boosted the Soviet perception of a growing strategic air threat. 
Since the mid-1980's the strategic air defence mission has 
been focussed on two areas: 
1. The ALCM threat. 
2. The Stealth bomber threat. 
There are also indications that defence against carrier-borne 
aircraft operating in a conventional role is becoming a major 
VPVO mission. However this is a theatre mission and dealt 
with in the next subsection. 
Cruise Missile Defence 
The air defence effort against the ALCM threat is the main 
VPVO task today. Operationally it involves the establishment 
of an Arctic defence-in-depth system, involving three main 
defence zones: 
1. 
2. 
Outer Air Defence Zone. (IAPVO) 
Central Air Defence Zone. (IAPVO+VMF) 
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3. Inner Air Defence Zone. (IAPVO+ZRV) 
These operations are outlined below. 
Far forward air intercept (IAPVO) 
The nature of the lA VPO modernisation drive and deployment 
of the 11-76 indicate an increased emphasis upon forward air 
defence operations against cruise missiles. At the same time 
the technological development of the IAPVO also increased 
the capability for forward air superiority operations."' This 
included the deployment of very long range interceptors (Su-
12 and MiG-31), the deployment of the new airborne control 
and surveillance systems (11-76) and the efforts to develop 
aerial tankers for the IAPVO interceptors. By the late 1980's 
the IAPVO exercise pattern also revealed a greater emphasis 
upon far forward air defence operations over the Arctic at 
great distances from the Soviet coastline." 
Forward air intercept (IAPVO+VMF) 
IAPVO cooperation with the Northern Fleet also grew in the 
late 1980's. The IAPVO increased the number of exercises 
involving coordinated VPVONMF air defence operations. 
These focussed upon low-level interception and air defence 
missions in forward sea areas, with the apparent objective of 
strengtherting the defence of key areas on the Kola against 
low-level aircaft and cruise missiles. This also improved the 
IAPVO capability for providing forward air defence for the 
Northern Fleet operations. 52 
TI!is was also indicated by the IAPVO exercises in the late 
1980's which began involving integrated strategic air defence 
operations involving the close COoo()peration between IAPVO 
and Northern Fleet surface urtits." These exercises were 
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located in the Arctic sea areas in the Barents Sea and the 
Greenland Sea. 
Inner air defence (ZRF+VMF+SV) 
The Arkhangelsk ADD exercises in the late 1980's reflected 
this mission for the defence of parts of Kola against aircraft 
and cruise missile attack. 54 These inner air defence operations 
primarily involve the SAM units of the ZRV, and by 1990 
several SA-10 battalions were operational on the Kola, 
deployed for the defence of the main naval bases." It was 
notably during one such exercise in 1985 that a target drone 
fired from the Barents and simulating an attacking SLCM 
penetrated the exercise area and flew on to crash in northern 
Finland. 
Soviet analysis of the Gulf War have reconfirmed the impor-
tance of the cruise missile defence mission. There are reports 
that a special VPVO air-defence element to counter cruise 
missiles is to be introduced to cover at least the most probably 
threat areas." TI!is will involve the 2. PVO Army heavily 
since both the Arkhangelsk and Baltic Air Defence Districts 
are primary cruise missile transit zones. 
Support for the Nuclear Offensive Forces 
The VPVO received a new mission as of the mid-1980's with 
the resurgence of the role of the heavy bombers in Soviet 
nuclear strategy. The new mission involves providing long 
range fighter escort for the strategic bombers of the Moscow 
Air Army. TI!is role has also been made possible by the new 
advanced Soviet interceptors with their long unrefuelled range. 
By 1987 the most modem IAPVO Su-27 Flanker B and MiG-
31 Foxhound A interceptors had begun integrated exercises 
with the Moscow Air Army, providing escort for Tu-95 Bear 
H with AS-15 Kent ALCM on training missions against the 
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CONUS." This mission has very strong - in fact exclusive -
Arctic orientation. 
Theatre Air Support 
The conventional Theatre Air Defence mission was strongly 
boosted with the organisation of the TVD command structure 
in the late 1970's and the reorientation of Soviet military 
strategy. This was also one of the main reasons why the 
VPVO regional command structure was partially integrated in 
the new TVD command system. It involves two main missions 
for the VPVO: 
1. Theatre Air Defence. 
2. Support for TVD Front and Fleet operations. 
Theatre Air Defence 
The TVD air defence miSSIOn is focussed on supporting 
massive conventional all-arms operations on the TVD level. 
The primary air defence role of the Arkhangelsk ADD on the 
TVD level is directed against tactical medium- and inter-
mediate-range bombers attacking targets in the Arkhangelsk 
ADD or transitting its airspace. It includes defence against 
both conventional and nuclear theatre cruise missiles, from 
which the threat has increased considerably since the USN 
deployment of the Tomahawk family of theatre SLCM began. 
The importance of the TVD air defence role has been strongly 
boosted by the Soviet analysis of the Gulf War in 1991 and 
the massive US demonstration of conventional air power. This 
has confirmed Marshal Ogalkov's thesis of 1979 that a 
Military-Technological Revolution was taking place, and it has 
strongly reinforced the importance of theatre air defence. 
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Recently there are also indications that a new VPVO maritime 
anti-carrier defence mission is being established. This based on 
the performance of the USN carrier aviation during the Gulf 
War, which has led to a Soviet requirement for the VPVO 
operating against carrier-launched aircraft. This will reportedly 
lead to the establishment of new VPVO units in regions where 
carrier-launched operations are likely." The location of the 
Arkhangelsk ADD facing the North Atlantic clearly makes it 
a major candidate for the deployment of these units. 
Air Support for the Northern Fleet 
The Alkhangelsk ADD IAPVO forces also train to provide air 
cover for the Northern Fleet general purpose forces operating 
in the Norwegian Sea and Arctic waters. This task is strictly 
subordinate to the strategic air defence task but has recently 
received more emphasis, partly because of the growth of 
Northern Fleet missions during early the 1980's, and partly as 
a spinoff of the combined Northern Fleet/2. PVO Army 
strategic air defence operations described above. 
IAPVO training for longer range maritime air support role 
began in the late 1970's when the limited over-water AEW 
capabilities of the Tu-126 Moss could by combined with the 
emerging long range fighters such as the MiG-23B." In the 
early 1980's the VPVO missions were expanded to include 
the task of providing air cover for the Navy.'" By 1985 the 
IAPVO was regularly exercising support operations for the 
Northern Fleet" These involved protecting Soviet naval units 
from air attack, providing long range CAP and recce, and 
denying the airspace north of the GIFUK barrier and especially 
in the Arctic waters to enemy air units, notably ASW aircraft. 
At this time these tasks were vital for the Northern Fleet 
surface forces, since they were being assigned missions in the 
central Norwegian Sea at the same time as they lacked 
effective sea-based air support." 
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In the late 1980's IAPVO long range flights from the Kola to 
western sea areas were gradually cut back. This was probably 
linked to the simultaneous reduction in Northern Fleet surface 
activity in the Norwegian Sea following Gorbachev's accession 
to power. However the IAPVO air units on the Kola main-
tained the same level of training." 
Combined IAPVO - Northern Fleet air defence operations in 
Arctic waters in the Barents Sea and the Greenland Sea have 
continued and even intensified since 1985,04 but these appear 
to have a primary strategic air defence role, with the Northern 
Fleet supporting the 2. PVO Army and not vice versa. (See 
above.) 
Air Support for the Northern Front 
Finally one should note that the Arldlangelsk ADD IAPVO 
interceptors may also be assigned to provide tactical air 
support for theatre level combined arms operations. This 
emerged after the Air Force reorganisation in the late 1970's 
and the establishment of the integrated TVD commands as of 
the fall of 1981. In the early 1980's the VPVO missions were 
expanded to include the task of providing air cover for the 
ground forces." The increased range of the IAPVO fighters 
combined with the ll-76 forward air control systems which 
emerged in the mid-1980's made this technically possible. 
However the drastic reorientation of Soviet theatre planning 
following Gorbachev's accession to power in 1985 - and 
particularly after the loss of eastern Europe in 1989 - has 
probably relegated this mission to a very low level. 
Strategic Early Warning (RTV) 
The RTV Early Warning mission emerged in the late fifties 
with the imminent US ICBM deployment, leading to the first 
of the Soviet Hen House BMEW radars being deployed to the 
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Arctic coastline in 1959. As noted above, these remain in 
place today, and have recently been augmented by the new 
phased array radars. This mission is likely to remain of high 
priority as it is also closely linked to the long-range air 
intercept role of the IAPVO and the the ABM mission of the 
PRO. 
Strategic Ballistic Missile Defence (PRO+RTV) 
Tbe Soviet Ballistic Missile Defence effort dates from the 
early 1960's and was boosted by the Soviet deployment of the 
Galosh ABM system around Moscow. Tbe Moscow ABM 
system was linked to the Hen House and today is linked to 
the modern phased-array radars of the RTV, which provide the 
ABM sites with long-range target tracking and acquisition data. 
While the technological difficulties involved in establishing a 
viable ABM defence probably kept this mission at a lower 
priority up to the late 1980's the partial replacement of the 
Galosh ABM system by the SH-04 and SH-0806 indicates that 
efforts in this field have continued. In all likelihood they have 
been spurred by the US SDI programme. Should the Soviet 
BMD effort intensify in coming years the Arctic coastline 
radar sites could grow in importance. 
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6. The Narthem. Fleet in the Arctic 
Soviet naval developments over the last few years present us 
with a paradox. The new Military Doctrine advertised by 
President Gorbachev in 1987 has been followed by noticeable 
reforms in almost all services of the Soviet Armed Forces on 
the theatre level and below. These have been dramatic, notably 
including the large-scale withdrawal of forces from Central 
Europe, Afghanistan and the Far Eastern border areas, the 
drastic reduction of the size of the continental theatre forces 
and the beginnings of a profound restructuring of the theatre 
force posture and strategy. 
The exception to this trend appears to be the Soviet Navy, 
whose general force structure and construction programmes 
have appeared to remain unaffected by the general cuts in 
theatre forces. The main naval changes so far have involved 
excercises, which have been cut sharply since 1985, and the 
scrapping of the first of a large number of obsolescent 
combatants left over from the 1950's and early 1960's. In the 
Northern Fleet this has led to the loss of 39 large combatants 
(above frigate) in the last four years. At the same time 
however the Navy has maintained her ambitious pre-Gorbachev 
ship-building programmes, providing a smaller number of 
larger and far more capable combatants to replace the old 
ships. Thus in the same period the Northern Fleet has received 
32 new large combatants - that is to say over eight new large 
ships per year. This has offset the cuts resulting from block 
obsolescence, partly by softening the quantitative decline, but 
mainly by compensating for it with a significant increase in 
quality. The aggregate result has been a steady growth in 
combat power to the present. This trend is particularly strong 
in the North Atlantic, since the Northern Fleet has a priority 
for receiving the most modem large combatants in the Navy. 
This study outlioes this development from 1987, when the 
Gorbachev military reforms and the CFE negotiations began, 
to the present. 
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Soviet naval forces can be divided between the SSBN's 
assigned to the High Command of the Strategic Nuclear Forces 
and the General Purpose Ships and Amphibious Forces 
assigned to Theatre and Front Commands. The present SSBN 
force is dealt with in detail in section 1.1. and it's possible 
future development in the section analysing the impact of 
START on the Soviet strategic nuclear posture. This section 
only deals with the General Purpose forces of the VMF. 
General Purpose Forces 
Soviet naval general purpose forces include most of the 
~aining combatants of the Soviet Navy. Their development 
m the Northern Fleet since 1987 is outlined in Table 3. in the 
appendix and summarised in the following table. 
SUBMARINES PLUO MINUS NET 
Theelnt Nuclear: .a~SSGN 
+ 11 '*' SS8N ·1 new SSGN' + 11 SSGNISSBN 
Long Rqe Antiihlp: + 2 new SSGN 
+ 1 old SSGN + 3 SSGN 
AIJadr. Sublllarint.: +2r.wSSN + 2 SSN 
Diosal &Dnarines: ••nawss -IS old SS ·14 ss 
SUM SUBMARINES: 
'" 
.,. ,, 
• 1.0111 In -=i<ll!nl. 
SURFACE SHIPS PI.US MINUS .... 
Alfiallon Ship!: .,,_~ + llihlp 
Largo SUotgcg Ships: + 4 new ahipB • 5 old ships -1 ship 
l..argeASWIIhlps: + 3 r.w sHps • 7 old ships - 4 shipJ 
_, 
+ 1 MW •hip - 1 old ship ,. 
SUM SURFACE SHIPS: •• 
., 
-4 ships 
Thus in the last four years the Northern Fleet general purpose 
forces have lost 29 old ships and received 27 new ships. Of 
the latter 19 consist of new ships delivered after 1980, while 
the average year in which the scrapped ship classes first saw 
service is 1959. Thus while the size of the force has remained 
almost the same, the quality has improved considerably, 
resulting in a far more powerful fighting force. The breakdown 
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of forces also provides a rough indication of which areas ha~e 
been prioritised in the development of the Northern Fleet. This 
is the case for the general purpose submarines, whose number 
has actually grown, with a strong focus on those with a 
theatre nuclear and antiship capability. At the same time the 
diesel submarine force (consisting of very old ships with a 
limited range) has been cut sharply. The number of surface 
ships has also dropped slightly, particularly in the category of 
large ASW ships, while the number of aviation ships has 
increased. However the considerable improvement in the 
quality of the new vessels in all likelihood outweighs the 
limited loss in numbers. 
All in all the above development indicates that the Northern 
Fleet general purpose forces capability has increased steadily, 
and secondly that it - and the Soviet Navy in general - has 
received a generous allocation of resources. This is paradoxical 
for three principal reasons: 
1. In Gotbachev's first five-year period in power there appears to have 
been a genuine attempt to cut the size of Soviet theatre forces. 
However this does not seem to have affected the Soviet Navy's 
theatre forces and especially not the Northern FleeL 
2. This is particularly curious since the Soviet Navy traditiooally has 
occupied the lowest rank in the hierarchy of Soviet theatre forces. 
Thus the interests of the Soviet Navy's general putpase forces have 
. been strictly subordinated to those of the Ground Forces, wi~ a 
correspondingly subordinate allocation of resources. The except1on 
has been when the Navy has been able to argue that its general 
purpose forces could provide support for Soviet strategic nuclear 
interests. 
3. Not only has Soviet naval construction continued on a large scale, but the Navy is actually expanding its shipbuilding programme 
significantly with the development of the two new classes of large 
CfOL carriers, a type of vessel traditionally derided as 'floating 
coffms' by the Soviet military. These costly projects not only 
represent a considerable boost to the allocation of resources to the 
Soviet Navy, but also places it on the verge of a new era in its 
history. This is all the more remarlcable since the large new carriers 
are exhorbitantly expensive and appear - at first glance - to be of 
marginal importance to Soviet vital security interests. 
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Various explanations for the continued development of the 
Soviet Navy have been offered, but many of these are not 
entirely satisfactory. They include: 
1. The notion that since the USSR has been unable to engage the US 
in naval arms control negotiations she may wish to maintain her 
naval development as a source of pressure and potential bargaining 
chip. However this does not take into account the range and depth 
of the initial Gorbachev reform drive, which included the 
announcement in December 1988 of significant unilateral cuts of 
Soviet conventional forces in Central Europe, before the CFE 
negotiatioo.s had been opened and contrary to all 'bargaining chip' 
logic. 
2. A second explanation which has been forwarded is that it is 
uneconomical to make abrupt cancellations of partly completed 
vessels and hence the effects of cuts in naval programmes only 
become apparent in the longer term, when the ongoing production 
pipeline is completed. The problem with this argument is partly 
that it ignores the depth of the Gorbachev's initial refonn auempts, 
and partly that it goes contraty to historical evidence of previous 
Soviet behaviour in similar situations. In the mid-1950's and early 
1960's the political leadership stopped major naval construction 
programmes virtually overnight, either melting down partially 
completed hulls or improvising their conversion for makeshift 
civilian use. And under Gorbachev the military ship construction 
programmes offer as good candidates for konvertsiya as most of the 
other improbable projects which have been attempted. 
The most plausible explanation for the continued development 
of the Northern Fleet general purpose forces and particularly 
for the development of the carriers is that they are perceived 
as supporting Soviet vital strategic interests - primarily nuclear. 
As noted earlier Soviet global nuclear strategy has not been 
affected by the military reforms which have emerged under 
Gorbachev, and is actually of increasing importance to the 
military security of the USSR under the new conditions. Thus 
a role in this field probably provides the only military 
rationale for the continued allocation of large resources to the 
Navy in a time of drastic and increasing economic hardship. 
This hypothesis is also borne out by the evolution of the 
Soviet-US strategic nuclear relationship and the force structure 
of the Soviet Navy. There are four primary ways in which the 
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Soviet Navy can support Soviet strategic nuclear efforts in the 
1990's: 
I. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
By supporting the Soviet strategic air defence system ~VO) 
against the growing US strategic bomber threat, by extendmg the 
intercept capability against bombers and ALCM further north. an.d 
west in the Norwegian. Barents and Greenland .Seas. Th1s IS 
particularly important in the 1990's due to the growmg role of .the 
US strategic bombers. This mission would include ~c new earners 
sently being a.mstructcd and the large surface ships deployed to 
:: Northern Fleet in the 1980's. This argument is s~~ by 
recent trends in the Northern Fleet exercise pattern,. wh1ch ~~eludes 
a growing nmnber of integrated air defence operabons earned out 
in close cooperation with the VPVO. 
Defendhtg the Arctic SSBN Bastions against US and B?tish hunter-
killer sulxnarines. This task has probably been a maJor N~ern 
Fleet priority since the 1970's but has proba~y been ~sted tn ~e 
1980's when it became apparent that strategiC ASY" m the A~c 
had become an important USN mission. Th~ speclal.configura~on 
of the Typlwon and Della IV classes for Arcbc under-Ice operabons 
will also have contributed to this, and as noted earlier ~e smaller 
number of SSBN's remaining after START .will m~ke the1r d.efen~e 
of even greater importance. The forces dtrectly mvolved m th1s 
mission would primarily consist of the Nm:thern ~ at_tack 
submarines with a particular ASW configurau~ ~bng ~ a 
forward posture, backed up by the Large Anb~ulxnanne .Shtps, 
operating in the western passages to the Arctic Ocean m the 
northern Norwegian Sea. 
Defending against USN SLCM carriers. For the submarine-borne 
threat this would involve the same ASW forces as would be 
defending the Arctic SSBN bastions, while the surface-borne threal 
would also involve the long-range anti-ship combatants from the 
Naval Aviation and the Nuclear Cruise Missile Submarines. 
Carrying out strategic ASW against western SSBN forces. ~is 
mission, which was a major priority during the 1960's and 19?0 s, 
has probabaly not been dropped entirely though the US Trident 
system in the 1980's made it extremely difficult. Non~~ss th~ 
are indications that Soviet stralegic ASW efforts pers.11t, mclud~g 
the surveillance of US SSBN bases and attempts ~ !J'~Il ~e SSBN s 
from there. In addition one should note that a d1m!l'ts~mg nut?bcr 
f US British and French SSBN's still are anned w1th mtennedl8~-~ge SLBM's which make the North Adantic an important potential 
launch area. 
Here it is also important to note that the first two missi~ns -
which probably are the most important - almost exclusiVely 
concern the Arctic and Norwegian Sea, and hence make the 
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Northern Fleet the key instrument. The last two missions 
primarily affect the Northern, Baltic and Black Sea Fleets and 
the Mediterranean Eskadra, but here too the North Atlantic and 
Northern Fleet play a key role. This would help explain why 
the Northern Fleet has received such a marked priority for 
new large combatants during the 1980's. 
However one should also note that while these missions in 
support of Soviet strategic nuclear interests probably constitute 
the main rationale for why the Soviet political leadership has 
maintained - and expanded - the investment in the general 
purpose forces, they also permit the execution of a number of 
secondary conventional missions. These include the use of the 
Navy for political or theatre support missions in the North 
Atlantic at a future stage. This leads us to a potential fifth 
mission, on the Eurostrategic level: 
S. Cutting the Atlantic SLOC between the US and Europe. For the 
Soviet General Staff the importance of this missioo. has probably 
increased significantly after the Revolution in Military-Technical 
Affairs which they perceived in the 1980's, and which has been 
rnrongly emphasised by the Gulf War. Under the new conditions 
the capability for Force Generation is decisive. A key element in 
NATO's force generation capacity are the Atlantic SLOC's. Hence 
cutting these would be a vital objective in any future European 
confrontation. Here one should also note that the importance of the 
SLOe's to the General Staff grew following the unexpected loss of 
the WAPA states in 1989, however in today's post-Soviet world this 
mission is probably no longer feasible. 
However this last mission has probably been bypassed by 
events. The collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991 
has made any Soviet or Russian all-European multitheatre 
operation virtually unthinkable. As is examined closer in 
section 2. Russia today remains in a state of internal collapse, 
and is thus virtually paralysed on the international level. 
However one should note that this domestic state could also 
lead to the return of an authoritarian regime exploiting foreign 
crises and conflicts as a means of maintaining domestic power. 
In this case an aggressive Russian foreign policy, including the 
use of military force on the regional level, cannot be excluded. 
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Under these circumstances the post-Soviet strategic nuclear 
arsenal would constitute a vital deterrent force, shielding 
Russia's regional policy, while the post-Soviet Navy would 
emerge as one of the main instruments for preventing foreign 
conventional forces from getting within striking range of 
Russia's coasts. This last factor is particularly important in 
view of the US operations in the Gulf War. 
Future development of Northern Fleet general 
purpose forces 
The future development of the Northern Fleet general purpose 
forces obviously depends first and foremost on the political 
development of the Soviet Union and/or Russia. A change in 
political leadership of the centre or the fragmentation of the 
Union could have major consequences for military policy, 
while a major domestic upheaval or collapse could dissolve the 
present Soviet military organisation, including the Navy. Apart 
from a general observation that the conditions in the USSR are 
steadily getting worse it is difficult to predict the course of 
future events. Hence this study will limit itself to the military 
rationale, based on a general continuation of present trends. 
On this basis two factors will probably determine the future 
development of the Navy general forces: their role in Soviet 
vital strategic interests; and the relationship between block 
obsolescence and new construction. 
In the first case it seems unlikely that the importance of any 
of the Navy's strategic support missions outlined above will 
decline in the foreseeable future. Barring a major change in 
US nuclear strategy the General Staff - regardless of whether 
it is Soviet or Russian - will be faced with a strategic nuclear 
equation evolving along today lines. This means that the need 
for the Navy general purpose forces to perform the strategic 
support missions outlined above will persist or perhaps grow. 
This in turn implies that the basic rationale for allocating 
resources to these forces will remain in force. However 
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whether the economic resources will continue to be available, 
and indeed whether or not Russia can avoid descending into 
a level of anarchic chaos which precludes all higher forms of 
organised military activity, is uncertain. If this is the case we 
may assume that the main elements of the post-Soviet Navy 
will rapidly become unusable. This is becoming increasingly 
(l9Ssible. In this case the Russian military presence in the 
Arctic will be strongly reduced. 
Assuming that this does not happen, and that present construc-
tion trends are maintained, the next question then becomes 
how heavily block obsolescence will affect the Soviet Navy. 
Table 4. provides a rough indication of the number and type 
of ships in the Northern Fleet which have reached an age . 
where economic and safety considerations call for their 
scrapping. On the table this includes those ship classes which 
were introduced in the 1950's and 1960's. However this is 
actually a rather conservative estimate since, as noted earlier, 
a number of the ships in the classes introduced in the 1960's 
will actually have been delivered at a far more recent date. 
Nonetheless the table provides a rough overview of how the 
overall block obsolescence facing the Soviet Navy affects the 
Northern Fleet 
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Pre-1970 Poot-1970 Percentage Pre-1970 
Theatre SSGNJSSBN:* 6 8 43% 
Antiship SSGNJSSG: 20 11 65% 
Attack SSN: 8 32 20% 
Diesel submarines: 12 16 43% 
SUM SUBMARINES: 46 67 41% 
Aviation ships: 3 0% 
Large surface ships: 2 10 17% 
Large ASW ships: 9 6 60% 
Amphibious ships: 9 5 64% 
SUM SURFACE SlllPS: 20 24 45% 
SUM LARGE VESSELS: 66 91 42% 
* Including Yankee I class. 
Thus 42 % of the Northern Fleet general purpose forces (66 
out of 157 of the large combatants) belong to classes first 
taken into service before 1970. If these constitute prime 
candidates for scrapping on the basis of their age we may 
expect corres(l9nding cuts in the Northern Fleet general 
purpose forces during the 1990's. On t!lls. basis three ty~s of 
combatant could be particularly hard hit smce they contam 60 
% or more of ship-classes predating 1970. They include the 
Antiship SSGN/SSG, the Large ASW Ships and the Am-
phibious Ships. 
. However here it is im(l9rtant to note that this estimate may 
be conservative. In the first place the classes being scrapped 
today are rough! y ten years older than those listed above. 
Secondly, a ship class first taken into service during the 
1960's could have a production run extending into the 1970's. 
This is for instance the case for the following classes: 
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CLASS 
YANKEE I 
VICTOR I 
FOXTROT 
CHARLIE I 
KRESTA I! 
KASIIIN MOD 
KASIIIN 
ALUGATOR 
POLNOCNY 
DELIVERIES 
1%7-1974 
1967-1974 
1957-1974 
1968-1972 
1967-1976 
1963-1972 
1963-1972 
1964-1977 
1961-1973 
Those ships delivered last might not be immediate candidates 
for scrapping on the basis of age. Thus the state of the 
Northern Fleet block obsolescence would partly depend upon 
how many of the latest deliveries of the older classes it has 
received. On the basis of the general priority of this Fleet for 
receiving the most modern equipment the actual number of 
obsolescent vessels could therefore be smaller than indicated 
in the table. 
Nonetheless it is clear that a considerable number of ships are 
reach!ng retirable age and are likely to be scrapped. The key 
que~uon then ~comes how many and how good ships the 
Sov1et (or Russ1an) Navy will be permitted to construct to 
replace them with. This is clearly difficult to foresee, since it 
depends to a large extent on the political development of the 
USSR. However if we assume that the Soviet naval production 
pattern of Gorbachev 's first five year period continues then we 
may expect that most of the scrapped ships will continue to 
be replaced with new and far higher quality combatants. This 
trend is also indicated in the latest report by the US Director 
of Naval Intelligence to the House Armed Services Committee, 
of March 7, 1991. 
Of course block obsolescence and ship construction are not 
be the only factors determining the state of the Northern Fleet 
in the coming years. Modern vessels might be decommissioned 
or placed in storage for reasons of economy or politics, Arms 
Control agreements could come into play, or the Soviet Navy 
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could suffer from manpower and other shorta~es. N?r should 
one forget that the internal collapse of the Sovret ~m on .c?uld 
also lead to the dissolution of the large-scale Sov1et m1htary 
organisation as we know it today, w!dch also would af_fect the 
Fleet. However it is almost impossible today to predict how 
these two latter factors will evolve. 
If the trend in the last four years development of the Soviet 
Navy .continues we may expect the qu~tity of th~ general 
purposes forces to diminish slightly, while the quality of the 
new ships increases considerably over the old sh1ps they 
replace. This could mean that the increase in the N?rthern 
Fleet general purpose forces ove~ co~bat power will also 
continue during the 1990's. Here 1t also Important to note th_at 
block obsolescence in the Soviet Fleet as a whole will 
probably only have a ~ru:ginal effect. o_n the Northern Fleet, 
since it has a high pnonty for receiVIng ~e mos~ ~odern 
naval vessels and the strategic rationale for 1ts conunumg to 
do so remains in force. 
However as noted earlier, this is today emerging as one of 
the least likely scenarios. The continued economic decline of 
Russia will cut the resources available to the Navy, and could, 
at its most extreme, lead to a general political collapse of 
Russia, precluding all higher military organisation. 
Conclusion, Northern Fleet 
Today the future of Russia is becoming increasing!~ uncertai~. 
Because of the potential scale of the changes on thiS level this 
factor of course constitutes the primary determinant of the 
future of the post-Soviet Navy and the Northern Flee~. !Jte 
most dramatic change involves the breakdown of Russ1a mto 
anarchic chaos. This would obviously also impact on . ~e 
Navy, in all likelihood reducing the general forces capa?1lity 
significantly. However this scenario at present only co~sututes 
one amongst several future possibilities, all of wh1ch are 
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exceedingly difficult to foresee with any certainty. It is also 
possible, and perhaps more likely, that Russia will continue 
to muddle on, at least insofar as the military organisation is 
concerned. In this case the most prudent course is to plan on 
a continuation of Soviet naval developments roughly along the 
lines of the last five years, but at a strongly reduced economic 
level. 
If this is the case then we may expect the overall combat 
power of the Northern Fleet general purpose forces to continue 
to decline gradually. At the same time the Northern Fleet 
strategic nuclear force will be reduced in size but remains of 
vital importance to Russian security. Here it is particularly 
important to note that Russia still remains a large state, facing 
the same geostrategic imperatives in the Arctic as the USSR 
did, and retaining most of the post-Soviet military assets. 
Under these conditions the role of the Kola, and the Northern 
Fleet, for Russian military interests will remain high and 
possibly grow. Should in fact the above scenario prove too 
cautious it will be easier - and safer - to reduce our invest-
ments post-facto than to catch up with an anticipated but 
mistaken reduction in Soviet naval capabilities. 
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TABLE 1. GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES. 
SUBMARINES AND NAVAL AVIATlON, 
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TABLE 1. GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES. (conL) 
TABLE 2. BLOCK OBSOLESCENCE AND THE NORTHERN FLEET.' 
SURFACE StiPS AND NAVAL AVIATION. 
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TABLE 2. BLOCK OBSOLESCENCE AND THE NORTHERN FLEET (conL). 
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1991 1 100% 
1988 1 100% 
1975 1 33% 
11170·-·····-····--···----
3 
0 
1982 1 33 % 
1981 7 57% 
1980 2 67% 
11170··--·····--····------
1967 2 50% 
10 
2 
1981 6 54% 
11170····--···----···--··· 
1969 7 70% 
1966 1 33% 
1962 1 9% 
6 
9 
1978 1 33% 
1975 4 17% 
11110·-···········-------· 
1964 2 14% 
1961 7 15% 
5 
9 
Notes 
l. Soviet designations. 
2. Estimated to enter service in 1991 or 1992. Soviet sources claim 
it will be assigned to the Northern Fleet. If so then the Naval 
Aviation MiG-29A and Su-27B mod. will probably accompany it 
3. This includes all submarine and surface ship classes above the 
size of frigate whose first class type was taken into service before 
1965. This provides a rough indication of the scale of the block 
obsolescence in the Soviet Navy, but one should note that obviously 
age alone is not at sufficient criteria, as the condition of a ship will 
depend on a variety of additional factors, such as maintenance, 
operational history ·and so forth. The tables are also rather conserva-
tive in the sense that classes in which a large number of ships have 
been constructed over an extended period will include a number of 
ships which still are relatively new. 
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7. Post-soviet Military Forces in the Arctic 
The future of Soviet military power is a function of the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and the political and economic 
developm~nt of. the . states emerging in its ruins. The exact 
course which. this Will ta_ke. and the extent to which parts of 
the .post-Sov1~t area Will descend into chaos, cannot be 
predicted prec1sely. However it is possible to identify the main 
trends prese~tly underway. From these the main alternative 
fu.ture scenanos can also be sketched. This section does this, 
With the f?Cus on the consequences for the post -Soviet military 
presence m the Arctic. 
P?~itical Development of the Post-Soviet Area and its 
M1htary Consequences 
Th~~ main alternative scenarios are envisageable for the 
political and economic development of the post-Soviet area 
Eac~ wi~. have a specific impact on the future of the ex~ 
Sov1et m1btary organisation: 
l. The Conferederation of Sovereign States remains in 
force ~d the k~y slavic states retain sufficiently 
harmomous relatiOns to maintain a coordinated 
security policy and military organisation of which key 
elements remain under joint Confederate control. This 
now appears unlikely. 
2. The Confederation of Sovereign States is unable to 
P~':!ue a co~o~ security policy and integrated 
military. or.g'?llsation and the ex-Soviet military 
arsenal1s divided among the post-Soviet states each 
of w~ich. develop~ an independent national mllitary 
organisation. In this case Russia will inherit the bulk 
of the Soviet military force and also remains the only 
post-Soviet state with access to the Arctic. 
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3. Key parts of the former USSR - including Russia -
descend to a level of chaos which precludes all 
forms of higher organised activity, including military. 
These three alternative scenarios and their military implications 
are examined below. 
Scenario 1: The Confederation of Independent States survives 
Scenario 1., based on a continued integrated post -Soviet 
military under joint CIS command appears unlikely. On the 
one hand two of the key participants, Russia, with 140 million 
inhabitants and the Ukraine with 50 million, have ever since 
the failed coup attempt in August 1991 been unable to agree 
on the integration of the military forces. Russia has sought 
their coordination under the ClS, while the Ukraine has sought 
to develop independent Armed Forces. The rift emerged in 
public since October 1991 and has gradually intensified, 
receiving most publicity when the Ukraine demanded control 
of the Black Sea fleet At the ClS meeting in Minsk on 14 
February 1992 the Ukraine and Russia could not agree on a 
settlement of the dispute, and the Ukraine, along with Mol-
dova and Azerbaijan, refused to participate in the integration 
of ClS forces. Instead the Ukrainian leadership, backed up by 
the Ukrainian Parliament, has voted in favour of establishing 
an independet 250,000 man force by 1995, incorporating the 
Army, Air Force and Navy. Thus it appears unlikely that the 
Ukraine will join the integrated CIS military organisation. This 
will leave a major gap in the CIS. 
Secondly the continued economic decline of the key state in 
the Confederation - Russia - makes the future political 
development of this state very unstable and increases the 
likelihood of a regression to an authoritarian and probably 
nationalist leadership. Should such an authoritarian regime 
emerge then the likelihood that it could maintain an integrated 
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CIS military organisation is reduced, since the fear for the 
independence of all of Russia's neighbours will increase. 
Scenario 2: The key post-Soviet states pursue independent 
military policies 
Under Scenario 2. key post-Soviet successor states are unable 
to agree on a joint security policy and military organisation 
under the aegis of CIS. At the same time the main post-
Soviet successor states remain in being and preserve a 
functioning central political leadership able to maintain some 
form of state-oriented higher organised activity. 1bis is a more 
likely development than that the Confederation remains in 
being, but one should note that it would not markedly affect 
the post-Soviet Arctic military presence. 1bis is so for three 
reasons: 
- Because Russia under all circumstances is the only post-
Soviet successor state with geographic access to the Arctic. 
- Because Russia under all circumstances will inherit the 
bulk of the ex-Soviet military forces with an Arctic 
orientation. 
- Because the likelihood of Russia reverting to a hostile 
authoritarian regime employing the threat or use of military 
force as a tool of policy is growing. 
On the other hand the economic decline will leave Russia with 
far fewer resources to be used for the military, which will 
probably also affect Russia's military presence in the Arctic. 
However under all circumstances a split of ex-Soviet military 
assets among the successor states would still leave Russia as 
the only Arctic state in a geographic sense, and would leave 
most of the Arctic forces under Russian control. Regardless of 
whether the Confederation remains in force the key to the 
post-Soviet military posture in tbe Arctic under all circumstan-
ces hinges on the development of Russia, and specifically of 
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the Russian military interests and posture. Here three factors 
are decisive. 
In the first place Russia will only inherit a part of the post-
Soviet military organisation and forces, since she will have to 
share the assets to varying degrees with the other post-Soviet 
states. Hence Russia's overall military capability will be 
weaker than that of the former Soviet Union. However in 
certain areas - and notably in those military Services and 
Branches of Service which involve the Arctic - Russia will 
inherit the bulk of the personnel and materiel. Thus Russia 
will under all circumstances be the only post-Soviet successor 
state with Arctic military forces. ('This is examined in greater 
detail below.) 
Secondly, the extent to which the Russian leadership will 
maintain or develop an Arctic military presence will be a 
function of two factors: 
- Russia's domestic economic and political development, 
- tbe state of Russia's internal and regional inter-state 
relations. 
The state of the economy will determine how many resources 
are available in general, including for the military, while the 
political situation will determine how much is allocated to the 
military and to which parts of the military it will go. Here the 
present situation provides enough information to permit us to 
predict the general trend with a fair amount of certainty. The 
key factor here is Russia's irrevocable continued economic 
decline for the next few years no matter what the west does 
or what any Russian regime does. This is in turn increasing 
the hardship of the population which makes the political 
climate increasingly tense, chaotic and violent. 1bis will 
impact on Russia's military capability in two basic ways: 
- In the first place it will reduce the basic pool of resour-
ces available to the Russian leadership in all sectors, and 
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making their distribution and interaction even more 
ineffective than it is at present This will include a reduced 
capability to maintain and develop the military infrastruc-
ture which Russia inherits from the USSR, regardless of the 
type of regime which takes power. 
- Secondly it will affect Russia's political development 
w~ch will either be forced back to an authoritarian regim~ 
usmg force to stay in power and maintain order, or will 
break down into anarchy (Scenario 3, below.). The military 
consequences of an authoritarian regime maintaining power 
would depend upon the nature of the regime. If it consists 
of a 'benign dictatorship' along the lines of Gorbachev or 
Yeltsin, which places a premium on finding a realistic 
solution to the economic crisis and in maintaining a 
cooperative policy vis a vis the outside world, we may 
expect a continued reduction in the resources allocated to 
military forces with an anti-western proffie. This would 
include the strategic and global forces which have an Arctic 
orientation. 
However such a political decision to reduce military expendi-
ture will probably not take place if Russia reverts to a 'hostile 
dictatorship', which exploits international crises and anti-
foreign sentiments to maintain power and uses military and 
nuclear force as an instrument of foreign-policy. In this case 
we could expect an attempt to maintain a greater number of 
the strategic and global forces, part of which would retain 
their Arctic orientation. 
Whether or not such a 'hostile dictatorship' will emerge is 
uncertain. However three factors indicate that it is the most 
likely development in the coming year. In the first place the 
deepening misery of the population is making Yeltsin increas-
ing~y u~popular. The desperate living conditions of the people, 
which mclude not only a lack of food but also a massive 
growth in crime and the collapse of the public sector, are also 
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increasing the calls for a return to an authoritarian leadership 
which can restore order in the growing chaos. 
Secondly, the professional military ranks, numbering over 
1,400,000 officers and NCO's, are becoming an increasingly 
active political force. They see the breakup of the Soviet 
Armed Forces as a direct threat to the safety and well-being 
of themselves and their families, since it is leading to increas-
ing unemployment among the military. While it is unlikely 
that the military would stage a coup in isolation, the discon-
tent and fear among their ranks could lead to a significant part 
supporting an authoritarian political movement which promised 
them job security. 
Finally the likelihood of regression to a hostile authoritarian 
leadership must also be taken into account because such 
political figures are already active in Russia. The most 
prominent of them is the leader of the Liberal Democratic 
Party, Andrei Zhirinovsky, who received over 6,200,000 votes 
in the Russian Presidential elections. His political stance is 
authoritarian with a strong appeal to Russian national chauvin-
ism. He also made direct appeals to the military to place him 
in power. Thus in August 1991 Zhirinovsky stated that Russia 
could use its nuclear weapons to obtain food from the west 
(without specifying how this would be done), and in both 
August and October he noted that Finland and the Baltic states 
were historically a part of Russia and should be reintegrated 
as part of Russia. In October he also noted that if negotiations 
in such a case had no effect then it was fully possible for 
Russia to use military force to destroy the area. 
Should this fonn of national-chauvinistic regime come to 
power in Russia the situation would become extremely 
dangerous for all neighbouring states. Especially since this 
type of leadership has a tendency to exploit ethnic hatreds and 
foreign conflicts for domestic puipOses, as one of several 
means of staying in power. The temptation to do so would be 
large, considering the massive domestic problems any Russian 
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leader faces and will face. A Zhirinovsky style regime could 
also lead to a general increase in the powers and resources 
allocated to the military. Thus on Monday, 9 December 1991, 
Zhirinovsky strongly criticised the creation of the Confedera-
tion of Slavic States and publicly appealed to the Soviet Army 
to help him get to power. In return he promised that his first 
priority as President would be to increase the readiness of the 
Armed Forces. He also promised that he would guarantee that 
the military received special privileges, such as cars, servants, 
cheap housing and plots of land for all retired officers. While 
Zhirinovsky and his ilk do not yet represent an acute political 
threat, their appeal among the military and the Russian people 
is certain to increase as conditions for the consumer and career 
military worsen further. 
TI!is development is strongly reinforced by the severe hardship 
facing most of the career officers and NCO's of the ex-Soviet 
Armed Forces. They and their families have no social security 
net, and the fate of those which have been forcibly retired 
from service so far is dire. They receive no pension, often no 
housing and with little or no prospect of abtaining alternative 
employment in the collapsed economy. Even for those military 
which still remained in service conditions were worsening. 
Thus according to one report the personnel of the Northern 
Fleet had in October 1991 not been paid for two months. 
As a result there are reports that units from the former Soviet 
Armed Forces are pledging their loyalty to whoever promises 
them a decent life. TI!is is particularly the case for elite units, 
but the most dangerous units are those which are being 
brought back home from abroad and face imminent demobili-
sation. They number 300,000 troops in all and are seriously 
concerned for their future. The officers are returning with their 
families to intolerable conditions, often without housing and 
with a great fear of being unemployed. This is making large 
parts of the junior officer corps desperate. 
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The accession to power of a Russian national-chauvinistic 
regime could thus preserve a Russian strategic interest in the 
Arctic, though such a policy could also be maintained with a 
'minimalist strategic nuclear stance' mentioned earlier. Because 
of the deepening crisis it is almost certain that Russia will 
have to revert to an authoritarian regime if a collapse to 
anarchic chaos is to be avoided. What is less certain is if this 
can be managed at all, and if so, what the chances are for 
the maintenance of a benevolent dictatorship. If a hostile 
dictatorship acquires power we will be faced with the most 
dangerous scenario envisageable, both on a global and regional 
level. 
Finally one should also note that the state of Russia's internal 
and regional relations will also impact on her Arctic military 
profile since it could detract from the resources available for 
strategic and global military forces. This would be so if 
Russia's leadership had to concentrate her military efforts very 
heavily towards maintaining domestic order and control, or to 
manage tense and possibly violent relations with her neigh-
bouring states. In this case the relative importance and 
immediacy of the traditional strategic nuclear and global 
military interests and forces would decline relative to the need 
for domestic and regional military forces. Combined with the 
continued deterioration of the economic situation this would 
choke the assets available for the Arctic forces. In this context 
one should note that the likelihood of serious Russian domes-
tic turmoil and military confrontations between Russia and her 
post -Soviet neighbours is very high. 
Thus if Russia manages to survive as an organised state with 
a modicum of centralised control over at least the main 
western areas we can draw two main conclusions with a fair 
amount of certainty: 
- Russia will inherit the main ex-Soviet Arctic military 
forces, but will have less economic assets available to 
maintain them. 
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- Russia will probably be forced to concentrate whatever 
economic remaining assets are allocated to the military on 
forces for maintaining domestic order and managing 
regional military campaigns along her land frontiers. This 
will leave very little for maintaining the strategic nuclear 
and global forces which have an Arctic operational profile. 
Finally one should note that the more precise division of ex-
Soviet military assets will be a function of three factors. 
Firstly, the military planning of the individual states and the 
political decisions regarding their future military posture and 
funding. Secondly the relations between the different states 
establishing their independent armed forces, which will 
determine whether the assets can be alloted through a negotia-
ted compromise agreement or whether they will be divided up 
competitively. In this last case the physical location of the 
military assets and the national affiliation and loyalties of their 
personnel may play an important part. (See below.) 
Conclusion 
On the basis of the above analysis Russia will inherit the vast 
majority of the personnel and assets of the Strategic Nuclear 
Forces, Strategic Air Defence Forces and the Navy, but will 
probably have to share part of the Theatre and a greater part 
of the Front-level forces for ground operations with the other 
post -Soviet states. This means that the overall size of the 
Russian military will be smaller than that of the USSR, 
particularly regarding her Theatre and Front level forces. 
On the other hand this development alone does not affect the 
military situation in the Arctic, since most of the Soviet forces 
which operated in this part of the world belong to the 
category of higher level strategic and theatre commands which 
Russia is inheriting almost exclusively. These Soviet forces 
which had an Arctic orientation are shown on Table I. 
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Table 1. Soviet Forces wHh an Arctic Orientation. 
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As noted above virtually all these forces are based deep inside 
Russia, which means that the danger of sharing them with the 
other .Soviet Republics is small. And those which do have 
units based outside Russia - the MAA and VPVO - consist of 
air-mobile forces of which elements could be flown to Russia 
if their crews and support staffs decided to do so. Thus Russia 
will inherit almost the entire Soviet Arctic military forces. 
However when this is said one should note that Russia may 
still split up further within its present boundaries. Several 
Autonomous Republics and other national regions inside 
Russia have already declared their intent to become indepen-
dent. None of these presently encompass territory which 
includes the bases of the above forces, but several lie in or 
next to the Arctic (Karelia, the Yakhut Republic), and it is 
possible that some areas which do contain strategic military 
forces could in the future proclaim their desire for indepen-
dence. 
Scenario 3: The post-Soviet area breaks up into chaos 
The third broad scenario consists of the possibility that major 
parts of the former USSR, specifically the western parts of 
Russia and Russia's main urban centres, collapse into a state 
of chaos. In this case the implications for the present post-
Soviet military presence in the Arctic are considerable, since 
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the continuation of all organised activity at a higher level 
would probably break down. This would include the Russian 
global foreign policy and military doctrine as well as the 
associated military forces, including the complex Strategic 
Nuclear Forces, Strategic Air Defence Forces and Northern 
Fleet. The demise of these Services would also signal the 
collapse of the organised Soviet military presence in the 
Arctic. 
Should the key western parts of Russia collapse into anarchic 
chaos the ex-Soviet (and ex-Russian) military could develop in 
three main ways, depending upon which of three basic driving 
forces predominate in an individual or unit: 
1. Nationalism: The transfer of the allegiance of officers, 
NCO's and even entire units to their national authorities 
outside Russia (if they had not already done so) or towards 
their individual ethnic group, or that particular local 
authority towards which they felt a sense of belonging (for 
instance a city, such as St. Petersburg). Under these 
circumstances parts of the post-Russian military would fonn 
the backbone of small sub-national or ethnic annies. These 
could range from potentially large fonnations, such as in 
the St. Petersburg area to smaller fonnations on a very 
local level. This process is already underway in the 
southern parts of the ex-USSR. 
2. Survival: Fonner professional officers and NCO's of the 
Red Anny abandoned in the various regions of the USSR 
would use their anned might to barter or steal the goods 
necessary to survive. This 'mercenary' scenario could 
involve selling anned or other support to local political or 
mafia leaders, or operating independent bandit groups, 
stealing goods directly. These post-military groups could 
operate under three main types of employer: 
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· Local political authorities who offer the local 
military housing and food in return for getting anned 
support for their regime. 
• LOcal mafia organisations which offer the local 
military housing and food in return for getting anned 
support or other assistance (transportation, storage, 
etc.) for their business. 
· Local military commanders supported by their units 
who physically take power in the area they live and 
acquire their needs through the use of force. 
The size and endurance of these military forces would 
depend upon the motivation of the constituent parts and on 
how much logistical support the employer could provide. 
Thus the several large organised crime families could 
probably maintain fairly sizeable military fonnations, should 
they choose to do so, while local political groups or ex-
military groups operating as bandits probably could only 
exist as small forces. 
3. Entropy: The present tendency towards the breakup of the 
old system could dissolve existing military fonnations as 
the officers and troops followed a natural urge to leave 
their military fonnations and go home. This would be the 
likeliest course for most conscripts, but not necessarily for 
many of the 1.2 million professional officers and NCO's of 
the Red Anny. Most of these military men have no home 
to go to and no alternative means to earn their living. Thus 
they would have to improvise their continued survival as 
best they could, which leaves one of the two main options 
described above. 
The three scenarious outlined above are not mutually exclusive 
but could take place simultaneously, as each individual and 
unit adapted to different circumstances in its own way. Thus 
we can have both the development of regional nationalist 
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annies, mercenary formations operating for organised crim 
and others, and smaller bandit formations. e 
TI!is is creating a new and more regionally flavoured military 
threat within and along the edges of ex-USSR. It will reach its 
stro~gest development in the southern and eastern parts of the 
empire but can also emerge in the northwest. If so nordic 
defence preparations would have to include a capability to 
handle four new types of regional threat: 
1. The breakout of civil war involving combat in areas 
close to the nordic states. The task of the nordic 
~efence forces w~uld be prevent the combat operat-
Ions of the wamng parties from spilling over to 
nordic territory and to support the police and other 
national authorities in handling refugee movements. 
2. The threat or use of tactical nuclear weapons. This 
could be either indirect, stemming from the local use 
o~ ~ctical nuclear weapons between warring groups 
withm ex-USSR, or direct, should Russia or a 
regional leader threaten the west directly with the 
use of nuclear weapons. The task of the nordic 
defence fo~s in this case would be to support 
efforts to dissuade the threatening party from using 
nuclear forces or to prevent those forces from being 
deployed or launched against nordic territory. 
3. 
4. 
'fohe threat ~f conve~tional military forces being used 
directly agamst a neighbouring nordic state. The task 
of a nordic defence force in this case is to defend the 
country against such an invasion. 
The threat from ex-military bandit formations 
operating in the frontier areas along the former 
USSR. Their activity could extend to include 
operations against tempting targets in adjacent nordic 
territory. If these anned bands are large enough the 
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nordic military would have to assist the police in 
protecting the nordic assets and if necessary in 
hunting down the bandit formations. 
This anarchic scenario would also be terribly dangerous, since 
the number, dispersion and relative ease of operation of 
tactical nuclear forces could lead to their use in a regional or 
local conflict. This would be catastrophic for the states within 
range of the tactical nuclear systems and could have wide-
spread global ecological consequences. 
In this case the post-Soviet military scenario which we would 
face in the Arctic would be the danger of the anarchic use of 
military violence among small-scale rogue forces. This would 
not present a classical 'strategic' military threat, but since this 
could involve the use of tactical nuclear weapons, or the 
destruction of oil wells and other industrial facilities which 
could cause significant environmental damage, this scenario is 
very serious for the states located along Russia's borders and 
for the Arctic ecology. 
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8. Strategic Stability in the Arctic 
!hls study was produced during the time of great upheavals 
m the foiTiler USSR and its military establishment, and it may 
seem less relevant now to discuss stability in the Arctic in 
te~s of the foiTiler East-West confrontation and the situation 
pnor to December 1991 when the USSR ceased to exist 
Nonetheless it remains important to understand the motivations 
?e~nd . the military_ build-up of forces with an Arctic 
mchnatton and the mteraction between measures taken on 
eithe~ side, if it is found that the successor leadership in 
RusSia, or the US administration are adopting policies which 
may result in continued strategic competition in the High 
Nonb. 
It is evident that great circle navigation and the special 
advantages of underwater operations in the adjacent Polar seas 
have made important elements of the US and fonner USSR 
strategic forces dependent upon the High Nonh for their 
oper~tions in case of a conflict between them, and that this is 
also Influencing their activities in the High Nonh in peacetime. 
It is, as. has been outlined in Chapter 7, not easy to fo~ee 
what will succeed the USSR, and what will be the security 
and defence policy of the new Russia. There are, however 
sufficient reasons to believe that the new state, whether a 
loose confederation of independent states, or one large Russian 
republic, will continue to maintain strategic forces, nuclear as 
well as conventional.' It is also realistic to assume that the 
High Nonh will continue to provide bases and areas for transit 
and patrol of those forces. 
It is, however, to be hoped that the new state will have a 
favourable at?tude to arms control and confidence building 
measures which may enhance strategic stability in the High 
Nonb. 
With regard to strategic stability it is important to note that 
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this applies both to dynamic stability of strategic forces over 
time, avoiding structural or qualitative developments which 
could result in one side achieving a decisive advantage over 
the other, and crisis stability to reduce the risks of inadvenant 
or accidental conflict 
A number of suggestion have been made for aiTils-control 
measures to be applied to the High Nonb. Some have sought 
comprehensive "demilitarization", others have concentrated on 
banning nuclear weapons or specified activities. 
If "demilitarization" or "naval exclusion zones" prevented 
Russian naval ships from sailing from the Kola to the Atlantic 
in peacetime, or Russian SSBNs patrolling in the Polar seas, 
then Russia would have to move its most important fleet away 
from its largest base complex, and would have a strong motive 
to secure other outlets to the Atlantic for its navy. 
The weakness of arguments for a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone 
in the Arctic stem from the fact that the Arctic is the natural 
transit zone for nuclear weapons of intercontinental range , 
which can be, and are, based and launched in locations to the 
South of the Arctic but must cross Arctic regions on the way 
to their targets. Moreover, although all ICBM and probably all 
SLBM would make their Arctic transit through space, they 
would only be launched in wartime; Soviet SSBN would have 
to operate in the zone whether in peace or in war. If 
"demilitarization" means undertakings never to launch weapons 
across Arctic territory, it would be a declaratory measure only, 
useless without removal of the weapons from sites south of 
the Arctic. 
The only suggestions of arms control in the Arctic that have 
any prospects of acceptance by the nuclear powers with 
legitimate security concerns in the region are partial measures 
designed to regulate specific systems or activities in designated 
areas. It is also necessary that the measures are seen to be of 
mutual benefit of the legitimate security interests of the two 
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nuclear powers. 
Strategic Arms Control 
It appears from Appendix A. !hat !he Strategic Arms 
Reduction Treaty signed 31 July 1991 by President Bush and 
President Gorbachev may result in: 
- The relative number of nuclear warheads on !he US 
heavy bomber leg of !he strategic nuclear triad will 
probably constitute !he largest launch platform in !he 
strategic arsenal, and !hat !his increases !he significance of 
this weapon system in !he US-Russian strategic nuclear 
relationship. Since !he long-range bomber weapon system 
has a strong potential Arctic operational profile !his could 
in turn increase !he importance of Arctic air space. 
- The Russian SLBM force will be cut substantially, 
leaving Typhhon and Delta IV !he ouly SSBNs likely to 
remain, increasing !he relative importance of !he Kola bases 
and !he adjacent Arctic patrol areas. 
The air-breathing threat 
While SAC bombers are able to attack Russian territory from 
almost any direction using overseas bases like Guam in !he 
Pacific, and Diego Garcia in !he Indian Ocean, when supported 
by an efficient system for aerial refuelling, !he shortest route 
is over !he Polar regions. It must also be taken into 
consideration !hat !he main part of !he former Soviet strategic 
nuclear forces are concentrated west of !he Urals, including all 
!he most modem ICBM and SSBN bases, and the main part 
of !he Moscow Air Army. In addition to !hese, some of !he 
primary targets for us penetrating bombers: !he mobile ss-
25 Sickle ICBM are located at ihree main bases between !he 
Urals and !he Nordic area, see map 1. 
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It is important to note that one of the most important elements 
in the current tactic of US penetrating bombers is a massiv 
concentarion of all available penetration aids (ALCM) and 
penetrating bombers (B-lB) to one specific geographic area 
in order to saturate the air defences and not to spread out the 
attacking forces in such a way that each single sortie becomes 
vulnerable. 
This makes the western part of Russia a high priority target 
area for a possible US counterforce attack. This is reflected 
in the location of former Soviet strategic air defence bases 
shown on the Map 2. If a line is drawn based upon the 
maximum operational interception range without aerial 
refuelling for the most modern VPVO air defence fighter 
aircraft , MiG-31 Foxhound, and Su-27 Flanker which are 
deployed to the forward IAPVPO bases, and note is taken of 
the localization and capabilities of US and allied forward air 
defence bases, it is possible to indicate a rough picture of an 
initial air "front line" at the opening of possible hostilities, see 
Map 3. 
It is obvious that the probability of a US air attack on Russia 
is very low, if not non-existent, in the present situation. It is 
also likely that President Bush announcement of 27 September 
1991 of the decision that all US strategic bombers will be 
removed from day-to-day alert status and their weapons 
returned to storage areas2, must have reduced Russian threat 
perceptions of bomber attacks. 
It is also evident that a bomber attack would not be likely to 
take place in isolation, but in combination with attacks by 
other US strategic forces, and that this contingency is only 
concievable in a situation where there is little hope of 
resolving the crisis by political means. Still, it is difficult to 
conceive of any scenario which would make it probable with 
a US first-strike with nuclear or conventional weapons as long 
as the Russia retains the capability to retaliate in kind. 
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QMOSCOW 
0 MINSK MIG-31 ~ 2.100 KM RADIUS 
0 KIEV SU·27 ~ 1.500 KM RAO!US 
Map 3: Russian strategic air defence: Maximum operational range 
of Su-27 and MiG-31 fighters, and range of US ALCM's. 
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All the same, it is evident that the former USSR has found 
it in its interest to maintain a robust air defense system against 
a "worst case" contingency of air attacks, and it is also a fact 
that in the 1980s great efforts where made to improve the 
effectivness of this system against long range bombers and 
low-flying cruise missiles: 
- This has particularly taken place in the north-western part 
of Russia by deployment of substantial numbers of the 
latest generations of air-defence fighter aircraft with "look-
down/shoot-down" capability, combined with the use of 
modem AWACS aircraft, and by the deployment of the 
latest models of surface-to-air missiles at important points 
to be defended. 
- It is furthermore evidenced by the increase in joint 
exercises in which air-, ground- and naval units are trained 
in coordinated defence against attacks by aircraft and cruise 
missiles. 
- Lastly it is apparent from Russian sources that the recent 
deployment of the new CfOL aircraft carrier Admiral 
Kuznetsov with high-performance air defence fighters to the 
Northern Fleet is in order to strengthen the air defence of 
Russia itself, although the aircraft carrier also will be able 
to provide air cover for Russian surface action groups in 
western sea areas.' 
One of the side-effects of the former Soviet build-up and 
extension of their air defence on Kola and in adjacent sea 
areas is that it may create the impression in Norway that the 
country is becoming situated behind the Russian first line of 
defence, and that this will make it more difficult to bring in 
allied reinforcements to Norway in case of a conflict in the 
area. 
Another consequence of the former Soviet air defence build-
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u~ in the North is that the two neutral countries, Sweden and 
Fmland, are becoming increasingly concerned about the 
c~ns~quences of a posible long-range bomber and cruise 
missile ~at to Rus~ia passing through their national air 
space. Tius concern IS strengthened by occasional former 
Soviet reminders of the importance that Sweden and Finland 
are able capable of meeting the challenge of cruise misssiles 
and that the former USSR in case of an attack would not waii 
to defend against the missiles at its borders.• 
Fin_nish and Swedish authorities are apparantly considering 
se~o~sly .how .they can include capabilities against cruise 
misssi~es m their own air defence. The ideal is, according to 
a fi~1sh commentator that the Swedish air defence is "clearly 
supenor to a forward Russian air defence". If this is not 
ac~ieved by Sweden, and by Finland as well, then this is 
believed to be clearly destabilizing in the region'. 
Politically it is significant that the extension of Russian air 
defence to include the air space of the two neutral countries ~nd. the adjacent western sea areas is seen as defensive!~ 
JUStified and therefore as more legitinlate. Another and 
somewhat surprising aspect is that the finnish and swedish 
commentators on this question do not seem to have considered 
the implications as regards international law and the status of 
neutr~lit~ of the t~o countries if they are deliberately 
contnbunng to the rur defence of Russia. 
It is furthermore to be expected that the requirements of 
Russian air defence with respect to a growing US long range 
bomber and ALCM threat will have an impact on the situation 
of the Baltic states. It is likely that Russian threat perceptions 
are going to have an influence on the settlement of the future 
R~ssian military presence in the Baltic states, and that this 
might lead to demands for Russian early warning and air 
defence installations ·on the territory of the Baltic states. And 
it i~ .likely since these demands may appear well justified and 
legillmate, that the new Baltic states will have to accept this 
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infringement on their sovereignty on a more permanent basis. 
North American Air Defen9e 
It is evident that the role of long range bombers and ALCM 
are increasing in the Russian strategic forces. In connection 
with the reduction of soviet sea- and land-based ICBMs under 
START, it is likely that Bear H and Blackjack long range 
bombers will be developed as cruise missile carriers. 
According to the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 
Russia which currently has about 90 ALCM-carrying bombers, 
could due to the START bomber counting rules deploy 180 or 
more such bombers. And Russian ALCM could increase from 
the present 720 to over 1.300 under START". 
At the same time it is evident that President Gmbachev's 
response to President Bush initiative~ of ~7. Sep .1991, in 
promising to eliminate sea-launched cruise miSSI!es, will ~duce 
the air-breathing threat against the north-amencan continent 
Still, it appears that the Russian emphasis on the long range 
bomber element of their strategic nuclear forces have been 
increasing after the 1987 announcement of the former Soviet 
military doctrine based upon "reasonable sufficiency." 
Map 4 indicates Moscow Air Army's most import~t 
peacetime intercontinental bomber bases, forward operating 
localities (FOL) in the Arctic, and the most probable target 
areas in North America. The shortest air route, which the 
Russian bombers will be dependent upon because of lack of 
alternative forward bases and limited aerial refuelling capacity, 
crosses over the Arctic. For this reason Russian plans for 
delivery of ALCM against north American targets are focused 
on the Arctic. The stand-off Bear H/AS-15 ALCMs could be 
accompanied by Tu-160 Blackjack on penetration missions 
flying at supersonic speeq at low level and using short-range 
missiles to suppress air defences. 
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Map. ~: Moscow ~ir Army's main bases, forward operating 
localities and trnns1t routes towards North American targets. 
206 
When considering the location of forward US air defence 
assets of Alaskan Air Command, NORAD's interceptor FOLs 
in Canada, and possibly additional air defence assets at Thule 
and Keflavik, and combining these with Russian interceptor 
bases in the Arctic it is possible to get an indication of the 
initial air "front line" between USA and Russia. This also 
takes into consideration the aerial refuelling capability on the 
American side. The most probable Russian bomber route 
passes over the central and eastern Arctic. 
The Arctic air space, and to some extent the adjacent Nordic 
air space has become more important for the total Russian 
strategic nuclear forces. This also increases the importance of 
the air space over the Barents sea, and the strategic bomber 
FOLs on the Kola peninsula. But the main Russian bomber 
routes, and the main American air defence effort will probably 
be concentrated in the central and eastern Arctic. 
Canada has in 1991 agreed to extend the NORAD arraogement 
for another 5 years. What is yet to be decided is how to keep 
the system up to date in face of the increasing ihreat of long 
range bombers and low flying ALCMs. Future air defence 
techoologies are currently being explored by the US with some 
Canadian participation in !he Air Defence Initiative, ADI - a 
parallel programme to the Strategic Defence Initiative. A 
significant increase in cost of "thickened" continental air 
defences would have serious implications for Canada's already 
strained Defence planning and budgeting7• 
Aerospace surveillance and air defence 
The net result of START will be more modem strategic 
offensive forces on both sides, including a more capable 
Russian bomber and ALCM threat. In fact, under START, 
Moscow and Washington will deploy as many strategic 
warheads as they had at the beginning of the negotiations. 
This, while representing a welcome and long- overdue 
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Jx:ginning to the process of strategic anns reduction, START 
will encourage a build-up of Soviet air-breathing weapons and 
thereby increase the complexity of and cost of North American 
aerospace surveillance and defence. 
The US Department of Defense is considering a Base Force 
Plan as part of its efforts to weed out repetitious and costly 
command layers. This envisages nierging US Air Force and 
Navy nuclear forces into a single unified command responsible 
for planning, deterring and implementing nuclear war-fighting. 
The new Base Force Plan calls for consolidating within a new 
Strategic C?mmand, command authority for all SlOP planning 
and executiOn. In other words, the new command will locate 
within one headquarters all assets for nuclear deterrence/war 
fighting missions. Logically the new US Strategic Command 
would seek to amalgamate both early warning and nuclear 
war-fighting missions. 
"J!le Canadian _Arms Control Centre has raised the point that 
smce prospective structural changes in the US command 
system are as yet poorly understood, and since the new US 
Strategi~ . ~ommand envisag~s combining under its aegis 
respons1b1lity for early warnmg, strategic defences, space-
based systems, and nuclear war-fighting, Canada needs to 
better understand how these changes could affect NORAD. • 
The latest configuration of SDI, as outlined by President Bush 
in January 1991, called Global Protection Against Limited 
Stri~e~ (G~ ~S) is oriented towards defence against limited 
ballistic m1ss•le attacks whatever their source, not just from the 
USSR. 
The US Air Defence Initiative (ADI), designed to defend 
against attacking strategic bombers and cruise missiles using 
space-based radar, continues to draw funds in the US defence 
budget. The apparent success in the Gulf War of the Patriot 
and Hawk air -defence missiles seems destined to improve 
future funding for ADI. 
208 
--
It is, according to the Canadian Arms Control Centre, 
inevitable that ADI will be linked to SDI, since it makes no 
sense to defend against ballistic missiles but not against 
bombers and cruise misssiles. How NORAD will relate to 
these progranunes, and its future role together with ADI and 
SDI in the new US Strategic Command are open-ended 
questions. 
Created to meet Cold War demands, NORAD functions must, 
according to the Canadian Arms Control Centre be re-
examined in the Post-Cold War world. It is no longer 
considered plausible with an intentional Russian attack on 
North America. In order to continue serving Canadian national 
security interests fully, it is recommended that North American 
aerospace surveillance requirements be adjusted to new 
demands in a post Cold War world, and the need to pursue 
new ideas, such as, multilateral circumpolar surveillance, limits 
on Russian strategic air defences and links between US and 
Russian early warning systems are underlined. 
Specifically, limits could be negotiated for any or all of ~e 
major components of modern strategic air defences: strategtc 
radars, interceptors, air defence missiles, and battle 
management systems. The former USSR has deploye~ ~ 
world's largest network of air defences, and negotiated lilllltS 
would hit it hardest or assymmetrically. Conceivably, though, 
the Russians might consider cuts in their area, were they 
linked to corresponding restrictions on the advanced 
technology bombers and cruise missiles to counter which the 
air defence system is being modernized. Given the huge 
resources consumed by the air defence system, and Russia's 
interest in relieving the burden of its defence, could make this 
measure negotiable. 
It appears that the increasing air -breathing threat is causing a 
number of problems of a military as well as a political nature 
for the circumpolar countries on both sides of the Atlantic. In 
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order to stabilize the situation, if possible at a lower level of 
military forces, there are som measures which could be 
beneficial: 
- ~e first could be to get the nuclear superpowers to 
revise the START bomber counting rules in such a way 
that ~ey do_ not favour the build-up of long range bombers, 
and mcreasmg the nuclear warhead inventories above the 
agreed central limits. 
This would be in harmony with the START aim to 
strengthen strategic stability at lower levels and to 
encourage the restructuring of strategic forces in ways tbat 
make them more stable and less threatening. 
- Secondly, it is desireable to renegotiate the START 
Treaty in: such a way that it limits heavy bombers in the 
same way as it limits other strategic nuclear delivery 
means, ICBMs and SLBMs. 
In the text of paragraph of the START Treaty dealing with 
heavy ?ombers it is stated that: "heavy bombers are stabilizing 
strat~gic systems (for example, they are less capable of a shon 
wa?Ung attack than ballistic missiles ... )" This is no longer 
believed to be correct. Advanced bombers and cruise missiles 
incorporati~g stealth technology are now capable of delivering 
shon warnmg a~ck , and they are not only destabi!izing at 
the cent~ strategic level, they also have a destabilizing effect 
at the regwnal level. Perceptions of cruise missile threats raise 
defence requirements which transgress national borders of 
adjacent states, and provide motives for forward air defences 
which infringes on the sovereignty and independence of 
neighbouring states. 
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The SLBM threat 
The START Treaty of 31 July 1991 will, if and when it is 
ratified and implemented by both sides, reduce the number of 
Ballistic Missile carrying submarines, SSBNs. How much the 
SSBN force will be cut by each side is dependent upon how 
each side decides to distribute the allowable ceilings between 
JCBMs and SLBMs For the purpose of this study it is 
assumed that the Russian SSBN force may be cut down to 
10-16 boats, and the US SSBN force to 18-20 boats. 
The SSBNs are designed to constitute the assured second 
strike or reserve nuclear capability of the nuclear superpowers. 
It is likely that the reduced number of SSBNs after START 
will make the remaining more imponant to each of tJ:~e 
powers. Another question is whether the fewer number will 
make the remaining boats more vulnerable. 
The vulnerability of the strategic second strike or reserve fo~ 
is a vital concern for the nuclear powers, and. they will 
probably do everything which is technol?~Ically an~ 
economically feasible to reduce the vulnerability of ~e1r 
SSBN's. The USA and former USSR have appa~~tly amve~ 
at different solutions to preserve the invulnerability of theiT 
SSBNs: 
-US: 
- Russia: 
Exploiting advanced technology for 
silencing, and sufficient range to use the 
deep waters of the Worlds oceans for 
patrols. 
Improving the silencing of their SSBN'~· 
and developing techniques to operate m 
shallow open or ice covered waters in the 
adjacent Polar seas. 
In each of the two solutions it appears that the nuclear powers 
have achieved a very high degree of security for their SSBN 
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force. What remains are some concern that there might exist 
intentions on either side to conduct strategic ASW against the 
other sides SSBNs in case of a conflict.Such concerns were 
particularly fuzed by the article by the then US Chief of Naval 
Operations, Athniral J. Watkins on "The Maritime Strategy" in 
1986, where he stated that in time of war, the US should seek 
to tilt the strategic nuclear balance in its favour, and that it 
should do so by having its SSNs seek out and destroy Soviet 
SSBNs with conventional warhead torpedoes'. 
The reasons for pursuing such a campaign was said to be that 
the destruction of Soviet strategic submarines would limit the 
USSR 's ability to inflict· nuclear damage on the United States 
should a conventional war escalate to the nuclear level, and 
that this would provide an opportunity for war termination. 
These reasons have been challenged by acknowledged experts 
on naval strategy as "nonsensical". Even in the more 
constrained post-START world, the former USSR could still 
deliver more than 7.000 warheads, 1.000 of which would be 
on mobile ballistic missile systems. The ouly way to limit 
d~mage would be to eliminate these effectively as well, but 
this would necessitate a disarming first strike. At no stage in 
the coming decade can Washington be confident of reducing 
the former USSR 's retaliatory capability to acceptable levels 
according to Donald C.F. Daniel. 
Another reason for maintaining a capability to conduct 
strategic ASW is that it ties up Russian forces in defensive 
roles, preventing them from operating offensively against 
NATO's lines of communication in the Atlantic. 
In order to maintain strategic stability it is important that both 
the US and Russia feel that they retain a secure second strike 
capability. 
;rws i~ probably going to be even more important if the 
mcreasmg accuracy of US intercontinental nuclear weapons 
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begins to threaten the security of Russia's land-based. sy~tems, 
and ICBM vulnerability could become even more stgnificant 
as START reduces the number of !and-based counter-fo~ 
targets. This increased vulnerability may be offset by makmg 
ICBM mobile, but the surveillance and targeting systems are 
becoming more capable too, and one of the roles of the US 
B-2 bomber is to seek and destroy mobile targets deep in 
hostile territory. 
It appears that the present deployment of Russian SBBN's are 
beneficial for strategic stability, and may become even more 
so in the years to come. It has therefore been suggeste~ that 
if threats to this security by NATO SSNs carry some n~k of 
escalation to nuclear war, and if the Russian SSBN's are likely 
to be able to conceal themselves securely from NATO SSNs 
in their "bastions" without much support from their own SSNs 
or other naval units, then there may be merit in an ~greem~nt 
to recognize these "bastions" as legitimate sanctuanes, which • • 10 
should be free of the threat of harassment m peacetime. 
In a "sanctuary" it would be necessary to exc~ude all .NA~O 
submarines and warships, since it is not posstble t~ tdenufy 
which have ASW capabilities. This would have th~ stde-e~ect 
of reducing the vulnerability of ports and ~ther mstallations 
flanking the "bastion" to attacks by conventional SLC~. and 
of coastal shipping to torpedo or mine attack. Although atrcraft 
can not operate against submarines under ice, under sue~ a 
regime military aircraft should also be banned from flymg 
over the "bastions", because parts of these would often be free 
of ice, and the presence of military aircraft close to the coast 
would be an irritant. 
The principal objections against such an arrange.ment are th~t 
it would prevent NATO from tying up ~usstan forces m 
defensive roles, relasing them for offenstve use, . and that 
NATO would receive no comparable advantage m return. 
Other objections are that it would restrict the freedom of the 
seas, and that it could make it difficult for Russia to develop 
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the Northe~ _Sea Route as a substantially shorter route for 
western sh1ppmg to the far East. Lastly, it would be difficult 
to veri~ the compliance with an agreement about SSBN 
sanctuanes. 
Given the fact that the US would most likely oppose any arm 
control measure which limits the operational flexibility 0~ 
freedom of movement of its naval forces to protect american 
~nd __ allied interests, there seems to be mutual benefits of 
liml!in~ the number of general-purpose, nuclear powered attack 
submannes. Of all the platforms of the US Navy's inventory 
thes~. are. the cau~e of greatest concern as regards strategic 
stability m the High North. By their numbers and technical 
sophisti_cation, Ru~sian •. NATO and US nuclear powered attack 
submannes are ratiOnaliZed almost entirely in East-West terms 
and the ~wo submarine superpowers might find it in thei; 
common mterest to negotiate agreed limits on iventories as 
long as the . negotiations deal with submarines only".This 
wo~ld effec~Ively reduce Russian threat perceptions against 
their ~SB_N s, and NATO threat perceptions against their 
Atlantic lines of communication and thereby contribute to 
strategic arms stability. 
Naval Arms Control 
The former Soviet Union tried to get NATO arid the US to 
~~r~e. to negotiations on naval arms control since the 
!mtiation of the Soviet unilateral withdrawals and reductions 
m Easte~ Europe . which w~re announced in president 
Gorbachev s speech m the Uruted Nations on 7 December 
1988. It is evident that the Soviet proposals for Naval Arms 
control were ai~ed at reducing the Wests superiority in naval 
:orces, and particularly as regards American aircraft carriers ~? respon~e to S?vie~ reductions in conventional ground forces: 
The_ Soviet Umon IS prepared to negotiate the elimination of 
th~ ~balances . and assymmetry taking guidance from the 
pnnc1ple of cutting the "suiplus" from those who have it" .12 
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NATO and USA have so far been opposed to the Sov!et 
demands for negotiations about naval arms control. ~~ aim 
of the CFE negotiations were to re~ove the capability . to 
launch a su1prise attack and to sustam large scale offensive 
operations, and to establish a stable balance at. a lower level 
of military forces in Europe. It was ~so be~1eved ~at. the 
geostrategic realities of the Atlantic Alliance JUStified 
maintenance of adequate naval forces by NATO membe~.' and 
naval arms control could imply limitations on the capability to 
protect sea lines of communication which are far more 
important to NATO than to the former Soviet Union. 
It is evident that the naval forces of both the US and Russia 
will be reduced in the coming years a.s a resu~t ?: the new 
international situation, changes in national pnontles, block 
obsolescense and economic necessity, (cf Cha~ter 3 and_ 4.) _It 
does, however, seem totally unrealistic to beh~ve that It ~ 
be possible for the post-Soviet Union to negotiate ~ reduc~on 
of US ilircraft carriers in exchange for the reductions whic~ 
the former Soviet Union accepted in theatre ground ~d air 
forces since 1989, considering the global tasks and com1ttnents 
of the US Navy. 
At the nordic regional level it seems. even more fa~-fet~hed to 
believe that it will be possible to Improve the situation for 
Norway by a reduction of the Russian N~rthern Fleet throug~ 
naval arms control negotiations". Nor is It easy to see how It 
would be possible to balance th~ regional ~eographical 
advantages in the Norwegian Sea which the _Russian No~ern 
Fleet enjoys with its bases on the Kola penmsula, compa1red 
with the us Navy with its nearest home bases on the eastern 
seaboard of the United States in an equitable naval arms 
control arrangement. 
Since 1989, there has, however, been a gradual chang~. in 
attitudes to naval arms control among prominent personalities 
in the Alliance. Norway's Defence Minister of Norway. Johan 
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!fllrgen Hoist, has on several occasions stated that it would be 
m Nory;ays national in!erest to have negotiations about 
appropnate confidence building ap.d anns control measures at 
sea. H!llst' s concern is that while the land forces in Europe 
are bemg reduced and regulated, an unregulated situation in 
Northern sea areas could decouple Norway from the new 
cooperative arrangements in Europe, and draw the country into 
a field of tension where the country's freedom of action will 
?e restricted. According to Hoist, this makes it in the national 
Interest that negotiations about appropriate confidence building 
and anns control measures at sea are implemented. 
Hoist, however, also lays down the preconditions that 1 the confiden~ building and anns control measures must contrlbute 
to protection of the Atlantic sea lines of communication and 
2. the pri?ciple of the freedom of the seas must be maintained. 
Hoist believes that confidence building measures can be based 
upon the International rules of navigation and the existing 
bilateral agreements to prevent incidents at sea. Hoist envisions 
that naval anns control measures may include reductions of 
weapons. sy~tems which particularly threaten the sea lines of 
commumcauon (e.g. ocean-going, attack submarines) and the 
coastal states (nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles)14• · 
The_ l!~ opposes, however, measures which would limit its 
flexibility to conduct independent operations on the high seas 
Official US spokesmen have acknowledged that the Americ;u; 
position leaves little scope to suppon anns-control initiatives 
but ther have ~0 pointed out that the us readily accedes ro 
and abides by sound agreements that result in an increased 
measure of :>~ability, but do not impinge on any nations free 
use of the high seas". They consistently single out three such 
~~ements: the 1972 accord with the former USSR to prevent 
m~•dents. at ~ea; the 1986 Stockholm Accord dealing with 
pnor notification and observation of military activities· and the 
recent US-Soviet Agreement to Prevent Dangerous 'Military 
Inci~e?~· Beyond ~e~e agreements the US has also raised the 
possibility of negotiating naval controls in the European area 
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. d . " in the aftermath of CFE ground and air re ucttons . 
President Bush arms control initiatives of 27 september 1991 
stated that "The US will remove all tac~cal nuclear w~apons, 
including nuclear cruise missiles from Its surface ships and 
attack submarines. It will also remove nuclear weapons 
associated with land-based naval aircraft. . Many of ~ese 
weapons will be dismantled and destroyed w•th the remamder 
placed in secure central storage areas."'" According to press 
repons, President Gorbachev accepted this ch~IIenge and 
announced that the USSR will "remove all tacttcal nuclear 
weapons from ships and from . submarines."
17 
These 
announcements are in effect far reaching naval anns control 
measures, and they will have a profound imJ?act on the naval 
situation and on stability in the High North, If and when they 
are implemented. 
It is for instance likely that the removal of _tactical n~~l~ar 
weapons from surface ships and submarines Will be stabilizmg 
in that it will remove much of the advantage of "the battle of 
the first salvoe" which has been emphasised by Soviet naval 
authorities." On the other hand, it is also possible that ~moval 
of the tactical nuclear weapons from surface ships and 
submarines may lower the threshold for conventional coJ?fiict 
because the risk of escalation by initiating a conventional 
· conflict would be less, panicularly if it was believed that ~e . 
conflict could be confined to naval ships at sea only. It IS 
therefore possible that removal of tactical nuclear weapons 
from surface ships and submarines may increase the need for 
adequate naval CSBMs. 
One area of naval forces which has been poi?ted ~ut _by 
Defence Minister Holst and others as worthy of mvestigallon 
as to its suitability for negotiations, is limiting the ?umber of 
nuclear powered attack submarines. SSBNs belongmg to the 
us NATO and the former USSR are justified almost entirely 
in 'the terms of the East-West confrontation, and the two 
submarine superpowers might find it in their interest to 
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negotiate agreed limits on inventories as long as the 
negotiations deal with submarines only. This would, in case, 
reduce the perceived threat against Soviet SSBNs operating in 
the northern Seas, and it would relieve the concerns in NATO 
for maintaining the lines of communication across the Atlantic 
in a conflict. It alo appears that limiting the number of nuclear 
powered attack submarines will not infringe of the freedom of 
the seas or on any of the other reasons which have been 
advanced as arguments against naval arms control. One 
disadvantage of an agreement to limit the number of SSNs 
would, however, be that it would provide less operational 
opportunity for NATO and the US to put pressure to confine 
the Northern fleet to its home waters in the Barents Sea in a 
conflict 
Another area for possible investigation are Naval Confidence 
and Security Building Measures (CSBM). In the Special 
Repon of the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment in 
1988 on "Confidence Building Measures at Sea"" it is pointed 
out that the Rules of Engagement (RoEs) which naval forces 
actually operate under will have great significance for the 
development of a tense crisis situation at sea when acts of 
war may appear imminent since it is evident that assumptions 
and expectations about the other side's Rules of Engagement 
will have implications for own reactions in such situations. It 
is therefore suggested by the Norwegian Defence Research 
Establishment that communication about the principles of 
development of RoEs are considered a suitable confidence 
building measure. The authors of this study suggest that this 
should be extended to include mutual exchange of information 
about the substance of the most critical elements of RoE's 
concerning the captain's rights of "self defence" of his ship, 
and the criterias for assessment of "hostile intent". This would 
most likely reduce the risks of inadvenant conflict and 
escalation in tense or unforeseen situations, particularly in 
areas where both sides often conduct naval exercises or transit 
of naval forces. 
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Nuclear testing in the Arctic 
In March 1990, the fo~er USSR announced that begirming in 
1993, all underground nuclear weapons tests ~ould be 
conducted on the Arctic island of Novaya Zemlya. Smce 1963, 
the USSR has carried out fony-two underground nuclear tests 
at Novaya Zemlya, eleven since 1980. The most ~cent tests 
known to be conducted were two in 1988 and one m October 
1990. 
Nuclear testing is not in itself a strategic activity: b~t it is 
closely related to the maintenance and modermzatton of 
existing nuclear weapons. And ~es~ng ~n ~e island of Novaya 
Zemlya in the Arctic has special Imphcan~ns because of the 
proximity to the Nordic ci;cumP?lar countries, and because of 
the sensitivity of the Arctic environment. 
A comparison of US and Russian testing sites have confirmed 
what was already known: that the c~rrent US ~sting site is 
located in a geographical area which lends Jtse!f t~ the 
containment of radiation more readily than the Russi~ ~Ite at 
Novaya Zemlya, The US test site in Nevada was ongmally 
chosen for atmospheric tests. It has turned out that the dry 
alluvium in the area, together with strict US contai~ent 
practices, is well suited to prevent the accidental release mto 
the atmosphere of radioactive debris from underground nuclear 
explosions. 
Russia in contrast, is confronted with a more . difficult 
containment problem because the special geological and 
environmental features at Novaya Zemlya. Although Novaya 
Zemlya is quite stable from a seismol~gical point ~f view, the 
hard rock in which the nuclear explosiOns are earned out has 
a higher propensity to fracture, creating potential outlets for 
radioactive products. 
One of the concerns of the circumpolar states is whether 
219 
pennafrost present special problems, and whether it is affected 
by underground nuclear tests. Russian scientists have explained 
that at Novaya Zemlya the pennafrost is generally 400 to 500 
metres deep. All larger tests are conducted at a depth that 
takes them below the pennafrost, i.e. - at depths of 600 m or 
more. Smaller tests, in the one-kiloton range are placed at a 
minimum depth of !50- to 180 metres. The US also detonates 
its nuclear devices at a minimum depth of 180 metres (600 
feet) at its Nevada test site. 
Although there are basic similarities in many of the design 
safety features and detonation authorization procedures used by 
the US and the USSR, there remain sharp differences in their 
respective acceptable standards for the venting of radioactive 
gases and other by-products. 
A joint symposium in Canada 23-24 April 1991, revealed that 
the containment standards employed by the fonner Soviet 
Union are not as rigerous as those of the US. US scientists, 
however, acknowledged that they would be unable to achieve 
current US containment standards if they were to test in the 
same difficult conditions Soviet scientists face at Novaya 
Zemlya20• 
While the infonnation provided by the Soviet scientists went 
a long way toward filling many gaps in knowledge, it does 
not ease the concerns about the potential for a disastrous 
accident, or about the effects of venting on the Arctic 
environment If the Soviets are doing the best they possibly 
can given the limitations of the Arctic region, the question is 
whether they should they be testing there at all? 
In this regard it must be noted that although US standards for 
venting are stricter, both in theory and practice, than those 
employed at Novaya Zemlya, the fonner Soviet Union has, for 
six years, advocated a complete ban on nuclear testing. 
Furthennore, the Soviets in the late 1980s maintained an 
eighteen-month long unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing. 
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The US, in contrast, remains opposed to a complete ban, and 
to beginning any negotiations, and to discussing nuclear testing 
issues. 
Agenda for Arms Control in the High North 
A study of the interests and factors influencing strategic 
stability in the High North make.s it apparent ~at the 
following measures would be of particular benefit to mcrease 
stability, and should therefore be given high priority by the 
concerned states: 
1.. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
Encourage both signatory powers of the START 
Treaty to revise the counting rules for heavy bombers 
in such a way that they do not favour the build-up 
of long-range bombers, and increasing the nuclear 
wamead inventories above the agreed central limits. 
Encourage the START signatory powers to 
renegotiate the Treaty in such a way that it limits 
heavy bombers in the same way as it limits other 
strategic delivery means, ICBMs and SLBMs. 
Limitations on Russian Strategic Air Defence, 
particularly as regards forward air defence beyond 
Russia's own borders, in balance with reduction of 
the long-range bomber and cruise missile threat. 
Mutual limits on nuclear powered attack submarines 
to increase the security of Russian SSBN's, and of 
the NATO sea lines of communications. 
Widening of the Naval Confidence Building Measures 
by exchange of infonnation about the content of 
Naval Rules of Engagement to reduce the risk of 
inadvertent conflict at sea. 
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6. Seek agreement to a comprehensive ban on nuclear 
testing, and if this is not possible, to get the United 
States to provide Russia with assistance for 
establishment of an underground nuclear testing site 
with acceptable containment standards located outside 
the High North. · 
It is clearly in the mutual interest of the two nuclear 
superpowers to implement the above mentioned measures, and 
this would also meet the global interests for increased stability 
at a lower level of military forces. At the regional level, there 
should be a common interest among the non-nuclear 
circumpolar states to join their efforts to achieve the 
mentioned aims. 
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The START Agreement signed in Moscow on 31 July 1991 
will have consequences for the Arctic if it is implemented. On 
the political level the Treaty is a reflection of the cooperation 
between the former Soviet and present US leadership. For the 
time being the post -Soviet Russian regime under Boris Yeltsin 
appears to be pursuing the same basic foreign policy line as 
the former Soviet leadership. Since the tone of this relationship 
also is a key factor determining the overall security-political 
climate this is fundamentally positive. However with the 
collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991 the future 
status of the treaties signed by the USSR are in doubt. In the 
first place the former single Treaty partner is now replaced by 
at least 14 new and more or less independent states. The 
extent to which they will honour Soviet agreements remains 
uncertain, while the multitude of new actors makes the 
situation more complex. To some extent this is offset by the 
fact that Russia will inherit the bulk of the ex-Soviet strategic 
nuclear command system and arsenal. Thus the consequences 
of the breakup of the Soviet Union are less dramatic for the 
START Treaty than for instance for the CFE Treaty. In the 
second place however the future development of Russia still 
remains highly uncertain. On the one hand it is uncertain to 
what extent Russia's present and future leadership will 
continue to honour the Soviet agreements and continue the 
present cooperative foreign policy line. On the other hand 
Russia herself may split up into a further number of smaller 
entities, which could also split the strategic nuclear forces 
further. The following section is based on the assumption that 
Russia remains intact, that Russia preserves a global strategic 
nuclear policy and that the START Treaty provisions are 
honoured. However as noted above the future of Russia 
remains highly uncertain. 
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A~~urning the START Treaty is honoured it will have direct 
m~ta~ consequences for the Arctic strategic environment 
1bis IS because pa_rt of the nuclear forces regulated by the 
Tr~aty h~ve a p~al Arctic orientation. That is to say that 
their ~asmg, tr~1t or ~aunch involves the use of areas close 
~ or m the Arctic. 1bis makes the affected regions of vital 
Importance for US and Russian national security, which in turn 
draws their political and military interest to these areas. Since 
the START Treaty alters the number and significance of these 
for~s !t will also _affect their impact on the Arctic region. 
Tb1s. w1ll not hav_e Immediate or direct consequences but will 
modify the Russian and US strategic interests in the north includi~ the way in which they perceive the importance of 
~e reg~on and their Arctic military posture. Hence the changes 
maugurated by the START Treaty have long-term consequen-
ces ~or the regional security equation. These consequences are 
outlmed below. However once again one should note that 
these strategic considerations are today heavily overshadowed 
by the degeneration and crises of the Russian internal collapse. 
Before START 
The US and Russian strategic nuclear forces which are part of 
the START Agreement consist of a triad of Strategic Nuclear 
Delivery Vehicles (SNDV). They are: 
Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBM), 
Heavy Bombers (l.RB - Long Range Bombers). 
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM). 
Tbes:e str~tegic nuclear forces are part of the central nuclear 
relationship between the US and Russia. Their primary 
function hitherto. has bee~ nuclear deterrence, and they have 
thus made a deliberate d1rect confrontation between the two 
gre~t powers unthinkable. These weapons are thus not directed 
~gamst the Arctic region specifically, but their operation has 
~nvolv~d _the us~ of the Arctic to varying degrees. This • Arctic 
Impact IS outlined below, giving the situation in the late 
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1980's. 1bis also means that the Soviet forces are referred to 
as 'Soviet' and not as 'CIS' or - as in the rest of this section 
- as 'Russian'. 
US Strategic Forces in the North Before START 
Tbe breakdown of the pre-ST ART US strategic nuclear 
warhead arsenal' is provided in the table below and its Arctic 
consequences analysed in the following subsections: 
System Warheads Percent 
SLBM 5,376 40.1% 
LRB 5,572 41.6% 
ICBM 2,450 18.3% 
To!als: 13,398 100.0% 
Two of the three weapons systems in the triad have involved 
plauned or actual operations in or near the Arctic. They are 
the SLBM forces, whose Arctic orientation gradually declined 
during the 1980's, and the LRB forces, whose Arctic orienta-
tion increased during the 1980'~· US ICBM forces have no 
Arctic operational profile. 
US SLBM forces 
40% of the US arsenal of strategic nuclear warheads is 
deployed on submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBM). 
36% of these watheads consist of the Poseidon C-3 inter-
mediate range SLBM. Its 4,600 km range means that it must 
be launched from patrol areas in the north Atlantic, Mediter-
ranean or possibly northern Indian Ocean if it is to reach 
targets in the Russian strategic heartland west of the Urals. 
Most of these SLBM are probably assigned patrol zones in the 
north Atlantic, where their main forward operating base lies 
(Holy Loch in Scotland) from which a reported ten SSBN 
operate. 
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On the other hand 64% of the US strategic submarine force 
is now equipped with the intercontinental range Trident C-4 
and D-5 SLBM which is replacing the Poseidon. The 7.400 
and 12,000 km range of these missiles permit them to reach 
strategic targets in Russia from most of the worlds oceans. 
Since the Russian capability to track and attack US submarines 
increases the closer to the Russian main naval bases one 
operates it is unlikely that the Trident submarines would 
approach the relatively dangerous waters in the Arctic. Thus 
the development of this SLBM system as of 1980 actually 
reduced the strategic importance of the north since it reduced 
the number and significance of those SLBM's deployed to the 
northern waters. 
US LRB forces 
42% of US strategic nuclear warheads are deployed aboard 
intercontinental range bombers (LRB). These bombers are all 
home-based in the United States and their shortest transit route 
to targets in Russia passes directly over the Arctic. For those 
bombers assigned targets in the Russian heartland the shortest 
flight route passes over the 'European Arctic' - that is to say 
over Greenland, the northern pan of the Norwegian Sea and 
then directly over Norway, Sweden and Finland. This makes 
this airspace of vital importance for the US offensive nuclear 
forces and for the Russian strategic air defence effons. 
How many US LRB actually would employ the shortest flight 
route to their targets is uncenain and would vary according to 
the scenario. These aircraft could approach their Russian 
targets from a variety of directions, using their aerial refuelling 
capability and/or operating via forward air facilities on Guam 
in the Pacific, Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean or other 
locations. However most would probably use the direct Arctic 
flight routes. This is so for three reasons: 
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In the first place it reduces the LRB dependence upon 
vulnerable suppon facilities. In the event of a nuclear war 
forward air bases would be destroyed in minutes and 
vulnerable airborne tanker operations could be interfered 
with or prevented. This makes the use of direct flight 
routes with a minimum of suppon dependence desirable or 
unavoidable. 
Secondly the desolation of the Arctic airspace means that 
there is less likelihood of the LRB 's being detected or 
interfered with by third parties, as could be the case if for 
instance the People's Republic of China, India, the Middle 
East or central Europe were used as transit routes. 
Finally the Arctic, and particularly nordic Arctic, offers the 
greatest security for the LRB forces. This is the only pan 
of the world where they can approach the immediate 
vicinity of the Russian frontiers behind the shield of an 
allied state (Norway) and with immediately available 
forward based air suppon (in the UK and Iceland). It is 
also the point where the Russian strategic air defences are 
the thinnest since the bordering states of Norway, Finland 
and Sweden make it difficult for them to extend outwards 
beyond the Russian frontiers, and the Russian heartland 
begins immediately inside the frontiers. 
Thus an imponant part of the US LRB force would probably 
transit Arctic airspace in the event of a war with the USSR. 
This possibility has increased since the deployment of the 
ALCM after 1982. This is a standoff weapon with a 2,400 km 
range, designed to be launched from relatively secure airspace 
beyond the reach of the Russian air defences by the vulnerable 
B-520/H bombers. One of the few areas in the world which 
both lies within 2,400 km range of the bulk of Russian 
strategic targets and is relatively sheltered from the Russian air 
defence system is the Norwegian Sea. Since the ALCM is also 
designed to be used en masse - overwhelming the air defences 
- and in concen with the penetrating bombers - blasting a path 
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through the defences - the ALCM has boosted the strategic 
importance of the Arctic and particularly nordic airspace 
considerably.' 
US ICBM forces 
18% of US strategic nuclear warheads are deployed aboard 
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM's). This force has 
virtually no Arctic impact at all. It is entirely based in the US 
and its extra-atmospheric ballistic trajectory to its targets in the 
USSR passes far above Arctic airspace. It has had a marginal 
impact on the Arctic area by leading to the deployment of 
Russian early warning EW radars to her Arctic coastline 
(Pechora and the Kola) and to the Baltic area but the security 
political consequences of these facilities are marginal. Thus 
this force has helped reduce the strategic importance of the 
Arctic. 
Soviet Strategic Forces in the North before START 
The breakdown of the Soviet pre-ST ART strategic nuclear 
warhead arsenal is provided in the table below and its Arctic 
consequences analysed in the following subsections: 
System Warheads Percent 
SlBM 3,636 31.2% 
LRB 1,460 126% 
ICBM 6,54S S6.2% 
Totals: 11,641 100.0% 
Two of the three Soviet strategic nuclear weapons systems 
have involved planned or actual operations in the Arctic. They 
are the SLBM force, of which two-thirds has traditionally been 
based on the Kola and whose Arctic orientation has increased 
strongly during the 1980's. The second force with an Arctic 
orientation are the Soviet strategic bombers, whose estimated 
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wartime use of the Arctic for forward basing and transit has 
remained roughly stable. On the other hand Soviet ICBM 
forces have had virtually no Arctic. operational profile what-
soever. 
Soviet SLBM forces 
31% of Soviet strategic nuclear warheads were deployed on 
her SLBM's, which have a strong Arctic orientation. In 1990 
61% of all Soviet strategic submarines (38 SSBN) were based 
on the Kola and 39% on the Kamchatka Peninsula in the Far 
East (24 SSBN), which has also been the rough SSBN 
distribution for the last two decades. However since 1980 the 
importance of the Kola bases has increased. During the 1980's 
the Arctic sea areas north of the Kola - the Barents, Kara and 
Greenland Seas and the Arctic Ocean - became the patrol and 
launch zones for the modem Soviet SSBN's. This led to the 
deployment of all Soviet SSBN classes constructed since 1980 
- the Typhoon and Delta IV types - to the Kola. They are 
armed with the advanced SS-N-20 and SS-N-23 SLBM with 
10 and 4 warheads respectively. As a result 72% of the Soviet 
SLBM warheads are based on Kola and only 28% on Kam-
chatka: 
Northern SLBM/ Whds 
SSBN Total Fleet SLBM SSBN Whds NorFlt PacFll 
DELTA N 6 6 (100 %) SS-N-23 16 4 384 
TYPHOON 6 6 (100 %) SS-N-20 20 10 1,200 
DELTA ill 14 7 (SO %) SS-N-18 16 7 784 781 
YANKEE 1! 1 1 (100 %) SS-N-17 12 I 12 
DELTA 1! 4 4 (100 %) SS-N-8 16 64 
DELTA I 18 8 (44 %) SS-N-8 12 1 96 120 
YANKEE I 12 6 (SO%) SS-N-6 16 1 96 96 
Totals: 61 38 2,636 JIID (72%) (28%) 
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This made the Arctic important both for the basing and 
operation of some three quarters of the Soviet SLBM warhead 
arsenal, leaving it a key element in the US-Soviet strategic 
nuclear relationship. This SSBN deployment is one of the 
primary factors behind the buildup of the Soviet Northern 
Fleet general purpose forces over the last three decades, as 
well having helped draw considerable US (and British) naval 
interest to the northern waters. 
Soviet LRB forces 
13% of Soviet strategic nuclear warheads were deployed on 
her intercontinental bomber force. These aircraft had their main 
peacetime bases deep in the central USSR and were not home-
based near the Arctic. However all of these bombers are 
strongly dependent upon using the shortest transit route from 
the Soviet Union to their targets in the US, since they did not 
dispose of secure forward basing areas outside the USSR and 
their aerial refuelling capability is limited. This means that 
most if not all would transit the Arctic in the event of war. 
71% of the Soviet LRB main bases (five out of seven) were 
located west of the Urals. From here the shortest flight path 
to the US passes directly over or northeast of the nordic 
states. While the Russian LRB forces would disperse in the 
event of war and would probably not operate en masse, a 
significant proportion would in all likelihood transit the 
airspace in the immediate vicinity of the nordic states. This is 
also borne out by the fact that 40% (five out of twelve) of 
their estimated forward staging bases along the Soviet Arctic 
coastline are located near the nordic area on the Kola (2) on 
Novaja Zemlya (1) and on Zemlya Frantsa Iosifa (2). Thus the 
airspace around the nordic region probably remains of major 
importance as a forward staging and transit route for the 
Russian strategic bomber force. 
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Soviet ICBM forces 
56% of Soviet strategic nuclear wameads were deployed on 
ICBM's. For the same reasons as for the US ICBM's these 
have had limited Arctic implications. Since the mid-1960's 
they have all been based in the central USSR relatively far 
from the Arctic and their extra:atmospheric ballistic trajectory 
places their transit route above Arctic airspace. Hence their 
deployment reduced the strategic importance of the Arctic by 
diminishing the relative size and significance of those nuclear 
forces with an Arctic orientation. 
Conclusion 
On the basis of the above it is possible to establish a rough 
picture of the role of the Arctic in the US and Soviet strategic 
nuclear relationship at the signing of the START Treaty. The 
table below provides an overview of the pre-START propor-
tion of US and Soviet strategic nuclear forces based in the 
Arctic and/or estimated as having it as a primary operational 
zone in wartime:' 
Arctic % 
Warheads Arctic of total 
us SLBM 40% 
LRB 42% 
30% 12% 
90% 38% 
ICBM 18% 
Sum: 100% so% 
USSR SLBM 31% 
LRB 13% 
72% 22% 
100% 13% 
ICBM 56% 
Sum: 100% 35% 
It is also possible to provide a slightly more precise picture of 
which parts of the Arctic were affected by the Soviet-US 
strategic nuclear relationship and - very roughly - to what 
extent: 
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'li> ofSNDV Airspace Sea Land lfJir of Arsenal 
us 30% SLBM Patrol 12% 
90% LRB Transil/launch 38% 
0% ICBM 
USSR 72% SLBM Patrol Bases 22% 
100% LRB Transit FOB 13% 
0% ICBM 
It is interesting to note that roughly half of the US strategic 
forces have a potential Arctic operational profile. This is 
largely due to the important role played by the US strategic 
bombers, which carry the largest number of warheads in the 
US strategic nuclear arsenal and which have a strong Arctic 
orientation. On the other hand the Soviet strategic nuclear . 
forces have a relatively lower Arctic profile, with an estimated 
one third likely to involve the Arctic in their operations. This 
is primarily due to the predominant role played by their ICBM 
force. 
After START 
The exact consequences of the START Treaty for the US and 
Russian strategic nuclear arsenal are not possible to foresee 
since the Treaty leaves considerable latitude for each side to 
decide how it will make the cuts within the overall limits. 
However it is possible to draw some general conclusions and 
estimate the broad range of alternatives open to both sides. 
The proportion of US and Russian strategic nuclear forces with 
a potential Arctic orientation is thus likely to increase after 
START. This is so for three reasons: 
Firstly because the START reductions impose the strongest 
cuts on those forces with a non-Arctic profile, that is to say 
US and Russian ICBM forces. This means that the relative 
importance of the remaining forces increases. 
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Secondly because the cuts imposed on the Russian SLBM 
force will in all likelihood eliminate all Russian strategic 
submarines based in the Far East, leaving all or almost all 
remaining SSBN' s based on the Kola. 
Thirdly because the START counting rules (and US policy) 
strongly favour the strengthening of the heavy bom~r 
forces, which will increase the importance of Arctic 
airspace further. 
One should note that the START Treaty imposes strong cuts 
on the US and Russian ballistic warheads (ICBM and SLBM). 
The Treaty leaves no latitude in this area, obliging the US to 
cut ballistic warheads by a minimum of 38% and the USSR 
to cut them by at least 45%. This will reduce the ballistic 
warheads, but will also make the remaining ballistic warheads 
more important, since there are less reserves and the smaller 
forces will be more vulnerable. This increases the importance 
of whatever forces are left or moved up to the Arctic area. 
This point is particularly important where the Russian SSBN 
force is concerned. 
Finally one should note that the above warhead cuts (38% and 
45%) only apply to both sides ballistic warheads, and that the 
counting rules for the bombers are far more flexible. This is 
dealt with below. 
US Strategic Forces in the North after START 
Tables 1. and 2. outline the present number of warheads in the 
US strategic arsenal included in the START Treaty, the 
warhead limits under the Treaty and the resulting cuts which 
the US must make if it is to comply with the Treaty. On the 
basis of the data presented in the table the US must - techni-
cally - cut her overall number of warheads by 38% and her 
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Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles (SNDV) by 17% if she is 
to meet the Treaty limits: 
US total 
START limit 
Warheads SNDV 
9724• 1,930 
- 6:ooo . 1,600 
3,724 (38 %) 330 (17%) 
* Using START counting rules. 
The SNDV limits are precise and cannot be circumvented, but 
the warhead limits are flexible and strongly favour the heavy 
bomber. In practice - as we shall see - the actual US warhead 
arsenal can be more than doubled by exploiting the special 
counting rules governing heavy bomber wameads. Secondly 
the Treaty pennits considerable latitude as to the way in which 
the different SNDV types are reduced to meet the overall 
counting limits. The most likely options for the US are 
examined below. 
US SLBM and ICBM forces 
One of the few precise predictions which can be made on the 
basis of the START regulations is that the US will have to cut 
her ballistic missile warheads (ICBM and SLBM) by at least 
37%: 
us total 7,826 
START limit - 4,900 
2,926 (37%) 
This is one of the few areas where the START Treaty leaves 
little room for manoeuvre, as the limits and the counting rules 
are clear. However from here on the going gets less clear. 
Within the above overall ceiling governing the ballistic 
warheads the US is free to choose how the ballistic cuts are 
to be made and hence what share of ICBM and SLBM will 
be eliminated. The size and composition . of the remaining 
236 
ICBM and SLBM force is therefore difficult to foresee. 
However one should note that the SLBM remains the only 
secure second strike system in the US nuclear arsenal, and as 
such it occupies a position of special importance. Thus it is 
likely that a significant number of wameads will remain 
deployed on the SLBM's. 
On the other hand it seems likely that the remaining SLBM 
force will only include the most modem Trident SLBM's and 
will lose its last intennediate range Poseidon forces. These 
ageing SLBM' s (first deployed in 1971) have already been 
phasing out gradually in favour of the new Trident C-4 and 
D-5 systems and today only 12 Poseidon SSBN remain in 
operation. Their retirement is likely to be accelerated by tbe 
START Treaty partly because the total SLBM force must now 
be cut, and partly since each Poseidon SLBM is counted as 
carrying 10 warheads and hence substantial wamead savings 
(1,920) can be made by removing this SLBM type. This 
would cover 66% of the US ballistic missile wamead reduc-
tions: 
Minimum ballistic cut: 2,926 
Poseidon warheads: - 1,920 (66%) 
1,006 
Such a cut in the Poseidon force is important for the northern 
waters since it removes the last US SSBN type which had a 
clear north Atlantic orientation and of which part or all of the 
force could have involved the nordic waters. Their removal 
will help reduce the strategic significance of these waters, and 
in this respect reduce the involvement of the nordic area in tbe 
US-Russian nuclear relationship. 
Reductions of the remaining US ICBM and SLBM forces are 
difficult to predict. On the other hand the exact composition 
of the remaining ballistic missile force does not matter as far 
as the Arctic is concerned. Neither of these systems involves 
the Arctic in their operation. The ICBM force has no Arctic 
orientation, while the Trident SLBM force is unlikely to 
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involve Arctic waters. Thus what really matters is not their 
future mix but their relative importance in the overall US 
strategic nuclear arsenal. The greater this is the less important 
will be those systems which do have an Arctic orientation, and 
hence the less involved will the Arctic be in the great power 
nuclear relationship. 
In this respect the relative importance of the US ICBM and 
SLBM force will decline after START, as the proportion of 
wameads deployed aboard the ballistic systems falls markedly. 
At a minimum level • assuming the full 4,900 ballistic missile 
force is retained · the drop will be from the present 58% of 
the total force down to 45%. As we shall see below it could 
be even greater, as there are reasons why the US ICBM/-
SLBM force may drop even lower than the 4,900 wamead 
limit. 
Thus START is in fact imposing cuts on the two nuclear 
systems which have detracted from the strategic importance of 
the Arctic area. This will make the remaining US SNDV 
system · the heavy bombers • relatively more important in the 
overall US nuclear arsenal. Since this system also has a 
marked Arctic orientation this could also increase the strategic 
importance of the Arctic. 
US LRB forces 
Superficially the START Treaty indicates that the US will 
have to make significant cuts in her heavy bomber force. 
Assuming that the US desires to retain her full complement of 
4,900 ICBM and SLBM wameads then the heavy bomber 
wameads will have to be cut by 42%, since there are 1,764 
bomber wameads and the limit is 1,100. This will in theory · 
reduce the US bomber force, but in practice the effect can be 
the opposite. The reasons for this are twofold: firstly because 
of the general drift of US national security strategy and 
specifically nuclear strategy, and secondly because of the 
238 
special counting rules which apply to heavy bombers under 
START, and which favour these systems. 
The evolving US National Security Strategy and nuclear 
strategy are presented elsewhere and will not be dealt with 
here.' other than to note that it favours the development of 
heavy bomber forces over and above ballistic missile systems 
and that the essence of US START strategy was based on 
favouring the bomber. Thus the trend is towards strengthening 
the US heavy bomber force, and particularly the penetrating 
bombers. 
This is evident if we look closer at the START counting rules 
which in fact permit both sides to increase the actual number 
of wameads dramatically over the 6,000 limit, if the wameads 
are placed on heavy bombers, and particularly if they are 
placed on non-ALCM heavy bombers. Thus having more 
bombers permits the US to have more wameads. This is so for 
two reasons: 
1. ALCM heavy bomber counting rules. 
The START Treaty distinguishes between ALCM bombers 
(which can carry ALCM) and non-ALCM bombers (which can 
carry bombs and SRAM). The US is permitted to have up to 
150 ALCM heavy bombers which are counted as carrying 10 
ALCM each though they actually are permitted to carry 20 
ALCM: 
Actual ALCM: ISO x 20 = 3,000 
START coont: ISO x 10 = I,SOO 
Net gain: + 1,500 
Thus by deploying the full 150 ALCM bomber force the US 
can increase its authorised nuclear warhead arsenal from 6,000 
to 7,500, which is a strong incentive to retain the full 150 
ALCM bomber force. The US can also deploy more ALCM 
bombers, but in this case all those exceeding the 150 level are 
counted for the actual number of ALCM which they carry. 
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The US presently exceeds the number of limited-count ALCM 
bombers by 22 aircraft: 
B-52G: 77 
B-52B: 95 
172 
START:I50 
Excess: 22 
Thus we can expect the US to reduce the present B-520 force 
to 55 aircraft,_ which re<!uces the ALCM bomber force by 
13%. From th1s perspective the size of this Arctic-oriented 
weapons sy~tem will probably be cut marginally. One should 
also n_ore that the 77 B-520 are only able to carry 12 ALCM. 
Thus If the ALCM bomber force is trimmed to fit the START 
ALCM counting limit and optimised for maximum ALCM 
loads (-22 B-520) then it would only carry 2,560 ALCM: 
B-52G 55 X 12 = 660 
B-52H 95 X 20 = 1,900 
2,560 
Thus using the present B-520/H ALCM carriers the US will 
only gain 1,060 warheads over the START limit of 6,000. 
(2,560 - 1,500 = 1 ,060.) However this can be increased to 
1,500 when the B-520 are replaced with another ALCM 
bomber (eg the B-lB) in the years to come. This role conver-
sion i_s already foreseen for the B-lB for when it is no longer 
perceived as capable of penetrating Russian strategic air 
defences. USAF analysts estimate that this will be the case in 
the latter half of the 1990's. 
Non-ALCM heavy bomber counting rules 
However the real warhead boost will probably come through 
the deployment of non-ALCM heavy bombers. Here the 
START Treaty permits truly remarkable warltead gains. All 
non-ALCM heavy bombers are counted as carrying only 1 
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wamead under the START rules, though they in fact are 
allowed to carry their full weapons load. The US B-520 
version which is not fitted for carrying the ALCM can carry 
up to 12 bombs/SRAM and the B-lB can carry up to 24 
bombs/SRAM. Thus the present US non-ALCM heavy bomber 
force is already permitted to carry 2,614 warheads over the 
6,000 warhead START limit: 
Bomber Number Warheads 
B-52G 39 X 12 468 
B-IB 95 X 24 = 2,280 
Smn: 134 2,748 
By subtracting the START warhead count for these bombers 
from the real maximum load which they can carry we get the 
number of warlleads over the START limit which these 
bombers provide the US: 
Actual wSJheads: 2,748 
START COIDlt: 134 
Difference: 2,614 
If we add up the existing extra ALCM and non-ALCM heavy 
bomber warheads which are permitted but not counted under 
START we thus get the actual authorised US warhead level: 
Extra ALCM warheads: 1,060 
Extra noo.-ALCM warheads: 2,614 
Sum extra watheads: 3,674 
Thus with the present heavy bomber ORBAT the actual 
number of warheads permitted to the US after START is 
9,674 (6,000 + 3,674). This means that the US really only 
needs to cut her warhead arsenal by 28% to meet the START 
requirements, provided she retains her full heavy bomber force 
along the lines indicated above: 
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Real US warhead l<llal: 
Real START limit: 
Cuts: 
13,398 
9,674 
- 3,724 (27 .8 %) 
However under these conditions 55 % of the US strategic 
warllead arsenal is carried by the heavy bombers: 
ALCM watheads: 
Non-ALCM warheads: 
Total bomber warheads: 
Real START limit: 
LRB warheads: 
Ballistic warheads: 
2,S60 
+2.748 
S,308 
9,647 
- S,308 (SS %) 
4,339 
This represents an increase of heavy bomber share of the US 
strategic warllead arsenal of 13%, from the present 42% of 
warlleads carried by the LRB up to 55%. This will make the 
LRB force the single strongest element in the nuclear triad. 
This is important if we take into account that this force has 
the Arctic area as one of its primary operational zones, both 
for standoff ALCM launch and for transit of penetration 
bombers. 
Ftnally one should also note one important point. All the 
above calculations are based on the assumption that the US 
wishes to retain her full force of 4,900 warneads on the 
ballistic missiles (ICBM and SLBM) permitted under START. 
However this is by no means certain. It is quite possible that 
the US will reduce the number of her ballistic warheads below 
the 4,900 limit in order to deploy more bombers. 
There are two key arguments in favour of this option. Firstly 
it fits in with US strategy which is heavily in favour of an 
increase in the strategic bomber force, and particularly of dual-
capable nuclear/conventional penetration bombers with a global 
range. This is favoured for several reasons.' On the nuclear 
strategic level because the manned penetration bomber provides 
the best means of delivering the type of discriminating 
strategic counterforce attack which appears to be a primary 
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in the 1990's. Secondly 
objective in US nuclear strat~~ - unlike the ICBM and 
because the manned ~omber tional operations. Thus it is 
SLBM - also be u~ed or conve~rozen stalemate of nuclear 
not limited exclustvely to the rt US global interests and 
deterrence but can. be us~d to s~pp~s an argument which is 
for regional conungenctes. Th \t is to the Air Force, and in 
equally attractive to C~ngr:_s :creased emphasis upon dual 
fact the move towa . s bers has been one of the key -
capable heavy penetrallOD; bohm US START strategy. 
if not the key -elements m t e 
. ALCM bombers would 
Secondly, ~ inc~se m h~av~:~~ds under the START 
also permroltt an ~~~a:pl~~ing one Minuteman Ill ICBM 
coll!'ung ~s. ads for three non-ALCM ~mbers 
attnbuted wtth 3 ":arneed with 3 warneads but whtch are · whic~ are also a~b~arheads would increase the number of 
permttted to carry 
US warheads by a factor of 24: . 
Weapons Warheads: Warheads: 
Number System 
START count Real count 
1 Minuteman ID ~ 
3 Non-ALCM bombers 
3 
72 
. red she could double her number of 
In fact if the US so des~T ART and still remain fully within 
strategic warheads afte~_,_ d limits An example of this is 
the fonnal START w ..... ea · 
shown below: 
Warheads Total Total 
p..- SNDV: Warheads: Warheads: 
START count START count Real count SNDV Number 
8 4,000 4,000 Trident 500 10 1,200 1,200 MX 120 I 800 19,200 B-IB 800 
6,000 24,200 
Totals: 1,420 
the number of delivery vehicles 
Such a force w~ul~ ltheaveSTART limit (1,600) and exactly (SNDV) well Within e 
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match the START wamead limit (6,000) while providing the 
US with a real warhead total of 24,200. This is of course 
strictly hypothetical and will not happen for many reasons, but 
serves to illustrate the way in which the heavy bombers can 
be used to exploit the START counting rules. However the 
extreme development given above is neither necessary nor 
economically justifiable (given the cost of modem heavy 
bombers). Nor is it likely that the heavy bombers would be 
fully loaded with warheads in an operational context, since it 
limits their flight performance and because multiple bombing 
missions on such a scale overtaxes the flight crew. However 
what is likely is that the non-ALCM heavy bomber force may 
be prioritised over the other systems. Since these also have the 
Arctic or nordic airspace as a primary transit zone in wartime 
such a development would increase the strategic importance of 
these areas. 
Rus_sian Strategic Forces in the North after START 
Tables 3. and 4. outline the present number of wameads in the 
Russian strategic arsenal and included in the START Treaty, 
the wamead limits under the Treaty and the resulting cuts 
which Russia must make if it is to comply with the Treaty. 
The USSR has a similar latiiude in determining the exact form 
of the cuts within the overall START limits and thus the exact 
consequences cannot be foreseen. However as for the US it is 
possible to identify the likely general trend. 
The USSR must techncially cut her overall number of 
warheads by 45% and her SNDV by 46% if she is to meet 
the Treaty limits: 
Warheads SNDV 
Russian tOlal 
START limit 
10,996• 
- 6,000 
4,996 (45%) 
• Using START counting rules. 
2,947 
- 1.600 
1,347 (46%) 
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b th the wamead limits are as 
The launcher limits are clea; u~ ~S as is the latitude for 
flexible for the USSR as .'tJ be ~istributed within the overall 
determining how the cuts WI • 
limits. The likely options are outlined below. 
Russian ballistic forces 
. 1 d specific limits on the two The START counting rules me u e ICBM (SS-18) 
. ICBM types· the Heavy . 
most modem_ Russian (SS-24 and 'ss-25). Here the ceiling IS 
and the Mobile ICBM h ICBM and 1,100 war-
set at 1,540 wameads for the eavy 
heads for the mobile ICBM: 
Heavy ICBM warlteads: 3,080 
Mobile ICBM warheads: 825 
TART I. ·1. I 100 
START I. .,. - 1,540 mu· 1,540 (SO%) S IJDI • +
07J5 (+33%) 
1 This means that heavy ICBM These counting rules are c ear i t 5091 but that the mobile 
wameads must be. cut by:~ e;~'ll sU:ce the upper limit has 
ICBM can still be mcrease ~ g"gregate heavy and mobile 
not yet been reached. Thus t e a 
ICBM cuts are actually 32%: 
Modem ICBM: 3,905 
START limit: • 2,640 
1,265 (32%) 
d m in the Russian arsenal and 
These ICBM are the most mo ~ Thus it is likely that their 
a vital part of her nuc!e_ar plannlthi~· . and assuming the 
ill be retamed If s IS so, full quota w · 00 ballistic wamead comple-
USSR wishewills .to ::r;2~~ ~h:~s left to be split between the 
ment, there SLBM force· 
remaining older ICBM and the · . 
START ballistic limie 
Hvy &. Mob limit: 
4,900 
• 2,640 
2,260 
245 
J!' 
Of course more warl!eads could be all 
heavy and mobile ICBM warheads bel ocatthed by cutting the 
limits but this a . ow e upper START 
This :Oeans that :::~ =1":~ for the reasons given above. 
arsenal of older IciM and SLB~v::~d:ade in the large 
Older ICBM warheads: 2,640 
SLBM warheads: + l,6J6 
Smn: 6,276 
These 6,276 warheads must be cut b 
reach the 2,260 warl!ead level: Y 64% if they are to 
Old ICBM/SLBM wrhds; 6,276 . 
Available: • 2,260 
4,016 (64%) 
The distribution of thes ts be the SLBM forces · e cu tweeen the older ICBM and 
fi IS up to the USSR and th d"ffi 
oresee. However probably most cuts ill be us . ' cult to 
ICBM force. On the one hand the I~BM I made m the. older 
already partly co d b th eg of the triad is 
warheads, and o:e~e ~the~ ~od~m.heavy and mobile ICBM 
force represents their onl 1 a? smce the Russian SLBM ~serve. Since the Russfanre ~~~:Z s;cure ~trategic n~clear 
IIDportance for th A . . orce IS of particular 
below. e rctic Its development is examined in detail 
Russian SLBM forces 
While the exact cuts to th R . foreseen they will probabl eh usslan SLBM force cannot be 
if they are prioritised ove~ th~eo:~e~I~~~co~iderabl!•. even 
level - assuming that the Russian leadershi . n a mlmmum 
ICBM systems in favour of th SLBM' P scrapped all older 
would still have to b e s - the SLBM force 
unlikely however. Mo~ pC:b~~l l?%th. Such limited cuts are 
e IS at at least some of the 
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older ICBM are retained and that somewhere between 40% 
to 60 % of the SLBM warl!eads are cut. The exact size of the 
SLBM reductions within these two extremes depends upon 
how many of the older ICBM's the Russian leadership chooses 
to preserve. 
However from an Arctic perspective a precise prediction is not 
necessary since the strategic consequences are essentially the 
same at both ends of the scale. This is because even minimum 
SSBN cuts of 40% of the current force will force the USSR 
to eliminate virtoally all older SSBN's. This would leave only 
the most modem SSBN's, all of which are based on the Kola 
at present. This is illustrated in the table below, which shows 
how many SSBN's the USSR will have to cut if she is to 
reduce her SLBM warhead arsenal by 40 and 60 % respective-
ly, and assuming that the Russian Navy tries to retain as many 
modem SSBN as possible: 
40% SLBM Warhead Cut 60% SLBM Warhead Cut 
SSBN SSBN cuts Warhead cuts 
SSBN cuts Warhead-
Y""""• I 12 (100 %) 192 12 (100 %) 
192 
Delta I 18 (100 %) 216 
18 (100 %) 216 
Delta IT 4 (100 %) 64 
4 (100 %) 64 
Yankee IT I (100 %) 12 
I (100 %) 12 
Delta m 8 (57 %) 896 14 (100 %) 
1,568 
SUM 43 SSBN 1,380 (38%) 49 SSBN 
2P52 (56%) 
These cuts can partly be offset by downloading - reducing the 
number of warl!eads on a missile. The START Treaty permits 
the downloading of up to a total of 1,250 re-entry vehicles on 
up to three different types of ballistic missile. This would 
permit a greater number of SNDV (and hence SSBN launch 
platforms) to be retained if desired. However with this option 
the Russian SSBN fleet will have to be cut substantially. At 
a minimum this would involve the removal of 43 SSBN's - or 
roughly 70 % of the present force. If so, and if the Russians 
try to keep their most modem systems, then virtoall y all 
SSBN's with the exception of the Typhoon and Delta IV 
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classes will have to be eliminated. This would have two key 
consequences for the Northern Fleet: 
I. 
2. 
On ~e basis of present deployments the bulk of the 
Russian Navy's remaining SSBN's will probably be 
based with the Northern Fleet and operate in Arctic 
waters. All Typhoon and Delta IV SSBN's deployed 
so far ope~te with the Northern Fleet, whose Kola 
bases prov1de the only good access to the Arctic 
Ocean, for which the Typhoon and Delta IV classes 
are specially designed. As a result the role of the 
!'forthern Fleet in global nuclear strategy is likely to 
mcrease. 
An overall reducti~n of the number of strategic 
nuclear laun~hers wtll make the remaining systems 
~ven more Important. Because of the size of the 
ltkely SSBN cuts this applies particularly to this 
force. At the same time the remaining Russian SSBN 
force would also - because it would be far smaller -
become far more vulnerable to US strategic ASW. 
Hence . we may expect US efforts to improve her 
strategic ASW capability - and Russian efforts to 
defend her SSBN's - to increase as well and to be 
focussed to a considerable degree to the North 
Atlantic and Arctic. 
The a~gregate result is that the importance of the Northern 
Fleet m ~obal. nuclear strategy _will PI"?bably increase during 
the 1990 s. This fleet wlll contam the !tons share - if not all -
of th_e Russia? SSBN forces, whose smaller number will 
constitute a pnmary strategic asset and target for the USSR 
and _the ~S respectively. This will probably maintain - and 
poss1~ly mcrea~e - both great powers strategic interests in the 
assoctated Arctic and North Atlantic waters. 
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Russian LRB forces 
Finally the same wathead counting rules apply to the Russian 
heavy bomber warlleads as for the US, whic~ again makes. th_e 
exact outcome of the START Treaty uncertalll. _However 1t IS 
not certain tltat the USSR wlll seek to exploit the bomJx:r 
option as fully as the US might. This is because the a1r 
breathing leg of the triad ~as not - y~t - eme!ged as. such ~ 
important element in Russ1an strategiC planmng as 1t has m 
us planning. However this could change. 
Under any event the Russian Union can still increas~ ';!er 
heavy bomber warneads without breaking the START limits, 
since she has not yet matched them. If we assume that the 
USSR wishes to retain her full ballistic warhead quota of 
4,900, then she will have 1,100 left for the heavy bombers. 
However the USSR presently only dep1~ys 815 bom~r 
warheads (according to the START counting rules) ~h1ch 
means that this forCe can under all circumstances still be 
increased by 35% before it reaches the START bomber 
warnead limit. 
It seems likely that the USSR will seek to fill this gap, whi~h 
cannot be filled by ballistic warheads, and thus there ~lll 
probably be an increase in the Russian LRB leg of_ the tna~. 
As noted earlier this weapons system has a maJor Arctic 
orientation which in turn means that the strategic s!gnifican~ 
of Arctic airspace may also grow along with the mcrease m 
the role of the Russian LRB force. 
It is also possible that the USSR will choose to boost her 
bomber forces above the 1,100 warhead limit, by cutting the 
number of ballistic watheads below the maximum level. of 
4 900 However this seems unlikely, given the Russ1an ~nchant for ICBM and the already large cuts which she will 
have to inflict on her SSBN forces. One should also note th~t 
the US has a large technological advantage of the USSR m 
the manned bomber field, and hence it is not sure to what 
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exte~t the_ USSR would want to focus on this area of com-
parative disadvantage. · 
Conclusion 
The following general conclusions can be drawn regarding the 
consequences of the START Treaty for the Arctic area: 
1. The relative number of warlleads on the US heavy 
bomber leg of the strategic triad will increase and the 
heavy bombers . will probab~y constitute the largest 
launch platfonn m the strategic arsenal. This increases 
the s_ignificance of this weapons system in the US-
Russian strategic nuclear relationship. Since this 
weapo_ns system also has a strong potential Arctic 
operational profile this could in turn increase the 
strategic importance of Arctic airspace and of Russian 
strategic air defence in this area. 
2. The Poseidon SLBM ·force will probably be eliminat-
ed, removing the last of the US SLBM systems with 
a clear north Atlantic patrol profile. This will remove 
this link between the nordic waters and the US-
Russian strategic nuclear relationship. 
3. The remaining SLBM and ICBM force will be cut 
reducing their relative importance in the strategi~ 
arsenal marginally. 
4. The Russian SLBM .force will be cut substantially 
leaving only the modem Delta IV and Typhoo~ 
SSBN classes and possibly a few of the Delta m 
class. At present all Russian Delta IV and Typhoon 
SSB~'s are based on the Kola and they are likely to 
remam based there since this is the only area which 
presently provides access to their Arctic patrol woes. 
As a result all or virtually Russian remaining SSBN's 
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will be based here, increasing the relative importance 
of these bases and the adjacent sea areas. 
5. The overall Russian ICBM force will be cut substan-
tially, reducing its strategic importance in the Russian 
arsenal marginally. 
The aggregate result is that the significance of the systems 
which have an Arctic operational profile will increase after 
START. This will also increase the strategic importance of the 
Arctic area marginally, and particularly in two areas: 
The importance of the Arctic waters as a Russian SSBN 
basing and patrol wne will increase considerably. 
The importance of Arctic airspace for the US strategic 
forces will increase, as will the need for Russian strategic 
air defence in this area. 
The probable develoment is outlined in the table below: 
Pre·START 
%of SNDV Airspace Sea Land % of Arsenal Trend 
us 30% SLBM Patrol 12% Decl. 
90% LRB Transit/laiDich 38% Incr. 
0% ICBM Decl. 
CIS 72% SLBM Patrol Bases 22% !ncr. 
100% LRB Transit FOB 13% !ncr. 
0% ICBM Decl. 
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Notes 
I. Unless otherwise specified all percentage are based on the number 
of warheads of the different weapons system in the US and Soviet 
strategic nuclear arsenal in June 1990, using the START counting 
rules for the maximum permitted real warheads loaclings. The source 
for the data is: The Military Balance 1990..1991, London, IISS, 
October 1990: pp. 212-213, 216-223. 
2. cf: RIES, Tomas: Strategic Implications of Unmanned Airborne 
Vehicles for the Nordic Region. Oslo, IFS, lst. ed., April 1990: pp. 
39-44. 
3. Obviously this only provides a rough estimate of the strategic role 
of the nordic area in the US - Soviet strategic nuclear relationship. 
It is impossible to determine exactly how many strategic bombers 
would operate in a given area since this will fluctuate depending 
upon the scenario. However on the basis of available information it 
is possible to make a rough estimate of the general proportion of 
bombers which would have the nordic and adjacent airspace as a 
major operational area, and this is what the table provides. The 
percentages for the Soviet and US SLBM forces on the other hand 
are fairly reliable since these are actually based in the area. 
4. See for instance (and particulary TRITI'EN): 1991 Joint Military 
Net Assessment. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C., DOD, 
March 1991: pp. 12-7. RIES, Tomas: 'US National Security Strategy 
in the 1990's.' in: Strategic Implications of Unmanned Airborne 
Vehicles for the Nordic Region. Oslo, IFS, lst. ed., April 1990: pp. 
30-35. SNIDER, Don M.: Evolution of a New U.S. Military Strategi. 
Washington, D.C., CSIS, lst. ed., September 1990: p. 45. TRITI'EN, 
James J.: America Promises to Come Back: A New National Security 
Strategi. (NPS-NS-91003A), Monterey, Ca., Naval Postgraduate 
School, Ist. ed., May 1991: p. 153. 
5. cf. RIES, op.cit., pp. 39-44. 
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AF"PENDD'l B. The Russian Military 
In.heri.tam:e 
Russia will remain the only Arctic power amo~g the post-
Soviet states, regardless of whether the C?nfedera~?n manages 
to survive or if the successor states split and ~~~~d~ the ex-
. Soviet military apparatus between thei?-· Th~~ tt ts. tmP?rtant 
to take a closer look at what the Russtan mtlitary trthentance 
is likely to be. 
The future division of the ex-Soviet military assets among the 
ost-Soviet states is presently uncle~. The most orderly 
p rspective would be their joint integratton under the CIS, ~r, 
kling that, their negotiated division among the post -.sovtet 
states in accordance with each of these states plans. Wtth th.e 
failure of the CIS Minsk meeting on 14 February 1992 tt 
ars unlikely that at least the Ukraine will integrate her ~~ices under the aegis of the CIS. This indicates that at least 
one major rift has already emerged, and two s~aller states : 
Moldova and Azerbaijan - also refuse? to mteg~ate thetr 
military with the CIS. Whether or not thts stance will spread 
further is not yet certain, but one must note that ?n 12 
February 1992 - two days before the Minsk CIS meettng .on 
the future of the joint military was to be held - the Russ~an 
military leadership warned that Russia is prepared to establish 
a separate Armed Force if the CIS states . caun?t agree on 
terms of joint military forces. With the parttal fatlure of that 
meeting this threat is becoming more acute. 
In the event that these rifts persist the division of the milit~ry 
assets can either take place through negotiated ~ompromt~e 
agreements or else by each party physically se~kmg to gam 
control of those assets which it desires. Whtch of these 
alternatives will emerge will vary from state to state. The 
clearest confrontation has emerged be~een the two largest 
post-Soviet states, Russia and the Ukraine, both of whom lay 
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claim to some of the miitary assets located in the Ukraine. 
This notably involves the Black Sea fleet. How this and other 
disputes will be settled is not yet clear, but at present it 
appears unlikely that the Ukraine will voluntarily relinquish the 
military assets on her territory, with the exception of nuclear 
weapons. If this attitude persists - and it is by no means 
certain that it will - we may assume that the distribution of 
the military assets will take place on a competitive basis, with 
acquisitions decided by two main factors: 
1. 
2. 
The national affiliation of military personnel. 
The geographic location of military facilities and 
materiel. 
On a general level we may assume that national affiliation 
combined with a desire to maximise living conditions will be 
the deciding factor for the allegiance of military personnel in 
the post-Soviet states. On the one hand a major concern of the 
professional military will be to safeguard the welfare of 
themselves and their families. This will probably lead a 
number to seek employment where it is offered, and could 
lead to a certain flow in military personnel between the post-
Soviet states and out of the area of the former USSR. 
However this option will on the whole be limited to persons 
with specialised skills which are in demand. It would probably 
not extend to the average NCO and officer. The affiliation of 
this majority group would probably be determined by national 
and ethnic factors, with individuals pledging allegiance to their 
national military organisations, and - possibly - individuals 
from other nations being denied positions in the Armed Forces 
of a given nation. 
On the other hand geographic location will be a major 
deciding factor for the distribution of military facilities 
(command centres, bases, depots, etc.) and - with some 
exceptions - equipment. This is because in most cases it is 
difficult to remove fixed military installations or ground 
combat equipment from the territory of the particular nation on 
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which they are located, if they have to be transported overland 
and if the host nation or other nations enroute oppose such a 
move. Exceptions are air units, air mobile units and naval 
units with a blue water capability, which possess a form of 
mobility which makes them independent of ov.erland transi~ 
Here the determining factor will be the allegtance of ~etr 
crews and support personnel (which in the case of mos~ uruts, 
but not all, will be mixed) and the ability to secure their local 
base and logistic requirements until departure. 
National affiliations 
In mid-1991 the personnel of the Soviet Armed Forces 
consisted of an estimated:' 
Generals/ Admirals: 
Officers on active duty: 
Career NCO's: 
Conscripts: 
Total: 
4,000 
400,000 
1,000,000 
2,000,000 
3,400,000 
NB: This excludes the large number of officers and career NCO's 
already dismissed between 1985-1991. 
Of these the most important are the 1,400,000 remaining 
career military personnel, consisting of active duty officers 
and career warrant officers and NCO's. This is so for two 
reasons. The first consists of the dangerous social and political 
impact which the demobilisation of this large body of me!~ 
and their families will cause. All 1,400,000 men and thetr 
families depend upon the Soviet Armed Forces for their 
welfare and security. While the conscripts in most cases have 
a home someplace to return to - and to which they want to 
return - the professional military have nowhere to go outside 
the Armed Forces. They are acutely aware of the fact that 
without any existing social security net the plight of their 
families and themselves will be grave. Thus the unemploy-
ment of the professional military will have a serious political 
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i~~act, ma_d~ particularly dangerous by the fact they have 
military trammg, have access to weapons and, in most cases, 
tend to support traditional authoritarian values. 
!he secon~ re~~on why the career officers and NCO's are 
Important IS military, and consists of the fact that their train-
ing and skills make them the key human element which most 
of the post -Soviet states need in order to construct their new 
n~tion~ Armies.2 However the economic collapse probably 
w~ll dictate that the sum of the post -Soviet national Armies 
will be smaller than that of the Soviet Armed Forces. Thus 
the large number of lower-level career officers and NCO's 
probably will not be particularly sought after. However the 
higher ranking officers and specialists, particularly in key 
management or technological fields, will be vital for the 
national military programmes of the main successor states.' 
The key factors determining the affiliation of these career 
mi~tary personnel and their families will probably be twofold: 
national roots and/or material welfare - based on the desire to 
?'laxim~se ~eir security and living conditions in a society of 
mcreasmg violence and hardship. The determining factors will 
not always be in that order however, since material welfare is 
becoming an increasingly scarce commodity in the former 
USSR. Thus officers and their families could seek to gain 
employment in a foreign nation if they perceive that this 
natton has better living conditions and offers greater security 
of employment. Thus Russian officers have for instance shown 
an ex~me reluctance - including strikes and outright mutiny -
to bemg transferred from relatively comfortable non-Russian 
areas, such as the Baltic states, eastwards. On the other hand 
~a~o~al affiliatio?s play a major part in deciding where an 
mdlVIdual and h1s family are welcome. Thus anti-Russian 
pressure (including extreme violence in the southern and 
central Asian states) in most non-Slavic states is pressing 
seve~al hundreds of ~ousands of Russians to migrate back to 
Rus~1a. As a result It could be difficult for the average ex-
Soviet officer to be accepted in the Armed Forces of another 
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nation than his own. Exceptions to this rule could in some 
cases be specialists with advanced training in certain key 
areas, such as senior General Staff officers or individuals with 
knowledge in advanced technology, particularly nuclear weap-
ons. However they would constitute a minority of the ap-
proximately 1,400,000 active duty officers and career NCO's 
in the former Soviet Armed Forces in 1991. 
Hence the distribution of nationalities in the former Soviet 
military organisation is an important indicator of the future 
distribution of human resources among the Armies of the 
post-Soviet nations. On this basis the three Slavic stat~s -
primarily Russia and secondly the Ukraine and Byeloruss1a -
are particularly well-positioned to receive the bulk of the 
officers and most of the personnel with advanced military 
training: 
I. 
2. 
3. 
Over 95% of the top echelon of Soviet officers are Russians, 
backed up by a small number of Ukrainians and Belorussions. This 
includes: 
- the Stavka of the Supreme High Cormnand, 
- the Supreme High Command, 
- the General Staff, 
- the TVD Commands, 
- the Ministry of Defence, 
- the Military District Conunands. 
75% of the full Soviet officer corps m all levels consists of 
Russians or other Slavs:' 
All key strategic facilities and forces are manned by Russians 
backed up by a smaller number of Ukrainians and Belorussians. 
This includes~ 
- High Q»nmand C3I facilities, 
- Strategic Nuclear Forces (RVSN, PLARB and MAA), 
- VPVO C31 and interceptor forces, 
- Spetsnaz. 
- Special security forces guarding High Command and 
Strategic Nuclear assets. 
Recently the Blavic Bite orientation has been expanded to include 
other key military assets, such as the most advanced vessels of the 
Soviet Navy, which exclude non..Slav nationals from their crews.' 
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4. In addition all the profess' a1 · of 
MVD (OMON) lat ~Its the special forces of th 
are Slavs,7 while the Ukrainians are . e 
numerous amoo.g professimal NCO's and · _specially 
m paratroop umts.1 
Among the . co!Dba.t and support troops at NCO level 
Jx:loedw the distribution of slavic imd other nationals I·s mano d 
mix : re 
I. 
2. 
Amo_ng ground combat forces on the divisional level d bel mos~ officers and NCO's are Slavs wb'l th an ow 
constst of a majorit of SI . , .I e e troops generally 
delib -" Y avs With a m1x of other national A 
crate <aJort was made to avoid havin unilll com ~· ?f non-Slavic nationals. The bulk of th g posed mbrely 
m remote e non-slavs also had to serve 
homeland. areas at a considerable distance from their national 
Non-combat suppon anns g 11 . • 
non-Slavic nationals which n:atf' contai~ eda shght majority of 
units. y are mix to avoid national 
~ this basis we ma~ assume that the distribution of officers 
rom tht: former So:llet Armed Forces to the military of the 
post-Soviet states Will be as follows: 
High Command, Otber SYS + Specialised General Staff Officers VPVO Personell 
Russia Most Most Most Most 
Ukraine sm~e Many Some Many 
Belorussia Some Many Some Many 
Otbers Few Few Few/None Few 
~ this case Russia will receive the bulk of the ~ S . 
High Command and General Staff ffi ormer ov1et d B . o Jeers and the Ukra · 
an yelo~ss1a most or all of the remainder Rem . .me 
offic_ers will be more evenly distributed amo~ the ~mg 
s.lavic states, but with most going to Russia, whil: the rem~ 
=: :~~~ w~~l~~cei;ethproport!o~ately less. Russia wo;d 
the . o e specialist officers and troops f 
Strategic Nuclear Forces and Strategic Air Defence Force~. 
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while the Ukraine and Byelorussia would acquire some and 
the remaining states few or none. The same applies to other 
military personoel with advanced or specialised training, 
though the distribution among the Slavic states might be more 
even. Finally the three slavic states would receive the bulk of 
the elite troops, while the other states would receive some. 
The slavic and particularly Russian affiliation of all the higher 
levels of the former Soviet Armed Forces is reinforced by the 
fact that liviog conditions in western Russia, the Ukraine and 
Byelorussia are generally better than io the other parts of the 
former USSR. Thus there have been mutinies and strikes 
among officers in units with orders reassigoing them to the 
eastern and central Asian parts of the former USSR. Thus the 
lack of facilities for officers and their families being trans-
ferred or demobilised from the western parts of the USSR 
eastwards constitutes one of the main obstacles to the reduc-
tion of the Soviet Armed Forces. The exception to this are the 
three Baltic states, which are considered very attractive by the 
non-Baltic officer corps assigned there. But with these states 
doing everything in their power to expel the Soviet Army 
from their territories it is very difficult to imagine a slavic 
officer obtaining military employment there other than by the 
use of force. 
One factor which could partly offset the predominance of 
officers and military specialist~ among the three Slavic states 
is the paradoxically precisely the large numbers of officers 
from these states which are available. This means that the 
uncertainty and growing unemployment among national of-
ficers in these states could continue. This could induce of-
ficers and technical specialists to hire out their services to the 
armed forces of other nations or organisations on a mercenary 
basis. Such a development is particularly dangerous where 
nuclear techoology is concerned. It is estimated that there are 
some 4,000 nuclear specialists in the Soviet military. However 
such elite groups would be comparatively small, and most of 
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the 1,400,000 ex-Soviet career military would have to seek to 
fend for themselves in their own nations. 
Overall the above data indicate that Russia will be able to call 
upon adequate numbers of nationals trained to manage the 
High Command and all Services of the Anned Forces, includ-
ing all services with an Arctic orientation. This does not mean 
that Russia will do this. That will be a function of her politi-
cal leadership and economic situation. However the basic 
manpower resources will probably be available. 
Geographic distribution of assets 
The next question is how the Soviet military facilities and . 
materiel will be divided among the post -Soviet states. As 
noted above this will probably be detennined by the geo-
graphic location of the assets, with the exception of those 
systems which do not depend upon overland transportation. 
Assuming that forces would be divided according to their 
geographic location - which is by no means certain but for 
many forces a likely option - then the Russian inheritance 
would consist of the forces shown on Table 2. 
As this table indicates Russia would, on the basis of their 
geographic location, receive the bulk of the Strategic Nuclear 
Forces, the Strategic Air Defence Forces and the Navy. In 
summary the Russian share would be: 
Strategic Nuclear Forces:: 
Strategic Air Defence Forces: 
Tactical Nuclear Weapons: 
Ground Forces: 
Navy: 
90% 
85% 
58% 
so 0 58% 
85% 
With respect to the Arctic the key point to note is that Russia 
inherits practically all Arctic- oriented military forces, while 
the general purpose forces designed for ground operations -
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including most of the tactical nuclear weapons - are far_ more 
dispersed. The geographical location of these forces ts ex-
amined closer below. 
SYS - Strategic Nuclear Forces 
There are an estimated 11,400-12,200 strategic nuclear war-
heads in the territories of the fonner Soviet Union.' They are 
presently located in four of the successor states. Their dis-
tribution is shown on Table 3.10 
Table 2. Geographic location of post·Sovlet military. 
""""' 
Brench/Fofell 
svs ICBM 
SSeN 
LAB 
VPVO IAPVO 
ws OA 
FA 
\IMF .....,,,.. 
SSMfASM 
sv SCUD bdes SS-21/FROG-7 bns 
vov ...... 
sv Atrrry lorces 
ws FA 
\IMF 
.......,_.... 
Table 3. Location of post-Soviet strategic nuclear forces. 
SI ID-ICBM Uablle ICBM LRB SSBN 
13 bell8ll 10 basel 
'"""" 
...... 
RUISIB , ..... 
Ukraine , ..... 
--· ·-
, ..... 
Belorus .. • 
, ..... 
Wur-ds' 5,420 
,..,. 
''" 
,,672 
• Accordng to START cou~ng n.dea. 
261 
,.. 
... 
,.. 
.. .. 
'"'" ,. .. 
'"' 
35% 
.... 
,., .. 
75% 
35% 
SO% 
45-70% 
60% 
"" 
.... 
Warheads" 
'·"' 
'·""' 1,150 
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At the time of writing it is reponed that these SYS forces 
remain under the centralised command and control of the 
former Soviet High Command.11 There are also possiblities that 
they will continue to do so under the aegies of the Confedera-
tion of Sovl)reign States - if the Confederation survives. 
President Yeltsin informed President Busb on 8/12-91 that the 
nuclear weapons would be handed 'responsibly'," and Presi-
dent Kravchuk stated on 09/12-91 that the Ukraine wanted to 
share control of the post-Soviet nuclear arsenal with Russia 
and the Ukraine in a 'three-button' system.13 Since then the 
Ukraine has also repeated that it does not intend to become a 
nuclear power, and that it plans to expell all nuclear warheads 
by 1995. However the situation remains uncenain. 
On the basis of geographic location Russia will retain the vast 
bulk of the SYS assets: 
ICBM: 79% 
SSBN: 100% 
LRB: 62 % (90%) 
Russia would also retain the vital central strategic nuclear C3I 
system. In addition to this the long range bombers of the 
MAA can be flown to bases in Russia. This would depend 
upon the affiliation of their crews and suppon personnel 
which, as noted earlier, are predominantly Slavic, with a 
majority of Russians. Thus we may assume that the bulk of 
the LRB would end up in Russia, possibly with a small pan 
of the force remaining in the Ukraine. In addition, and this is 
vital, Russia would also retain control of the SYS C3I system 
and its central command network and personnel, without which 
it would be extremely difficult or impossible to target and 
launch the SYS forces, but with which Russia would retain a 
fuoctioning global nuclear capability.' 
This is not the case for the silo-based and land-mobile 
ICBM' s however, which cannot easily be transponed from the 
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other states to Russia, especially if such an effon were 
opposed. Present indications are _that nei~er ~azh~an, !be 
Ukraine nor Byelorussia automatically will relinqmsb control 
of these weapons. However here one should note that !his in 
itself would not detract from Russia's military presence in the 
Arctic, since the ICBM never had an Arctic operational 
profile. 
On this basis, and assuming all other factors are equal, Russia 
would still retain the SYS C3I network and the bulk of the 
SYS forces, and all of those which have an Arcti~ orientation 
(SSBN's and LRB). This means that under scenanos 1. ~d 2. 
(maintaining a Conferedate Military System or the ~rea~~ of 
an independent Russian Military Force) the bas1c m1lit~ 
elements necessary to maintain the Soviet military presence m 
the Arctic will remain in place. 
Under scenario 3. - the chaotic breakUp of Russia - !be 
centralised command structure and specialised suppon system 
could permit pan of the sys~m to rem~ operational as .I~ng 
as sufficient personnel remamed committed and the remauung 
launch platforms could be serviced. However depending upon 
the state of chaos such a vestigial system would have to 
collapse at ·some point. From then on it is unlikely tha! anyo~e 
not part of the SYS system actuall~ could. do an~mg With 
the missiles or bombs even if they d1d obtam physiCal con~! 
over them. They cannot be launched in isolation, dismantlmg 
them would be extremely difficult, and it is estimated that 
without maintenance the ICBM/SLBM systems would be 
unusable after two weeks.14 
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VPVO - Strategic Air Defence Forces 
The geographic distribution of the IAPVO strategic interceptor 
airbases is heavily concentrated in Russia, but with smaller 
numbers of bases split among most post-Soviet states: 
lA VPO Bases" 
Russia 46 
Ukraine 8 
Belorussia 3 
Estonia 3 
Latvia 1 
Lithuania 
Moldavla 
Georgia 2 
Armenia 
Azerbaijan I 
Kazhakstan 1 
Uzbeklstan 1 
Turkmenlstan 2 
Tadjlklstan 
Klrghizistan 
However as noted earlier the geographic location of the air 
units is unlikely to determine their national affiliation due to 
their ability rapidly for rapid unopposed redeployment Thus 
the key factor here will probably be the national affiliation of 
their crews and support personnel. As noted earlier these elite 
units are primarily manned with slavic nationals, and it would 
be extremely unlikely that crews or units would transfer their 
allegiance to any of the smaller southern or central Asian 
nations. This reluctance would be reinforced by the extreme 
poverty and violent anti-slavic sentiments of the local popula-
tion. However some units could well declare themselves under 
Ukrainian or Byelorussian command, while most would 
probably place themselves under Russia and/or the central 
military authorities in Moscow. Thus Russia is likely to , 
maintain the largest post-Soviet IAPVO force. 
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Assuming the Ukraine and Byelorussia n;tained. the IAPVO 
units based on their soil and that Russ1a retamed all the 
remaining forces, the distribution would be as follows: 
Russia: 
Ukraine: 
Byelorussia: 
84% 
12% 
4% 
In this respect it is important to note that the Kola Peninsula 
and the Russian Arctic coastline in gene~ pos~e~~es a num?er 
of reserve airbases and forward operating facilities to which 
IAPVO aircraft - and possibly crews and their f~ilies : ~ould 
be transferred. These bases are also located m pobtically 
tranquil areas, which would als~ increase their attractiveness 
as basing or storage areas. Th1s could lead to a boost . of 
IAPVO materiel and possibly active units along the Rus.slan 
Arctic coastline. One should also note that an undete_rmmed 
number of nuclear warheads exist for part of the approximately 
8,000 VPVO SAM missiles. 
Whether or not the IAPVO interceptors wo~ld ~till be direc~ 
towards Arctic operations - and could mam!run an effec?~e 
Arctic operational capability - is a function o~ Russ1~ s 
political and economic development. Under a ~gune wh!ch 
prioritised the economic reconstruction of Russ!a ar~;d wh1ch 
sought to cooperate with the US and th~ west m thi_s eff?rt, 
the costly - and in this case absurd - Arcnc IA~VO o~entation 
could be cut back sharply. However if the R~ss1an regtme held 
a basically hostile attitude towards the. outs1de w~rld then the 
IAPVO Arctic profile could be maintatned, even 1f. at a lower 
level due to economic limitations. This would particularly be 
the case if the Russian regime used her global nuclear 
capability as an instrument of domestic and foreign policy. 
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Tactical Nuclear WeapoiLI' 
There are an estimated 15,000 tactical nuclear warheads in the 
territories of the fanner Soviet Union." They are presently 
dispersed over all of the fifteen post-Soviet successor states: 
Warheads11 
Russia 8,525 
Ukraine 2,605 
Belorussla 1, 120 
Estonia 270 
Latvia i85 
Lithuania 325 
Moidavla 90 
Georgia 320 
Annenla 195 
Azerbaijan 295 
Kazhakstan 650 
Uzbeldslan 105 
Turkmenistan 125 
Tadjikistan 75 
Klrghizlslan 75 
Total: i4,960 
On this basis 57 % of the post-Soviet tactical nuclear war-
heads are located in Russia. These warheads are operated by 
three Services of the ex-Soviet military: 
Service 
Air Force 
Navy 
Ground force.s 
Branch/weapons type 
Theatre Bmtber Annies ASM and bombs 
Franal Aviation units ASM and bombs 
Submarine and surface ship SSM and torpedoes 
MA ASM, 
Coastal Defence SSM battalions 
Mines, depth charges, etc. 
SCUD brigades 
SS-2i!FROG· 7 hdesftms 
Artillery rounds 
Mines, etc. 
The VVS DA medium-range and FA short-range bomber units 
possess the same airborne mobility as the strategic bombers, 
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and hence could relatively easily be transferred between 
successor states. Their choice would depend upon the al-
legiance of their crews. In the DA these are primarily slavic, 
and hence would probably support one of the three slavic 
states and/or the central military authorities. At present all DA 
medium-range bomber bases are also located in one of the 
three slavic states:" 
Russia 6 
Ukraine6 
Byelorussia 
(35 %) 
(35 %) 
5 (30 %) 
The future allegiance of these units amongst these three states 
is unclear, but considering their ~lite nature we may assume 
a high level of loyalty to the central military authorities - for 
the time being. However this may weaken if there arises a 
split between the three slavic states. 
The FA short-range bomber units are dispersed over a far 
greater number of successor states with personnel from a 
greater number of nationalities: 
State FA nuclear capable aircraft 
Russia 850 
Ukraine 385 
Belorussia i80 
Estonia+ 
Latvia + 180 
"Lithuania 
Georgia+ 
Azerbaijan 120 
Kazhakstan 220 
The allegiance of these units is less certain, except that they 
contain a predominant number of slavic nationals. Thus the 
bulk of the crews would probably support Russia, the Ukraioe 
or Byelorussia, though it is not impossible that some units, 
and particularly individual pilots within units, would deliver 
their aircraft to the military forces of other nations if it came 
to a split. However this would probably only involve a smaller 
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number of pilots. An estimated post-split distribution of FA 
nuclear capable aircraft is: 
Russia: 1,070 55 % 
Ukraine: 565 29 % 
Byelorussia: 300 15 % 
Here one should note however that it is possible that the 
nuclear weapons depots for these aircraft are more centralised 
and guarded by troops with a stronger allegiance to the central 
authorities. However if they are dispersed among the successor 
states it could be difficult to prevent their weapons from 
falling into the hands of the national authorities or if the 
situation became sufficiently chaotic, into the h~ds of 
organised crime or terrorists. Whether these could acquire the 
know-how, maintenance and delivery vehicles to use them is 
less certain. However given the relatively large number of 
personnel trained for these tactical nuclear systems, and given 
the desperate need for money, it is by no means impossible. 
The VMF theatre and tactical nuclear weapons constitute the 
second major category of non-strategic nuclear weapons. Their 
basing is examined in .more detail in Appendix 1., but 
basically they are located in the only two successor states with 
access to the oceans, Russia and the Ukraine. However three 
of the ex-Soviet Navy's four fleets are based in Russia, and 
she retains the vast majority of nuclear capable naval units: 
Slate 
Russia 
Ukraine 
• 
•• 
Nuclear capable unlb * 
375 
136 
13% •• 
27 'To 
Submarines, surface ships, MA aircraft, Coastal Defence 
GLCM battalions. 
This percentage is based m the number of units listed 
above. It would be even higher if launch ramps were 
counted, since the Russian Northern Fleet and Pacific 
Fleet arc supplied with virtually all of the modem 
s~arines, surface ships and strike aircraft. 
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The final main category of tactical nuclear weapons consist of 
the ex-Soviet Army ground-launched missiles and artillery 
rounds with a nuclear capability. These are the most widely 
dispersed nuclear forces in the post-Soviet area: 
Slate 
Russia 
Ukraine 
·aeiorussia 
Moldavia 
Estonia+ 
Latvia + 
Lithuania 
Georgia+ 
Annenia.+ 
Azerbaijan 
K.azhakstan 
SCUD bdes 
13 
12 
5 
3 
4 
SS-21/FROG· 7 bns 
57 
19 
9 
2 
7 
10 
12 
These ground-launched tactical nuclear weapons are the most 
prone to proliferation among the post-Soviet successor states. 
This is so for two basic reasons: 
1. In the first place because they are the most readily avail-
able. Open sources provide little information about the 
security of the ex-Soviet theatre and tactical nuclear 
warheads. However four factors indicate that they would 
be relatively less well-guarded than the strategic nuclear 
forces: 
- the large number and variety of tactical 
warheads, 
- the dispersed distribution of units with the 
weapons· systems for which these warheads are 
designed, 
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- the general laxity and carelessness of Soviet 
procedures, which has increased dramatically since 
the Soviet collapse began in the late 1980's, 
- the greater mix of nationalities in units with 
tactical nuclear weapons and in their surrounding 
units. 
In addition to this the ground launched weapons are 
difficult to transport from one area to another, especially 
if the transit is opposed. 
2. Secondly because they are the most attractive to the 
users. They are among the few nuclear weapons which 
could actually be used on a local level, either for 
blackmail, deterrence, terror or in practice: 
- They are robust and relatively easy to maintain 
and use since they have been designed for tactical 
operations on a decentralised basis. 
- A relatively greater number of individuals have 
been trained on these weapons, increasing the 
chance of recruiting personnel which can maintain 
and use them. 
- Their limited range and yield make them usable 
in regional or local politics or conflicts. These are 
the most likely issues which will preoccupy the 
successor states leadership in the coming years. 
As a result it is like! y that proliferation of tactical nuclear 
weapons will take place amongst the various groupings in the 
former Soviet Union. Recipients of these weapons would 
primarily consist of the new successor states but coud also, 
because of the dispersion and large number of tactical nuclear 
weapons combined with the increasing chaos and poverty, 
include the large criminal organisations or small ethnic, 
terrorist or criminal groups. 
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Th future of the ground-launched tactical nuclear forces 
p:Sents the single greatest danger arising out of the breakup 
of the Soviet Union, far overshadowing the problem presented 
by the strategic nuclear weapons. 
271 
Notes 
1. These figures are based on a combination of the following two 
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equipment, will have to acquire the expertise and know-how of the 
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know-how of lower ranking ex-Soviet military personnel to maintain 
basic combat equipment, such as APC's, tanks, aircraft and so on. 
3. In this context one should also note that the highest levels of the 
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